Sanford v. State

Citations: 25 S.W.3d 414; 342 Ark. 22; 2000 Ark. LEXIS 387Docket: CR 99-1057

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; September 14, 2000; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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Damond Sanford was convicted of capital murder, residential burglary, rape, and theft, receiving a death sentence. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, Sanford filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, William Howard. The trial court denied the petition, prompting Sanford to appeal and present eight arguments for reversal.

The court referenced the standard established in Strickland v. Washington for assessing claims of ineffective counsel, which comprises two components: (1) the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the defendant must show that this deficiency caused actual prejudice, depriving him of a fair trial.

Sanford's first argument challenged the trial court's finding that Howard was not ineffective for failing to suppress Sanford's custodial statement, which he argued was obtained following an illegal arrest. Sanford noted that he was arrested without probable cause on the day of the murder and subsequently confessed two days later. The trial court determined that probable cause existed for his arrest based on information regarding Sanford possessing a gun owned by the murder victim. However, the court concluded that Sanford failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice resulting from the alleged illegal arrest and confession, consistent with the requirement that a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice due to attorney errors.

Sanford acknowledges that even without his confession, his sister Earlene's testimony, which included Sanford admitting to killing Minnie Ward and threatening Earlene and her children, would still support his conviction. He concedes that the absence of his written confession may not have changed the outcome concerning his conviction but argues it could have affected his sentencing to death. However, he fails to provide substantial evidence for this claim, which has been deemed insufficient for postconviction relief as established in Sasser v. State. 

Sanford claims ineffective assistance from trial counsel Howard for not communicating a life without parole plea offer. This claim relies on conflicting testimonies; Howard asserts he conveyed the offer, while Sanford and his family deny it. The trial court found Howard’s testimony more credible and noted his efforts to negotiate a better deal were consistent with his account. The court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in this assessment. Additionally, Sanford did not assert he would have accepted the life sentence if offered, which is necessary to demonstrate prejudice in seeking postconviction relief, as per Rasmussen v. State.

Sanford further argues that Howard was ineffective for failing to call medical examiners to testify about the victim's time of death, which relates to the rape charge. However, any challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for the rape conviction cannot be raised in this postconviction context, as established in O'Rourke v. State. He also claims Howard failed to object to improper rebuttal testimony, but such claims are not grounds for postconviction relief according to Nooner v. State. 

At trial, Sanford implicated Mingo Kennedy as the actual murderer, stating that Kennedy threatened him with a gun and forced him to participate in the crime.

David Palmer, a state witness, provided rebuttal testimony against Sanford, asserting he saw what appeared to be a gun in Sanford’s pocket on the day of Ward's murder and noted that Sanford and Kennedy interacted normally. This rebuttal was deemed appropriate, and Sanford's counsel, Howard, was not ineffective for not objecting to its admission. The court referenced Monts v. State, indicating that counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise meritless arguments. 

Sanford also claimed that Howard should have objected to prosecutor remarks suggesting the defense did not prove Sanford's mental retardation; however, the trial court recognized a factual dispute regarding Sanford's IQ, with scores of 67 and 75 presented, making it appropriate for the jury to decide. Sanford's claim regarding the jury's finding of no mitigating circumstances was similarly dismissed; the court noted that such determinations are factual findings made by the jury.

In his seventh argument, Sanford contended that Howard was ineffective for not asserting that his mental status met the definition of mental retardation, which would violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Although Sanford acknowledged this issue was not raised at trial, he cited Bowen v. State to argue for its consideration on appeal. However, the court found that Sanford did not demonstrate a conclusive right to relief under Rule 37 regarding this claim. The court noted that while Sanford's expert reported an IQ of 67, the State's evidence indicated an IQ of 75, which is classified as borderline. Act 420 of 1993 establishes a presumption of mental retardation at an IQ of 65 or below, but Sanford did not challenge the constitutionality of this statute. The court concluded that the jury appropriately considered all evidence related to the mental retardation issue, and therefore, Sanford’s claim of ineffective assistance was rejected.

Sanford argues that his counsel, Howard, was ineffective during the penalty phase by failing to present crucial mitigating evidence, including Sanford's school records indicating long-standing mental retardation, medical history, family background, and positive jail records. The Supreme Court case Williams v. Taylor established that a trial counsel's failure to investigate and present significant mitigating evidence in capital cases can amount to ineffective assistance. In Williams, despite being sentenced to death based on a perceived future dangerousness, the trial judge later found that the failure to present mitigating evidence violated Williams' right to effective counsel. The federal district court identified multiple categories of omitted evidence that could have altered the sentencing outcome, but this decision was initially overturned by the Fourth Circuit and then reversed by the Supreme Court, which emphasized the necessity of thorough background investigation by counsel. The Supreme Court noted that the omitted evidence included severe childhood abuse and commendable actions taken by Williams in prison, which could have influenced the jury's perception of his moral culpability. Additionally, cases from the Eighth Circuit, such as Hill v. Lockhart and Pickens v. Lockhart, reaffirm the principle that failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court emphasized that failing to investigate all potential defenses, particularly in a mitigation case, constitutes a "total abdication of duty" and is not acceptable as trial strategy, especially given the high stakes involved in capital cases. In Hill, the Eighth Circuit found ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to obtain medical and psychiatric records that would have highlighted the defendant's long-term mental illness and positive response to treatment, which could have influenced the jury's perception of mitigating factors. In the current case, attorney Howard acknowledged minimal effort in presenting mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, attributing this to disappointment in the jury's guilty verdicts and his fatigue. Despite being aware of the prosecution's portrayal of Sanford as remorseless, Howard did not counter this narrative effectively. He indicated intentions to request a specific capital murder mitigation instruction but failed to prepare adequately, relying solely on the testimony of Sanford's parents, which provided limited context. Howard neglected to seek crucial records related to Sanford's educational and medical history, despite having resources available, including a social worker. Evidence existed that could have demonstrated Sanford's mental challenges and family background that might elicit sympathy, but Howard's focus remained primarily on the guilt phase of the trial, leading to a lack of thorough investigation for mitigative proof.

Counsel's primary responsibility during the penalty phase of a capital trial is to mitigate the aggravating circumstances presented by the State and to provide mitigating evidence. According to Parker v. Bowersox, a lawyer must conduct a thorough investigation into all mitigating factors before making strategic decisions about evidence presentation. The Pickens case emphasizes that a lawyer’s role includes actively raising mitigating factors based on comprehensive information rather than emotional appeals or unverified statements from the defendant. Relevant considerations include the defendant's background, education, employment history, mental health, and family dynamics, as well as circumstances surrounding the offense. Attorney Howard's lack of investigation resulted in the jury not being presented with significant mitigating evidence, creating a reasonable probability that the sentencing outcome would have differed with competent representation. Consequently, the decision affirms in part and reverses and remands for resentencing. Additional notes indicate that Sanford's parents would have advised him to accept a plea deal, Howard's limited experience with capital cases, and the prosecutor's expectation that the jury would not impose the death penalty in this jurisdiction.