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Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance
Citations: 650 A.2d 974; 138 N.J. 437; 1994 N.J. LEXIS 1178
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; December 22, 1994; New Jersey; State Supreme Court
The case, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co., involves Owens-Illinois, Inc. as the plaintiff-respondent against multiple defendants, including United Insurance Company, Owens Insurance Limited, and General Reinsurance Corporation, among others. The Supreme Court of New Jersey heard the case, argued on September 26, 1994, and decided on December 22, 1994. Various attorneys represented the parties, including Stephen D. Cuyler for United Insurance Company and Andrew T. Berry for Owens-Illinois, Inc. Several intervenors, including Allstate Insurance Company and American Re-Insurance Company, also participated in the proceedings. Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the Insurance Environmental Litigation Association and the New Jersey Public Risk Managers Association, representing a broad coalition of corporate interests. The case addresses complex issues surrounding insurance and liability, particularly in the context of environmental litigation and claims. The Court's opinion, delivered by O'HERN, J., addresses a legal dispute between an asbestos product manufacturer, Owens-Illinois (O-I), and its insurers over liability insurance coverage. The case presents two primary issues: the 'trigger of coverage,' which determines the events during a policy period that necessitate coverage for the policyholder's losses, and the 'allocation issue,' which concerns the extent of coverage available under a triggered policy. Specifically, it questions whether the manufacturer can claim the total coverage from multiple policies or just a portion of each for injuries or damages that occur gradually. Complications arise from O-I's use of a captive insurance company, a wholly-owned entity that reinsured risks with various insurers but may not have fully disclosed underwriting risks during policy issuance. The Appellate Division has mandated a hearing regarding potential fraud linked to the policies, particularly focusing on whether O-I's officers adequately disclosed risks or if they expected their products to cause injury. The background indicates that O-I manufactured Kaylo, an asbestos-containing insulation product, from 1948 to 1958, self-insuring until 1963 when it obtained excess indemnity policies from Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, which included a deductible and provided coverage for losses above that threshold. The Aetna policies had limits from $20 million to $50 million, and in the mid-1970s, O-I sought to establish a new insurance program through a captive insurance company managed by American Risk Management, which would facilitate reinsurance arrangements with other companies. In 1975, Owens Insurance Limited (OIL) was established to provide reinsurance and loss prevention services to O-I. In 1976, OIL was proposed to cover O-I's casualty insurance, and by June 1977, O-I sought quotes to replace its expiring Aetna insurance coverage. O-I selected American Risk Management's proposal for comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance, which included a self-insured retention (SIR) of $250,000 per occurrence, primary coverage up to $1 million, and excess umbrella coverage that increased from $50 million to $150 million between 1977 and 1985. United Insurance Company provided the primary coverage, while OIL issued the excess umbrella policy, reinsuring with various insurers. By late 1977, O-I's legal department became aware of several asbestos-related lawsuits linked to the Kaylo product. In early 1978, O-I notified Aetna of these claims, which Aetna insisted should be reported on a manifestation basis, assuming it would be responsible due to the lasting nature of statutes of limitations. However, Aetna later rejected the claims, asserting that the $250,000 SIR was a per-claim figure and estimated that none of the claims fell under its coverage. As the number of claims increased, O-I notified the Insurance Companies of the asbestos claims in 1980, but they adopted Aetna's position regarding the SIR and stated that coverage was triggered by exposure rather than manifestation, leading them to decline coverage since exposures predated the OIL policies. By January 1980, O-I had set aside $3 million for legal expenses due to the ongoing asbestos litigation. In November 1984, O-I sought a declaratory judgment to compel United and OIL to cover its asbestos-related claims. Judge Keefe determined that an 'injury in fact' occurs upon inhalation of asbestos, continuing until the disease manifests, and later reaffirmed by Judge Conley, making the insurers jointly and severally liable within policy limits. The court also ruled that this continuous trigger should apply to property damage claims, while other issues, including the interpretation of the $250,000 SIR, remained unresolved. The Insurance Companies' stance effectively negated coverage for most claims against O-I, as individual claims typically do not exceed $250,000. However, the courts determined that the $250,000 self-insured retention (SIR) applies to the aggregate exposures from a single condition over the policy period, identifying the manufacture and sale of Kaylo as a single occurrence for asbestos-related injuries. The Appellate Division found certain policy exclusions to be contradictory or ineffective, although these issues were deemed not significant enough for higher court review. Disputed factual issues necessitating further hearings on coverage remained acknowledged by the Appellate Division. The economic context is significant, with O-I having settled 43,000 bodily-injury lawsuits by 1991, while over 90,000 bodily-injury and 63 property-damage cases were still pending. O-I