Miro v. Superior Court

Citations: 5 Cal. App. 3d 87; 84 Cal. Rptr. 874; 1970 Cal. App. LEXIS 1418Docket: Civ. 9893

Court: California Court of Appeal; March 5, 1970; California; State Appellate Court

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Petitioners Samuel Miro and others seek a writ of mandate to annul an order of immediate possession issued by the Superior Court of San Bernardino County regarding an eminent domain action initiated by the City of Rialto to condemn property for airport purposes. The central issue addresses whether California's constitutional and procedural statutes authorize immediate possession for property designated for airport use. The court determined that immediate possession does not extend to such property, thus ordering the annulment of the immediate possession order.

The Miros previously owned an 80-acre parcel adjacent to Linden Avenue in Rialto. In April 1966, they granted the city an option to purchase 58 acres for airport development, retaining about 22 acres. The option included a clause ensuring continued access to their retained land via Linden Avenue, regardless of future rerouting. In June 1966, the city exercised this option through a third party, but the deed executed did not include the access provisions from the option agreement.

In November 1968, the city council vacated a section of Linden Avenue adjacent to the airport, prompting the Miros to file a lawsuit to reform the deed to include the access terms and prevent the road's closure. The Miros won this suit, resulting in a court judgment prohibiting the city from closing Linden Avenue without constructing an underpass.

In June 1969, the city began eminent domain proceedings to condemn a strip of Linden Avenue by claiming ownership through the earlier resolution and describing the Miros' interest as merely a right of access. Upon initiating the action, the city secured an order of immediate possession. The Miros, in their response, not only assessed the value of the land taken but also alleged that the city's actions were an attempt to bypass the previous court's injunction against closing Linden Avenue, arguing that the condemnation was not for public use.

The Miros filed a motion to quash an order of immediate possession related to an eminent domain action, which was denied, prompting them to petition for a writ of mandate. The appellate court is reviewing whether the respondent court had the authority to issue the order. Jurisdiction for such orders in eminent domain cases can be assessed in original proceedings, supported by various California case law. The authority for a superior court to grant immediate possession is derived from section 14 of the California Constitution and implemented through sections 1243.4 to 1243.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions allow municipal corporations to take immediate possession for public use, given that just compensation is provided. 

The Miros acknowledge that their property rights can be taken for municipal airport purposes with compensation, although the exact nature of their interest in the Linden Avenue property is unclear. Their rights may originate from an option agreement or a private easement linked to their retained land. Legal precedents establish that the government cannot significantly impair reserved rights in dedicated lands without just compensation.

Rights may be taken for public use with just compensation. Abutting property owners' access rights cannot be substantially impaired without compensation, yet such rights can be taken via eminent domain. The Miros argue that the city's actions are an attempt to bypass a prior judgment and claim the taking is not for public use, thus challenging the authority for immediate possession. However, it is established that the property is being taken for a municipal airport, which is a valid public use. To contest public use, a condemnee must demonstrate fraud or bad faith by the condemnor, which the Miros did not do; their challenge pertains to necessity, which is conclusively determined by the city council. The Miros also argue that immediate possession is invalid because their interest is not a 'right of way,' but this is unfounded. Immediate possession is determined by the public use for which property is taken, not the nature of the property interest. The argument that immediate possession is limited to 'right of way' interests lacks support. The critical question is whether airport purposes qualify as a 'right of way' under relevant California law, a matter previously addressed by the District Court of Appeal, though the Supreme Court had not yet issued a decision before the appeal was dismissed.

The transfer of the case to the Supreme Court nullified the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, rendering it ineffective as precedent. This situation requires the matter to be considered as a first impression, analyzed de novo. The term 'right of way' in section 14 has not been clearly defined by the Legislature, nor have the uses it encompasses been enumerated. Traditionally, 'right of way' refers to the privilege to pass over another's land, but it has also been interpreted to include the land itself for specific purposes. The analysis must consider the broader intent of the constitutional provision, as illustrated by arguments presented to voters in support of amendments related to immediate possession for public purposes. Amendments to section 14, approved in 1918 and 1934, established the right for sovereign entities to take immediate possession of land necessary for rights of way upon depositing compensation with the court. This policy aims to prevent property owners from delaying essential public infrastructure projects by exploiting compensation rules.

Sovereign agencies are recognized as entitled to obtain necessary property, prompting the allowance of immediate possession to prevent delays in construction and development, particularly for water resource conservation and reservoir sites. The history of the immediate possession provision in section 14 illustrates that voters intended for immediate possession to apply to rights of way, such as roads and canals, which require extensive land strips. This aligns with the legislative definition of a right of way, necessitating a detailed map with the complaint in eminent domain actions, as outlined in subdivision 4 of section 1244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the intention behind this provision does not extend to land sought for general airport purposes, nor does it categorize such condemnation as a right of way. The principles established in this case would equally apply to larger land condemnations for intercontinental airports. While the absence of commercial airports in 1918 does not negate their classification as a right of way, a proposed 1957 constitutional amendment sought to explicitly grant immediate possession for airport and school land condemnations, indicating legislative intent to address delays in acquiring necessary land for such purposes. The amendment aimed to facilitate timely airport construction to support the state's air transportation growth.

The proposed amendment to authorize immediate possession of land for airport purposes was rejected, with 1,277,452 votes in favor and 2,847,379 against. The proposal's submission indicated that existing provisions of section 14 do not allow for such immediate possession. Legislative interpretations hold persuasive significance when constitutional provisions are open to multiple reasonable interpretations. The California Law Revision Commission acknowledged the restrictive nature of section 14 regarding immediate possession and recommended revisions in 1961, emphasizing the need for legislative flexibility in determining which agencies can exercise this power for various public projects. The current interpretation concludes that neither section 14 of article I nor section 1243.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits immediate possession of land for general airport purposes. A peremptory writ of mandate was issued to vacate the order of immediate possession. Additional context includes a pending eminent domain action by the city for more land, the historical context of immediate possession provisions, and judicial precedents indicating that airport purposes do not equate to a 'right of way.' The extent of legislative power over immediate possession remains undecided.