Ragan v. City of Hawthorne

Citations: 212 Cal. App. 3d 1361; 261 Cal. Rptr. 219; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 816Docket: B038098

Court: California Court of Appeal; August 8, 1989; California; State Appellate Court

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Pamela Ragan, a former police officer for the City of Hawthorne, was denied an industrial disability pension by the city manager without an evidentiary hearing. Three years later, she sought a writ of mandate from the superior court to compel the city manager to conduct the required hearing. The trial court denied her petition as untimely, citing a 30-day statute of limitations under Government Code section 11523 and the doctrine of laches. 

The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, determining that section 11523 did not apply because it pertains to judicial review after an agency hearing, which the City had not provided. Instead, the applicable statute of limitations was found to be three years for a statutory liability. The court noted that while laches could deny a petition even within the statute of limitations, there was no substantial evidence of prejudice to the City, leading to the reversal and direction to grant Ragan's petition.

The case highlighted the rights under the Public Employees' Retirement Law, where incapacitated local safety members are entitled to disability retirement. The determination of incapacity is delegated to the city manager by the city council, but the court established that an evidentiary hearing is required under the Administrative Procedure Act to address the employee's vested rights to disability benefits.

PERS, governed by statutory law, requires the city to conduct an evidentiary hearing when determining a police officer's disability status. In this case, the city manager denied Pamela Ragan's disability retirement application without such a hearing, stating she was not incapacitated. Both PERS and the city failed to inform Ragan or her attorney about appeal procedures following this denial. Ragan's attorney later inquired about the status of the application and was told it was resolved in 1985 without a timely appeal. Citing various legal precedents, the attorney argued for a hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or due process. The city maintained the matter was closed and did not respond to subsequent requests for a hearing. 

The trial court incorrectly applied the 30-day statute of limitations from Government Code section 11523, which pertains specifically to cases involving formal agency hearings, not to Ragan’s situation where no hearing occurred.

The appellant seeks to compel the City to conduct a hearing, but section 11523 of the Government Code is not applicable at this stage, as it pertains specifically to adjudicatory hearings governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Such hearings involve formal procedures, including testimony under oath, cross-examination, representation rights, and the issuance of a formal decision, detailed in various subsections of the law. Section 11523 allows for judicial review through a petition for a writ of mandate, with a 30-day filing limit post-reconsideration. However, the appellant is not seeking to review an existing hearing but to mandate one, thus there is no administrative record to review.

The case cited, Garner v. City of Riverside, involved a different procedural context where a hearing had already occurred, and the employee sought to challenge the findings after the statutory period had lapsed. In contrast, the appellant's situation does not fit the circumstances outlined in Garner, as no hearing has taken place. Therefore, section 11523 does not apply because the necessary hearing has not been conducted. The applicable statute of limitations for a writ of mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 is contingent on the specific obligation being enforced, necessitating the identification of an alternative limitation period in this case.

Appellant is seeking to enforce her statutory right to a pension and the right to a hearing, contending that the City, as a delegate of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or that the denial of her pension violates constitutional due process. The statute of limitations for actions based on statutory liabilities is three years, as specified in Code of Civil Procedure § 338, subd. a. Appellant filed her petition within this timeframe, countering the respondent's argument for a one-year limitation based on personal injury claims under Code of Civil Procedure § 340, subd. 3. Respondent attempted to recast the case as a federal civil rights issue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this characterization was rejected since appellant's action is grounded in statutory obligations.

The trial court also cited laches as a basis for denying the petition. However, to establish laches, there must be both an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and demonstrable prejudice to the defendant, which was not shown in this case. The respondent did not claim prejudice in the trial court and the court's own concerns about delay were not supported by evidence of prejudice. Consequently, the judgment denying the writ of mandate is reversed, and the trial court is directed to issue a writ compelling the City to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the pension application. Appellant is awarded costs on appeal. The three-year delay in proceedings is explained by the City’s lack of communication regarding appeal procedures and the subsequent actions taken by appellant's attorney once aware of the pension denial.