faced accumulating defense costs exceeding $95 million, alongside nearly $10 million for property damages. The core issues pertain to which insurance policies from 1977 to 1985 cover O-I’s liabilities and to what extent. The certification granted focused on two main issues: the continuous trigger theory and the apportionment of liability. The duty of the Insurance Companies to defend or indemnify O-I is rooted in the insurance contracts, which stipulate that the insurer will cover all sums the insured is legally obligated to pay due to personal injury or property damage caused by an occurrence. Definitions in the relevant policies clarify that an "occurrence" includes accidents leading to bodily injury or property damage, with specific terms for both bodily injury and property damage outlined similarly in both the United and OIL policies. The term 'trigger' in insurance policies refers to the event that determines whether a policy must respond to a claim. In the context of comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies, coverage is provided for property damage or bodily injury that occurs during the policy period. The policies stipulate that the insurer must pay for damages the insured is legally obligated to pay, due to injuries sustained during the policy period caused by an accident or continuous exposure to harmful conditions. A hypothetical scenario illustrates the complexities of coverage: a group of workers occupied an office building over nine years, only being insured under a CGL policy for three of those years. Asbestos exposure occurred during the first three years; however, no symptoms were present until later, when some occupants were diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases. When claims from these occupants were made, the building owners, who had lost their insurance, sought coverage from the Trustworthy Insurance Company for the damages incurred during the insured years, arguing that the inhalation of asbestos fibers caused ongoing injury during the middle years of exposure. The critical questions arise as to whether the policies during the insured years were 'triggered' by the claims stemming from the later diagnosed conditions, and to what extent Trustworthy must respond to these claims. The owners assert that the inhalation of fibers constituted an ongoing injury that should be covered by the premiums paid for those years. The total damages claimed could reach $15,000,000, raising significant questions regarding the extent of indemnity owed by the insurer for the claims. The trigger of coverage for insurance liability in toxic tort cases varies across jurisdictions, primarily categorized into three theories: exposure, manifestation, and continuous-trigger. The exposure theory posits that coverage is triggered at the moment an injury-causing agent first contacts the body, as established in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., where the court prioritized maximizing coverage for the plaintiff, who had become uninsured after 1976. Conversely, the manifestation theory asserts that coverage only arises when the injury becomes apparent, as seen in Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., which aimed to maximize coverage based on the specific case circumstances. However, this approach may ultimately limit coverage availability for future claims. The continuous-trigger theory, endorsed in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, recognizes that diseases like those caused by asbestos develop over time, thus holding insurers liable throughout the duration from exposure to manifestation. Each theory has implications for risk management and insurer liability, affecting how coverage is determined in toxic exposure cases. The court favored the continuous trigger rule for toxic waste cases due to its efficiency in maximizing coverage and avoiding issues associated with the manifestation rule. This rule asserts that injury occurs at all stages of environmental contamination: exposure, continued exposure after the initial contact, and the manifestation of disease. Alternative theories include the 'injury-in-fact' approach, which triggers coverage based on actual injury regardless of its discovery, and the 'double-trigger' theory, which recognizes injury at both exposure and manifestation but not necessarily in between. The court criticized the notion of maximizing coverage as a basis for legal principles, labeling it 'judicial legislation.' A more consistent approach is necessary, as demonstrated in the case of Hartford Accident, where the triggering event for indemnity was determined to be the manifestation of injury rather than the wrongful act. This conclusion aligns with established case law in the jurisdiction, affirming that coverage is triggered at the point of actual damage rather than the act that caused it. In the Miller Fuel Oil case, the court clarified that the "occurrence" for indemnity policy purposes is defined as the time when actual damage occurs, rather than when the wrongful act was committed. The court emphasized that negligence is only established upon the occurrence of damage, making the timing of damage critical for insurance coverage in negligence claims. The Insurance Companies argue that the determination of when damage occurs must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in numerous pending lawsuits, although they agree that a general formula might be applicable. The court addressed the issue of progressive bodily diseases, specifically regarding asbestos exposure. It noted that while mere exposure does not constitute a "bodily injury," inhalation of asbestos results in immediate tissue damage, which may not be immediately evident. Judge Skillman pointed out that the courts have recognized that asbestos disease progresses and that bodily injury occurs from inhalation throughout the disease's development. The Insurance Companies claimed the record lacked medical evidence confirming immediate tissue damage from asbestos inhalation; however, Judge Keefe, experienced in asbestos litigation, found no need for further discovery on this issue. The courts have generally acknowledged the progressive nature of asbestos diseases, agreeing that injury occurs upon inhalation. The case also discussed property damage associated with asbestos, with complaints indicating that damage from Kaylo insulation begins upon installation and continues as long as the material remains in the property, leading the Appellate Division to assert that ongoing damage activates all relevant insurance policies. Multi-year triggers have been recognized in property-damage claims involving delayed manifestation, particularly in relation to asbestos. In **Dayton Independent School District v. National Gypsum Co.