Perales v. Department of Human Resources Development

Citations: 32 Cal. App. 3d 332; 108 Cal. Rptr. 167; 1973 Cal. App. LEXIS 984Docket: Civ. 1630

Court: California Court of Appeal; May 14, 1973; California; State Appellate Court

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Appellant Hector G. Perales sought a writ of mandate from the superior court to compel the Department of Human Resources Development to grant his claim for unemployment insurance benefits, which had been denied on the grounds that he voluntarily left his last job without good cause. Perales was employed at Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. during the 1969 canning season and subsequently worked for nine days pruning peach trees before quitting to attend English classes, despite having three days of pruning work left. The Department denied his claim, and subsequent appeals to a referee and the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board upheld this decision. The superior court reviewed the administrative record and found substantial evidence supporting the board's ruling.

Perales argued he had good cause to leave his job to enhance his employment prospects and contended that the denial of benefits violated Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256, asserting the employer needed to provide written notice within five days of termination to rebut the presumption of not leaving without good cause. The court concluded that both arguments lacked merit, emphasizing that the purpose of unemployment insurance is to support those unemployed through no fault of their own and that 'good cause' must relate to the job. The decision referenced precedent indicating that whether an employee quit without good cause is a legal question, with examples provided to illustrate what constitutes good cause.

Quitting a job for personal reasons that are not work-related may constitute "good cause" for unemployment benefits under specific circumstances. In *Cal. Portland Cement Co. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Board*, the court found that leaving a job to accept another was considered good cause, despite the employer's evidence suggesting it was not responsible for the employee's departure. The court emphasized that the employer failed to prove the absence of a compelling reason for quitting and acknowledged that the Legislature recognized personal reasons as valid causes for leaving a job under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1032.

Section 1264 outlines situations where quitting for personal reasons—such as marriage or accompanying a spouse—would not disqualify an employee from receiving unemployment benefits, provided the employee is the primary financial support for their family. Quitting under these circumstances may be deemed "involuntary."

However, the court concluded that quitting to attend school, regardless of its personal merits, does not meet the required standard for good cause under the unemployment insurance law unless explicitly authorized by legislation. The ruling indicated that using unemployment benefits to subsidize education is not permissible, thereby determining that the appellant left his job without good cause.

Additionally, Section 1256 establishes a presumption that an individual was discharged for reasons other than misconduct unless the employer provides written notice to challenge this within five days. The appellant argued that this notice is the sole method to rebut the presumption, asserting that unless properly executed, the presumption should prevail regarding the circumstances of their departure.

An employer's assertion regarding whether an employee voluntarily quit without good cause or was discharged for misconduct is contingent upon the employer filing a written notice within five days after termination. If this notice is not filed, the presumption under section 1256 remains rebuttable, rather than conclusive. The statute does not declare the presumption conclusive, aligning with Evidence Code sections 620 and 601, which differentiate between conclusive and rebuttable presumptions. A conclusive presumption would undermine the policy aimed at ensuring benefits are only provided to those who did not quit without good cause or were not discharged for misconduct. The interrelation with sections 1327 and 1328 indicates that the legislative intent was for section 1256 to allow for a rebuttable presumption, enabling a comprehensive evaluation of a claimant's eligibility based on submitted facts rather than solely on the employer's compliance with the notice requirement. Sections 1327 and 1328 mandate that the employing unit be notified of claims and allows for submission of relevant facts, which should influence the eligibility determination. Thus, the interpretation of section 1256 must be consistent with these later provisions to preserve the established administrative processes for determining eligibility.

Respondents and enforcement agencies have consistently interpreted section 1256 of the Unemployment Insurance Code as establishing a rebuttable presumption regarding unemployment benefits. The administrative interpretation carries significant weight unless proven erroneous. An employer's failure to file a pre-claim notice under section 1256 does not prevent the department from denying benefits if the claimant's ineligibility is evident from their statements or from facts uncovered during investigations. The presumption is designed to support public policy by ensuring prompt benefit payments and shifts the burden of proof to the employer and department, who must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the claimant quit without good cause or was discharged for misconduct.

In the current case, the department successfully met this burden, and the trial court's findings were substantiated by ample evidence. The appellant's claim that the last employer did not provide the required notice under section 1256 was not contested by the respondent, leading to the assumption that the allegation is true. As a result, a formal finding regarding the employer's notice was unnecessary. The judgment was upheld, and the appellant's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied. The document also notes relevant facts about the appellant's prior desire to attend English classes and the legislative history of the relevant code sections, emphasizing the presumption's impact on the burden of proof.