Outten v. State

Citations: 650 A.2d 1291; 1994 WL 719059Docket: 159, 1993, 163, 1993, 164, 1993 and 166, 1993

Court: Supreme Court of Delaware; December 23, 1994; Delaware; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the death sentences of Jack Outten and Steven Shelton, imposed for the first-degree felony murder of Wilson Mannon. Shelton's key arguments for overturning his sentence included the State's failure to preserve evidence (a washing machine top), the alleged incompetence of witness Christina Gibbons, errors in jury instruction regarding burden of proof for non-statutory aggravating factors, exclusion of testimony from Anthony Borsello, failure to sever trials, and a violation of Batson v. Kentucky concerning jury selection. Outten supported Shelton's last two arguments and claimed error in not allowing extrinsic evidence to bolster a witness's credibility. Under 11 Del.C. 4209(g), the court also reviewed the proportionality of the death sentences. After a thorough examination of the case and relevant legal standards, the court found no errors by the Superior Court and affirmed the sentences. The facts revealed that Outten, Shelton, and two others, after a day of drinking, were involved in Mannon’s robbery and subsequent murder, with his body discovered showing signs of violence and robbery.

New Castle police interrogated Nelson and Gibbons on January 12 regarding an unrelated issue, during which Gibbons claimed that Outten killed an elderly man named "Willie" using a sink, and that while Steven kicked the victim, Nelson did not participate. Gibbons later alleged that Outten also assaulted Mannon with a hammer before using the sink. Nelson admitted to swinging a hammer at Mannon. Outten, Nelson, and Steven faced a joint trial in the Superior Court without a timely motion for severance. The prosecution presented significant scientific evidence linking all three defendants to the crime, including the victim's blood found on their clothing. Gibbons served as the main eyewitness, initially denying Steven's involvement but later recanting and stating all three were complicit in the murder. The trial court excluded Borsello’s testimony, an inmate who claimed Outten confessed to him about the killing, asserting that Steven and Gibbons were uninvolved. The jury convicted all three defendants of first-degree felony murder, recommending death sentences, which the court accepted. Outten and Steven appealed their convictions, leading to an automatic appeal of their sentences. 

Steven's appeal included a claim that the State negligently failed to secure and preserve the washing machine top purportedly used in the murder, arguing that the Superior Court should have issued a Lolly instruction to negate any incriminating inference. Gibbons had initially identified the murder weapon as a "sink," which she could not locate during a police search. The police later found the washing machine top only after Nelson's counsel requested it nearly three months post-murder. The court found no negligence in police conduct, as they acted lawfully based on available information and seized the washing machine top as soon as its potential relevance was noted. Given that the top had been submerged in water for an extended period, its evidentiary value would likely have been compromised. Moreover, Gibbons testified that Outten, not Steven, used the washing machine top against Mannon. Consequently, the court ruled that the police's actions were justified, and the Superior Court did not err in its findings.

Gibbons admitted during the trial that she had previously perjured herself, stating, "I have been lying so much for this trial, I really don't know what the truth is anymore." Steven contends that the trial court wrongly failed to strike her testimony or declare a mistrial, arguing that Gibbons was incompetent and lacked a sense of obligation to tell the truth. He cites State v. Keys for the principle that a witness must feel bound to testify truthfully to avoid disqualification. While Delaware Rules of Evidence establish broad competency for witnesses (D.R.E. 601) and require a declaration of truthfulness before testifying (D.R.E. 603), Gibbons' inconsistent testimony, although troubling, did not warrant striking her testimony. The record indicates she understood the importance of her oath. The court noted that it is the jury's role to resolve conflicts in testimony, as affirmed in Conlow v. State. The jury had the chance to cross-examine Gibbons, ultimately choosing to believe her, leading to Steven's conviction. Therefore, the trial court’s decision not to strike her testimony or declare a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.

Additionally, Steven argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the burden of proof for non-statutory aggravating circumstances, relying on State v. Cohen, which requires such factors to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the more recent ruling in Dawson v. State clarifies that the Delaware death penalty statute does not necessitate proving non-statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Superior Court's jury instructions were deemed appropriate and not erroneous.