**, the court ruled that all insurance policies covering the risk from the installation to the removal of asbestos-containing products were triggered by property damage claims. **Armstrong World Industries** concluded that insurance coverage is activated when any part of the damage occurs across multiple policy periods due to the release or reentrainment of asbestos fibers. Similarly, in **Gottlieb**, homeowners could potentially recover for chemical poisoning under a continuous-trigger theory from a pest control company's earlier insurer. **Lac d'Amiante du Quebec** confirmed that under New Jersey law, the progressive nature of asbestos-related damage triggers all relevant policies from installation to removal. The court noted that asbestos materials undergo continuous deterioration, releasing fibers over time, which can be exacerbated by environmental factors. It compared asbestos exposure to disease contraction, highlighting that harmful effects may not manifest until long after initial exposure. The California Court of Appeals, reflecting on **Armstrong World Industries**, acknowledged that property damage from asbestos can occur not just at installation but whenever fibers are released or disturbed. This implies a continuous nature of damage as new episodes of fiber release can happen repeatedly. In the context of the current case, claims involving asbestos-related property damage from installation through discovery or remediation trigger insurance policies throughout that entire period. However, the opinion does not address when the injurious process concludes, focusing instead primarily on asbestos-related personal injury claims. Courts have generally resolved ambiguities in coverage language in favor of policyholders, particularly regarding injuries from inhaling asbestos fibers. The District of Columbia Circuit's application of the continuous-trigger theory highlights the ambiguity in the typical language of Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies regarding asbestos-related diseases. Key terms such as 'bodily injury,' 'sickness,' and 'disease' lack the precision needed to clearly determine when insurance coverage is triggered in the disease's progression. While medical professionals may categorize cellular damage as an injury, this does not align with the policies’ definitions. The interpretation of these terms must consider the contract's context. The court found no ambiguity in the language of the "occurrence" clause, asserting that its meaning is clear and familiar to the parties involved. However, the legal determination of when an injury necessitates indemnity remains complex and context-dependent. Different cases illustrate varying interpretations of injury, such as in Coughlin v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., where the accrual of asbestos-related injury claims was debated. The law has established differing standards for liability across contexts, as seen in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, which determined that mere exposure to toxins without a diagnosed disease does not constitute a legal injury, and in Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc., which acknowledged diagnosable injuries from asbestos exposure yet still grappled with the implications of what constitutes an injury in these scenarios. The court determined that the injury was not sufficient to allow recovery for the increased risk of cancer. However, it acknowledged the need to adapt legal principles to the uncertainties surrounding medical causation. In prior cases such as Ayers, it was established that public health interests might warrant judicial intervention even without clear physical injury, allowing for recovery of medical-surveillance damages under mass-exposure toxic-tort cases. The court recognized that traditional legal concepts were developed in a different scientific context and admitted the imperfections in their resolutions regarding causation. The discussion highlighted the inadequacies of common-law tort doctrines in addressing the complexities of toxic-tort claims, emphasizing that a statutory compensation system might be necessary for just redress of injuries from chemical exposure. The court also noted that the trigger-of-coverage issues must be considered alongside the scope of coverage in insurance policies, referencing joint-and-several allocation principles and the precedent that all triggered policies must respond fully to a claim. The Keene rule is identified as the "majority rule" concerning insurance liability for asbestos-related injuries, as articulated in *Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Health Compensation and Liability Insurance Co.