County of San Bernardino v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp.

Citations: 72 Cal. App. 3d 776; 140 Cal. Rptr. 383; 1977 Cal. App. LEXIS 1768Docket: Civ. 17439

Court: California Court of Appeal; August 22, 1977; California; State Appellate Court

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The case examines the longstanding judicial philosophy advocating for leniency in granting continuances in civil trials, characterizing it as outdated and misapplied. The court emphasizes that current legal standards necessitate a stringent approach to continuances, as outlined in Rule 224 of the California Rules of Court, which mandates that motions for continuances must be accompanied by good cause and proper notice to opposing parties. The rule stipulates that continuances should only be granted based on an affirmative showing of good cause and identifies specific acceptable grounds, including the death or illness of trial attorneys or witnesses, unavailability of key participants, and necessary substitutions of attorneys, provided they serve the interests of justice. The court criticizes the frequent misuse of the notion that courts should be "indulgent and liberal" with continuances, noting that only a few cases have even referenced this rule, suggesting its limited applicability in current judicial practice.

In three cases (Capital National Bank, Canal Oil, and Ross), appellate courts upheld trial judges' denials of motions for continuance. Conversely, in the Larson case, a continuance was granted and upheld on appeal. In Cohen and Whalen, the appellate courts found reversible error in the lower courts' denials of continuances, emphasizing that the moving parties demonstrated strong justification. The courts noted a need for liberality in granting continuances, yet clarified that such language was not central to their decisions and indicated an obsolete judicial philosophy. The excerpt highlights a shift towards a more stringent standard for granting continuances due to increasing demands on judicial resources, asserting that unnecessary delays are detrimental to court efficiency and public perception. A proper showing of good cause is now required, in accordance with established rules and standards. 

In the case at hand, the County of San Bernardino sought to recover unpaid property taxes, but on the trial date, an attorney, not the defendant’s official counsel, requested a continuance, which was denied. The court proceeded with the county's evidence, resulting in a judgment favoring the county. The defendant appealed, arguing the denial was an abuse of discretion, but the appellate court affirmed the judgment. On the trial date, the defendant's attorney of record had been with Coughlin, Schmitt, but an attorney named Mr. Sackey appeared to request a continuance after being informed that the original attorney no longer wished to represent the defendant. Despite county counsel's indication of a willingness to agree to a short continuance, the presiding judge refused to grant it.

If the parties were unprepared for trial, the case would be delayed by three to four months, which the county opposed due to the four-year duration since the action was filed. The county sought to proceed to trial within two to three weeks. On September 17, the trial date was set for September 24. Mr. Sackey, who indicated he would need one to two weeks to prepare if granted a continuance, claimed that the defendant had a solid defense. County counsel, prepared with a witness, was willing to agree to a brief continuance but not to remove the case from the calendar. When the motion for continuance was denied, the defendant appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by not being "indulgent" in granting continuances. The court, however, noted that no such fundamental rule existed and reviewed the case based on the trial judge's discretion. 

Mr. Sackey's motion did not comply with procedural requirements; it was raised orally on the trial date without prior notice, lacked promptness, and did not demonstrate good cause. There was no evidence of diligence in securing a new attorney, and the necessity of substitution was unproven as no official withdrawal had occurred. The trial judge considered the lengthy duration of the case, the absence of support from written declarations, and the readiness of the county to proceed with a witness. Standard 9 of the Standards of Judicial Administration allows for continuances based on attorney substitution only if justice requires it, which was not shown in this case. Previous case law supports that parties do not have an absolute right to change counsel right before a trial without sufficient justification.

The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the defendant's motion. The defendant argued that the motion should have been granted under Code of Civil Procedure section 595.2, which allows a trial postponement if all attorneys of record agree in writing. However, the defendant's attorney, Mr. Sackey, did not reference section 595.2 or provide a written stipulation during the hearing. The county counsel's earlier willingness to continue the matter was not a formal stipulation. Additionally, Sackey was not an attorney of record and thus lacked the authority to enter into such an agreement. Even if he had been, the trial judge still had discretion to deny the motion. The court clarified that, despite the mandatory wording of section 595.2, it is considered directory, meaning the trial court has the authority to interpret and apply it flexibly. The judgment was affirmed, with justices Tamura and McDaniel concurring. Furthermore, it was recommended that attorneys and judges review specific judicial standards related to continuances, highlighting that in criminal cases, Penal Code section 1050 emphasizes the need to expedite trials and restricts the granting of continuances. The standing of Mr. Sackey to make the motion was not contested, and the court refrained from commenting on that issue. Lastly, withdrawing from a case before trial could raise ethical concerns.