Steven argues that the trial court erred by excluding Borsello's testimony, claiming it met the criteria for a statement against interest under D.R.E. 804(b)(3). He contends that the testimony should have been admitted because it was a self-inculpatory statement. In contrast, the State argues that Borsello's testimony was inherently unreliable and lacked clear trustworthiness, justifying its exclusion. D.R.E. 804(b)(3) allows for the admission of reliable self-inculpatory statements from unavailable declarants, specifically those that would not be made unless the declarant believed them to be true, especially if they expose the declarant to criminal liability. Such statements are inadmissible to exculpate the accused unless there are corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate their trustworthiness. The determination of whether sufficient corroborative evidence exists is at the trial court's discretion and can be reversed only for abuse of discretion or clear error, as established in Ross v. State. Although the court has addressed similar issues, it has not fully defined the factors for assessing statement trustworthiness. Federal interpretations of the equivalent rule suggest that relevant considerations include the spontaneity of the statement, corroboration by other evidence, and whether the statement is genuinely self-incriminatory. The Supreme Court did not clarify if a court should consider the witness's reliability or other factors in evaluating trustworthiness.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not established a uniform approach for assessing witness and declarant trustworthiness in hearsay cases. In *United States v. Atkins*, the court reversed a district court's exclusion of a minor's testimony, emphasizing the need to evaluate the declarant's trustworthiness rather than the witness's. Subsequent cases expanded the factors considered, as seen in *United States v. Bailey*, which highlighted the importance of the circumstances surrounding a statement and the reliability of its reporting. Trustworthiness is primarily determined by the witness's probable veracity and the declarant's reliability.

The court also referenced *United States v. Satterfield*, which indicated that while the trustworthiness of the witness can be relevant, it must be balanced with other factors. In the current case, despite the trial court's flawed interpretation of D.R.E. 804(b)(3), it correctly excluded Borsello's testimony due to insufficient corroborating evidence supporting the trustworthiness of the statement. Key issues included the delayed nature of the statement and its context, as it was obtained nearly eleven months post-crime and at the request of law enforcement. Furthermore, statements not self-incriminatory lack inherent reliability and are presumptively inadmissible. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding Borsello's testimony, despite its imprecise reasoning.

Outten and Steven contended that their defenses at trial were sufficiently antagonistic to necessitate severance. The Superior Court disagreed, asserting that the defenses did not warrant separate trials. Severance is determined at the Trial Court's discretion, with the defendant required to show "substantial injustice" and unfair prejudice to justify such a request. Both defendants cited the precedent set in Bradley v. State, where the Court recognized that mutually exclusive alibis between codefendants warranted separate trials due to the incompatibility of their defenses. In Bradley, the defendants directly implicated each other, which created an environment unsuitable for a fair trial. However, the Court clarified that mere hostility or inconsistencies in defense strategies do not mandate severance. In the current case, neither Outten nor Steven testified or provided evidence implicating one another, apart from a late mention of testimony by Steven. Their defenses were not mutually exclusive, allowing the jury to potentially find either one, both, or neither guilty. Consequently, neither defendant demonstrated the required level of injustice or prejudice, leading the Superior Court to conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for severance.

Rodney Merriweather, an African-American potential juror, expressed concerns about the fairness of the death penalty during jury selection, citing racial bias and personal experiences with crime. The State moved to strike Merriweather for cause, but the trial judge denied this motion, citing the equal protection clause and the precedent set by Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits race-based exclusions of jurors. When the State attempted to use a peremptory challenge to dismiss Merriweather, the Superior Court resisted, reiterating Batson's principles. Despite the judge's concerns about potential Batson violations, he ultimately allowed the peremptory strike, stating that all parties waived any Batson claims by agreeing to this action.

The defendants contended that the alleged Batson violation warranted a mistrial and that the State's peremptory challenge violated the Delaware Constitution. However, to establish a Batson violation, a defendant must show that a peremptory challenge was based solely on race, which neither Outten nor Steven, both Caucasian, could prove against Merriweather. Additionally, there was no evidence of a systematic pattern of racial exclusion by the State, as Merriweather was the first African-American juror struck. The trial court found no pattern of discrimination in the State's peremptory challenges, and thus the defendants failed to establish a prima facie case for a Batson violation. While the Superior Court’s determination that the strike violated Batson was incorrect, this error was deemed harmless. The argument based on the Delaware Constitution was also rejected, as precedents indicated consistency with federal standards. Ultimately, the court upheld the State's challenge against Merriweather.