* The ruling accepts that medical evidence may delineate the extent of bodily damage during a policy period, allowing for apportionment among insurers. In the absence of such evidence, the Keene approach is preferred, conceptualizing the exposure to injury as a "pleated accordion," which compresses injuries into a single policy year for liability purposes. The court determined that only one policy's limits can be applied to each injury, allowing the insured to select which policy to use for indemnification. This principle, termed joint-and-several allocation, does not imply that one insurer bears full liability; instead, the "other insurance" clauses in policies provide a framework for liability apportionment among multiple insurers. The court's decision hinges on defining "injury," leading to ambiguity whether it refers to each claim or each cause of injury. Commentary suggests it pertains to the latter. The ruling emphasizes that insurers' responsibilities for long-term exposure injuries should align with their obligations for other types of losses. Consequently, for claims arising from a single occurrence, only one policy’s limits would apply, although the insured might allocate multiple claims across different policy years. The cross-indemnity among policies would serve to mitigate the impact of contribution on policy limits. In *Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.*, the district court employed a per-claim analysis for triggered insurance policies but restricted the policyholder's ability to choose which policy to use for coverage. Following Pennsylvania law, the court mandated that liability should be allocated chronologically among triggered policies. However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this approach, favoring joint-and-several allocation that allows the insured to select the policy for indemnification. The excerpt highlights anomalies in the apportionment method, particularly in scenarios where a single claim could result in differing policy limits based on the number of affected parties, despite the same underlying cause. Additionally, it notes inconsistencies in the premise that all damages could be claimed in one year while still requiring contributions from other policies. The text further discusses pro-rata allocation for multi-year coverage triggers, where courts have ruled that triggered policies must respond proportionately to claims. The policyholder is accountable for defense and indemnification obligations during periods of being uninsured or self-insured. Key cases supporting this include *Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.*, which established a framework for allocating costs based on the duration of coverage. Other cases, such as *Gulf Chemical* and *Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.*, reinforced the principle of allocating defense costs and damages among insurers in relation to the time on risk, ensuring policyholders bear their share of costs for uninsured periods. The policyholder contested the allocation of defense costs in the Court of Appeals case, Forty-Eight Insulations. In the precedent set by Uniroyal, Judge Weinstein utilized a pro-rata allocation method, differentiating coverage periods based on the quantity of the substance released, thereby rejecting the Keene theory of joint-and-several liability. He reasoned that a manufacturer without insurance for a period is self-insuring for that period, thus "going bare." The Appellate Division also upheld a similar allocation in Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. v. Aetna Casualty, which involved Agent Orange liabilities. Both parties in the current dispute refer to the same policy language. O-I asserts that the language is clear and mandates that once a policy is triggered, the insurer is liable for all sums the insured is legally obligated to pay due to personal injury or property damage occurring during the policy period. The Insurance Companies counter that the Appellate Division's interpretation overlooks critical language that limits their liability to injuries occurring during the policy period. They highlight that the United policy specifies coverage only applies to personal injury or property damage occurring within the policy period, reinforced by definitions within the OIL policy. Thus, coverage is strictly confined to incidents that happen during the specified policy term. The Insurance Companies argue that their policies do not cover injuries or damages occurring outside the policy period. However, this reasoning is flawed. For instance, in a 1994 automobile accident that leads to long-term injuries manifesting later, the policy in effect during the accident must cover all resulting damages, regardless of when they occur. The interpretation of "all sums" or "ultimate net loss" does not lend itself to apportionment across multiple years of injury. Arguments suggesting that damages from long-term asbestos exposure could be attributed to any policy year are inconsistent with established toxic tort jurisprudence. The complexities of environmental disease do not align neatly with traditional legal concepts, such as the clear-cut identification of damages from a specific incident, like a boiler explosion. In cases of gradual contaminant release, determining the timing and extent of injuries is challenging, even when exposure is evident. Judge Barry noted that differing judicial interpretations often stem from attempts to maximize coverage, which can lead to questionable reasoning. Judge Wald dissented from the majority opinion in the Keene case, recognizing that damages accrue over the years of exposure, challenging the notion that all can be assigned to a single policy year. An asbestos manufacturer that chose not to insure itself during specific years within the exposure-manifestation period should not expect to be exempt from liability for injuries occurring during those uninsured years. A pro-rata allocation formula is deemed logical and fair, similar to the approach taken in the Forty-Eight Insulations case. Both the Keene and Forty-Eight Insulations cases lack significant differences in principle; both involve allocation among insurance companies regarding risk, and neither method eliminates ongoing litigation. The primary distinction lies in how self-insured periods are