Morehouse v. Taubman Co.

Citations: 5 Cal. App. 3d 548; 85 Cal. Rptr. 308; 35 Cal. Comp. Cases 695; 1970 Cal. App. LEXIS 1463Docket: Civ. 25750

Court: California Court of Appeal; March 18, 1970; California; State Appellate Court

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John Morehouse was awarded $62,763 for serious personal injuries sustained at the Southland shopping center construction site, leading to Taubman Company, Inc.'s appeal. The case centered on Taubman's duty of care to Morehouse, who was working as a laborer on the site. On May 4, 1964, while pouring concrete, Morehouse fell from a 10-foot wall lacking required safety railings, suffering injuries when a concrete buggy, operated by Taubman employee Xavier Wanzo, lurched and caused him to fall. The jury had to resolve conflicting evidence regarding the wall's height and the circumstances of the accident. Taubman, as the general contractor, argued its liability was limited to specific Labor Code provisions and that the jury should not have considered general tort principles. However, the court found that Morehouse's situation warranted a broader consideration of duty. Taubman subcontracted concrete work to Conco, where Morehouse was employed, while Wanzo worked for Taubman but was assigned to Conco on that day. The appeal did not challenge the injuries or the awarded amount but focused on Taubman's legal relationship to Morehouse.

Taubman supplied concrete through Conco and directed its pouring, including the necessary grades for elevation and cambers. Taubman’s representatives, Schirrmacher and Drinkward, specified the concrete pour locations and quantities. Taubman's carpenters constructed the forms for the cement slab, built the wall supporting Morehouse, and were responsible for excavation and backfilling. The contract with Conco allowed Taubman to mandate overtime and dismiss employees deemed unfit. Taubman employed carpenters who installed guardrails and safety devices, with a policy to install guardrails around slab edges over 10 feet high. Although evidence of guardrail installation by Taubman's carpenters at the site of Morehouse's injury was inadmissible for proving negligence, it was relevant to determining control of the premises and safety duty under the contract. Taubman’s duties are not solely defined by negligence doctrines relating to employment but also involve liability for injuries due to failure to ensure safety precautions when hiring independent contractors, as established in legal precedents including Baldwin Contracting Co. v. Winston Steel Works, Inc. and Van Arsdale v. Hollinger. The liability of a premises owner does not equate to that of an "employer" under the Labor Code if they only exercise general oversight, as clarified in Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp., which emphasized that such an owner is not responsible for ensuring compliance with safety measures by independent contractors.

In Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds, the California Supreme Court established that property owners may be liable for injuries if their employees are aware of work being conducted under conditions that pose an unreasonable risk of harm without necessary precautions being taken. This liability is rooted in the Restatement Second of Torts, section 413, which emphasizes that this rule does not pertain to general negligence anticipations but specifically addresses identifiable dangers inherent in the work. The ruling clarifies that even if a contract assigns safety responsibilities to a contractor, the property owner may still be liable under section 416 if they retain control over the work and fail to exercise reasonable care. Specifically, if a principal contractor oversees subcontractors, they are liable for failing to prevent unreasonable dangers if they know or should know of such conditions and have the ability to intervene. Additionally, a general contractor can be held liable for injuries to subcontractor employees if they neglect to ensure that necessary safety precautions are taken, even if those precautions were contractually assigned to the subcontractor. In this case, evidence indicated that Taubman was aware of the dangers, and despite contractual obligations on Conco to provide safeguards, Taubman could not be absolved of responsibility due to their knowledge of the situation and the ongoing work conditions.

Taubman had a nondelegable duty to provide safety safeguards under its contract, evidenced by its active involvement in overseeing subcontractors. This duty classifies Taubman as an "employer" under Labor Code section 6304, which entails responsibility for safety obligations and compliance with specific safety orders. Evidence supported the jury's determination that Taubman fell under the statutory definition of an employer, making it subject to safety regulations and common law duties to ensure a safe workplace for subcontractor employees. The jury was correctly instructed on these responsibilities, and no prejudicial errors were found in the instructions, as the principles had been properly presented and previously acknowledged without objection. The argument that any contractual provisions between Taubman and its subcontractor could absolve Taubman of liability was dismissed, as such duties are legally nondelegable, and violations constitute negligence per se. The absence of a tendered instruction by the appellant further invalidated claims of error in jury instructions. Additionally, the trial court's focus on Taubman's legal obligations regarding workplace safety was consistent with the issues outlined in the pretrial conference.

The court maintained that the issue at hand remained pertinent and was not abandoned. The plaintiff's decision to pursue claims under Labor Code provisions, rather than through an invitor-invitee framework, did not alter the core issue. The court concluded that the instructions provided were not prejudicially erroneous, as the duties defined by common law and Labor Code sections exhibited overlap. The possessor of premises holds a duty of care towards individuals on their property, with status being a single factor among many.

The trial court is obligated to issue instructions based on a party's reasonable theories if supported by evidence, but it can also include instructions on any evidence-supported theory, regardless of alignment with a party's argument. The appellant did not demonstrate that they faced unexpected issues needing additional evidence, nor was any issue withdrawn from the case. The plaintiff's instructions referenced relevant case law, and any claim of surprise due to a change in theory could have been addressed by a motion to reopen the defense.

The denial of a new trial motion negated the appellant's arguments about potential jury verdict changes stemming from the instructions. The instructions, when viewed collectively, sufficiently addressed liability linked to the appellant's status under the Labor Code. The appellant accused opposing counsel of misconduct but failed to raise these concerns adequately at trial; consequently, the court viewed the misconduct claims as waived. Of the cited instances of alleged misconduct, only a few objections were made, and the appellant did not request jury admonishments regarding these comments, further supporting the waiver.

An admonition is unlikely to mitigate any adverse effect in the case at hand, as established by precedent cases Marcus v. Palm Harbor Hospital, Inc. and Ahrentzen v. Westburg. The trial judge, present during the proceedings, found no prejudice against the defendant, a view echoed by the reviewing court. The order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed, and the appeal regarding the nonappealable order for a new trial is dismissed as per Code Civ. Proc. 904.1. The judgment is affirmed, along with the March 3, 1967 order taxing costs against the defendant. 

The document also references specific Construction Safety Orders, outlining safety requirements for scaffolds, railings, and work conditions at elevations of ten feet or more. Key provisions include ensuring the safety of workers, requiring railings on scaffolds and elevated platforms, and defining safety standards for openings and passageways. Specific definitions related to platforms, ramps, runways, and scaffolds are provided, along with standards for the construction and maintenance of railings, which must meet specified height and material criteria. All safety measures must remain in place until permanent protections are implemented.

Safeguards, safety devices, and safety appliances must remain in place as long as hazards exist, except during repairs or adjustments, for which adequate substitute precautions must be implemented. The case of Conner v. Utah Constr. Min. Co. was referenced, highlighting the relevance of safety laws. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's proposed instruction 37 based on Johnson v. A. Schilling Co., as it pertained to an invitor-invitee relationship. The court instructed that if Taubman Company is not considered the plaintiff's employer, safety laws do not apply to its duties towards the plaintiff. However, the jury could still evaluate whether Taubman was negligent or had assumed duties related to safety, such as installing guardrails or ensuring a safe work environment. The court clarified that specific code sections and safety orders apply to relationships outside the traditional employer-employee framework, including those between general contractors and subcontractor employees. The court emphasized that both contracts and codes govern their respective areas and instructed the jury on their application. Ultimately, if Taubman is determined not to be the plaintiff's employer, it does not absolve them of potential negligence or contractual duties regarding safety.