Outten's appeal centers on the exclusion of witness Lisa DeLude's evidence during the trial. DeLude testified that Gibbons confessed to killing Mannon, but her credibility was challenged by the State, particularly regarding her delay in coming forward. DeLude asserted she attempted to contact an attorney, but her call went unanswered. Outten's counsel sought to introduce evidence of DeLude’s call to Nelson's attorney, which the trial court denied, citing D.R.E. 608(b), which prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to attack a witness's credibility except for prior convictions. Outten argues that the precedent set in Weber v. State necessitates the admission of such evidence, claiming the jury needed more context to evaluate DeLude's motives. However, the court found Outten's reliance on Weber to be inappropriate, noting that Weber dealt with bias rather than acts affecting credibility. Therefore, the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence regarding DeLude's phone call was upheld as consistent with D.R.E. 608(b).

The Court must ensure that the death sentences imposed on Outten and Steven are proportionate to similar cases, as mandated by Title 11 Del.C. 4209(g)(2)(a). This statute requires an evaluation of whether the death penalty was applied arbitrarily or disproportionately compared to similar cases, considering both aggravating and mitigating evidence. The Court will focus on First Degree Murder cases that have proceeded to a penalty hearing under the death penalty statute as amended in 1991, which introduced significant changes in sentencing procedures, including the role of the jury and the trial judge.

Pre-1991 cases, while potentially relevant, are deemed not significantly persuasive due to these statutory changes. The Court distinguishes between pre- and post-1991 cases, as the former required a unanimous jury verdict for a death sentence while the latter grants the trial judge the ultimate responsibility for sentencing without a unanimous jury recommendation. The Court has previously held that the relevant proportionality analysis should primarily involve post-1991 cases.

In the current case, the murder was characterized as gruesome and unprovoked, involving the brutal beating of the victim, which aligns with other post-1991 death penalty cases where killings occurred during the commission of a felony. The Court concludes that the defendants' actions demonstrate a level of culpability justifying the death penalty, finding that the sentences are warranted and not disproportionate when compared to similar cases.

The Court affirms the death sentences for Outten and Steven in the murder case of Wilson Mannon, finding the sentences fair and proportional to similar cases under 11 Del.C. 4209. All claims of error presented by both defendants have been reviewed and rejected. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. Previous stays of execution for both defendants will be lifted upon the issuance of the Court's mandate. Additionally, the document includes an updated list of first-degree murder cases that have undergone penalty hearings under the amended statute, superseding prior appendices from various decisions. Notable cases listed include those with life sentences and various death sentences, with some appeals pending. The Clerk is directed to deliver copies of this opinion to relevant parties.

In the legal document, several cases are summarized with their sentences and relevant details. John E. Watson and Dwayne Weeks each received life imprisonment and a death sentence, respectively, in New Castle County. Roy R. Williamson was sentenced to life imprisonment in Sussex County, while Jermaine M. Wright has a new penalty hearing scheduled. Nelson Shelton, tried with co-defendants Steven Shelton and Outten, was also sentenced to death; however, his appeal has been separated and he is proceeding pro se. The document notes the appeal process for Shelton, including stayed and lifted orders regarding his representation.

Additionally, the jury instructions emphasized the importance of the jury's advisory role in sentencing, indicating that their recommendations, though not binding, carry significant weight. The jury's votes on death sentences for Outten and Steven were close (7-5 and 8-4, respectively). The document addresses the handling of exculpatory evidence, defense claims regarding closing arguments, and the legal foundations for imposing the death penalty under both state and federal constitutions. Outten's claims on Eighth Amendment violations were rejected based on jury findings of his active participation in the murder. The appendix of the decision specifically includes first-degree murder cases from post-1991, reflecting a structured approach to the analysis of relevant precedents.