handled. The Forty-Eight Insulations court supported the exposure theory, stating that insurers are only responsible for defense costs related to claims arising within the policy period. Conversely, Keene interpreted its policies as covering the entirety of its liability once triggered, with an emphasis on policy language. The continuous-trigger theory and joint-and-several liability are viewed as fragile concepts, reliant on the assumption that damages remain consistent from exposure to manifestation. Historical drafting indicates that multiple policies could apply to progressive environmental diseases. Industry acknowledgments from 1977 indicated coverage for each carrier during the development of asbestosis, suggesting that every insurer active during any part of the exposure period could be liable for the associated costs. The insurance industry contends that such views reflect speculative predictions rather than established legal principles. Additionally, it has been noted that gradual injuries could trigger coverage under multiple policies over time. The CGL policy lacks a pro-ration formula due to the challenge of creating a universally equitable solution. While coverage may apply under multiple policies, this does not equate to policyholders being able to stack limits for continuous exposure claims. The Keene court rejected this broader interpretation in relation to governmental cleanup costs at a landfill. The drafting history of the occurrence clause indicates that had a single trigger based on disease manifestation been adopted, it could have led insurers to prematurely reject risks associated with early cases of occupational diseases. The authors of the policy recognized the continuum between exposure and disease manifestation but did not establish a clear method for apportioning liability. The Keene court sought equity in allocating damages among insurers, allowing contribution from policies in force during other years, despite the difficulty in applying "other insurance clauses," which were traditionally meant to prevent double recovery. These clauses generally fall into three categories: excess, pro rata, and escape. Excess insurance supplements coverage when limits of other policies are reached; pro rata shares liability based on the coverage amounts; and escape clauses exempt insurers from liability if other coverage exists. Pro-rata provisions are generally applicable only when insurance coverage is concurrent; if policies do not overlap, these clauses typically do not apply. However, in Glacier General Assurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., a court adopted a unique approach for prorating losses between consecutive malpractice policies triggered by different incidents, disregarding an "other insurance" clause that would limit coverage if other valid insurance existed. The court chose to evenly prorate the loss between the two insurers. Contract interpretation principles offer limited guidance in these scenarios. Courts have noted that sophisticated insureds, like O-I, cannot rely on strict construction doctrines meant for less informed consumers. Assessing reasonable expectations of policyholders in cases of long-tail injuries is challenging, particularly concerning environmental contamination where liability can be retroactively imposed under laws such as CERCLA. The doctrine of contra preferentem, which interprets ambiguities against the insurer, can yield inconsistent results, as illustrated by various cases where different theories of coverage were preferred by insureds. The variability in interpretation based on insurance configuration is viewed unfavorably. Consequently, public interest factors from Ayers guide decision-making, emphasizing efficient resource use and promoting responsible conduct among parties involved in environmental damage cases. Strict liability is advocated on the grounds that manufacturers and distributors of defective products are best positioned to absorb and distribute the costs associated with injuries from those products. The argument suggests that product pricing should incorporate costs related to potential injuries, enabling these costs to be shared among manufacturers, distributors, and consumers. Key policy considerations include the bargaining power of involved parties and assigning risk to those best equipped to manage it in a modern marketplace. Insurance plays a crucial role in risk management, as insurers can either retain or spread risks across the industry, promoting cost efficiency. The law should encourage, rather than dissuade, parties from obtaining insurance to cover their risks. A legal framework should aim to incentivize behavior that minimizes future risks and ensure that stakeholders understand the implications of their risk management choices. The discussion references a hypothetical scenario involving property owners and potential disease exposure, arguing that a legal principle disincentivizing insurance could ultimately reduce risk management assets. O-I’s counsel challenges these assumptions, suggesting that real-world responses may differ, yet acknowledges the soundness of the policy goal. Lastly, the text contemplates the fairness of insurance coverage related to long-term liabilities, questioning whether a manufacturer with limited insurance coverage should receive the same legal protections as one with comprehensive coverage, emphasizing that neither logic nor precedent supports such an outcome. The final inquiry revolves around whether the proposed remedy would effectively address insurance coverage challenges for long-term environmental damage. The court in Forty-Eight Insulations highlighted the necessity for a clear and manageable interpretation of insurance policies to minimize litigation. Current claims-related expenses for insurance companies are significant, estimated at $500 million annually, with legal costs consuming up to 70% of total environmental cleanup