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In Re Marriage of Osborne

Citations: 763 N.E.2d 855; 327 Ill. App. 3d 249; 261 Ill. Dec. 606; 2002 Ill. App. LEXIS 48Docket: 3-01-0252

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; January 23, 2002; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Niky and Robert Osborne divorced on August 31, 1979, with their marital settlement agreement designating Niky as the irrevocable beneficiary of six life insurance policies, for which Robert was responsible for paying premiums. Robert later filed a petition to terminate his obligation to maintain these policies, arguing that since their children were over 22 and no longer needed support, the policies were unnecessary. He claimed that the premiums, particularly for the Occidental policy, were significantly increasing and burdensome.

The court denied Robert's petition, affirming that the agreement clearly designated Niky as the irrevocable beneficiary and that the provisions for the life insurance policies were separate from any child support obligations. The court noted that the agreement did not indicate that these policies served as security for child support. Additionally, the court authorized Robert to substitute a term life insurance policy for the existing Occidental policy to help manage costs, allowing for stable premium payments instead of escalating ones. Robert subsequently appealed the court's decision.

General contract rules apply to the interpretation of marital settlement agreements when a trial court reviews a motion to terminate support, emphasizing that the court must determine and uphold the parties' intent. The language of the marital agreement serves as the primary indicator of this intent. If the terms are clear and unambiguous, the court interprets them according to their ordinary meaning. Ambiguity, defined as a term with multiple potential meanings, is assessed as a legal question subject to de novo review.

In the case at hand, Robert cites **In re Marriage of Tieman** to argue that life insurance on a non-custodial father's life, with the children as beneficiaries, is intended to secure child support obligations. In Tieman, the court upheld a trial decision allowing the father to reduce life insurance coverage, affirming that the policy was meant to support the children until a certain age. Additionally, Robert references **Reid v. Reid**, where the father was permitted to substitute life insurance policies intended to cover children's educational expenses, with the appellate court affirming that the substitution met the agreement's intent.

Both Tieman and Reid differ from Robert's situation, as the children were explicitly named beneficiaries in those cases, and the court orders included clear purposes for the life insurance proceeds. In contrast, in Robert's case, Niky, not the children, was named as the irrevocable beneficiary. The circuit court applied the ordinary meaning of the marital settlement agreement's language, concluding that Robert's obligation to maintain life insurance was not tied to child support or spousal maintenance. Consequently, the court did not err in denying Robert's petition to terminate support and acted equitably by modifying the settlement to alleviate the burden of escalating premium payments on one policy. The ruling of the Rock Island County circuit court is affirmed.