expenses. The court acknowledged that while legal disputes often precede cleanup efforts under complex regulations like CERCLA, the existing rules are ineffective. It will not seek a universal solution for all coverage issues, particularly regarding gradual pollution exposure, such as asbestos-related claims. Instead, it aims to develop rules that connect the concept of continuous triggers of injury to the risk levels transferred or retained over time. The court rejected a straight annual progression for allocation, advocating for a more nuanced approach that reflects the varying degrees of risk during exposure years. It recognized that occurrence policies inherently cover pre-policy incidents, suggesting that later insurers responding to such claims is justified. A proposed allocation formula, similar to that in California's Armstrong World Industries case, would distribute losses based on the risk assumed, using policy limits multiplied by coverage years. This method is considered more aligned with the economic realities of risk management. Carriers for years four, five, and six will collectively pay one-ninth of the loss, totaling thirty-three percent. If insurance policies had been set at two million per year for years one through three and three million for years four through six, the risk for years seven through nine could be assessed at four million per year. The distribution of risk would see carriers from the first three years covering approximately twenty-two percent, those from the middle three years thirty-three percent, and building owners forty-four percent. Policy limits and exclusions are crucial in this assessment. A significant amount of discretion will be necessary for a master tasked with developing a fair formula to reflect the assumed or transferred risks, given the complexities involved, such as primary versus excess coverage and policy triggering order. Although these issues were not the main focus of the parties, they are deemed manageable. The challenges of analyzing the self-insurance portion of the risk are acknowledged as difficult but feasible. While there is considerable uncertainty in apportioning costs, the legal system is equipped to handle such complexities. The case involves a large number of claims, but there is a reasonably well-developed record on risk measures since 1963, making it feasible to extrapolate back to earlier years. Aetna has paid its policy limits for 1963-1977, meaning its contributions will not be sought going forward. The approach will consider the entire occurrence from a long-term perspective. The proration may lead to broader coverage with partial indemnity instead of fewer cases with full indemnity. The court will appoint a skilled master for model allocation of claims and efficient administration. Defendants, by not participating in their defense against the claims, are bound by the facts in the plaintiff's records regarding exposure dates and settlement amounts. Indemnity and defense costs must be allocated among the companies based on a developed mathematical model, adhering to policy limits and exclusions. No relitigation of settled claims is permitted, although some exposure dates may be unavailable. However, existing data should allow for a general understanding of the claims and exposures. The Keene formula requires exposure dates for determining contributions, and the cases require special management methods, such as case calendars and alternative dispute resolution techniques, as highlighted in the Supreme Court Committee’s report on Environmental Litigation. An example of successful dispute resolution is provided, where Champion International Corp. negotiated with sixty-three insurers, resulting in significant savings in litigation costs. Future insurers should proactively engage in defense to minimize costs, with ultimate cost allocation to follow established formulas. The legal framework surrounding environmental liability insurance will evolve, and trial courts need to remain adaptable to new situations. The continuous-trigger theory is affirmed, allowing courts to treat progressive injuries from harmful exposures as occurrences within each year of a Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. While applying this theory to property damage can be complex, especially regarding contaminants, the analogy to personal injury cases justifies its use in certain contexts, such as with asbestos. Determining the extent of indemnity from multiple triggered insurance policies under the continuous-trigger theory does not require a precise ending point for the continuum of bodily injury and property damage. Allocation of indemnity should relate to both the duration of coverage and the degree of risk assumed. Periods without insurance that result from a conscious decision to retain risk should not exempt the risk-bearer from cost allocation responsibilities. Insurers must respond to claims during their policy periods and, if denying full coverage, must seek judicial determination of their obligations regarding defense and indemnity costs. Policyholders are required to cooperate in providing coverage information. Courts must actively manage coverage disputes, with trial courts empowered to delegate discretion to special masters to develop allocation formulas. Insurers, being adept at claims management, are positioned to mitigate costs effectively. The complexities of such disputes cannot be simplified, but courts can narrow the issues and enhance resolution procedures to better address environmental remediation. The Appellate Division's judgment, which allocated no costs for periods without insurance and directed contributions under "other insurance" clauses, has been reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in line with these principles. The language in the insurance policies is clear, obligating insurers to cover damages for personal injury or property damage caused by occurrences.