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People v. Wohl
Citations: 226 Cal. App. 3d 270; 276 Cal. Rptr. 35; 90 Daily Journal DAR 14231; 90 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9119; 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 1310Docket: B046252
Court: California Court of Appeal; December 13, 1990; California; State Appellate Court
Vehicle Code section 23175, amended in 1988, establishes that individuals convicted of drunk driving within seven years of three or more prior offenses may be charged with a felony. This amendment allowed for felony charges for a fourth drunk driving offense, which previously could only be classified as a misdemeanor. Richard David Wohl appeals his felony conviction for driving under the influence, acknowledging three prior misdemeanor offenses. The court rejects Wohl's argument that using these prior convictions to elevate his current offense to a felony violates the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions. For a law to be considered ex post facto, it must apply retrospectively and disadvantage the offender. The court cites *People v. Sweet*, affirming that referencing past events does not constitute retroactivity. Wohl attempts to distinguish his case from *Sweet* by claiming the use of prior convictions as an element of the felony offense is different from sentence enhancement. However, the court finds that the legal ingredients of the offense remained unchanged from the time of his prior convictions to the time of his current offense, thus not violating ex post facto principles. The court references previous cases to reinforce this position, noting that changes in legal consequences after the offense occurred do not apply to Wohl's situation. Wohl was convicted of drunk driving after his fourth offense, which occurred after an amendment that elevated a fourth conviction to a felony. The court clarified that the statute was not retrospective, as it provided Wohl fair notice of the consequences following its enactment. Similar to Ex Parte Gutierrez, where a misdemeanor's second conviction was elevated to a felony after a new law was enacted, the court maintained that Wohl's punishment was based solely on acts committed post-amendment. Wohl's argument that the prior convictions violated due process because he was not informed of potential felony consequences was rejected, as the court only needs to inform defendants of direct, not collateral, consequences of guilty pleas. Additionally, the court found no merit in Wohl's claim that his plea diminished the prosecution's burden to prove prior convictions for the current offense. The judgment affirming his conviction was upheld, and his petition for review was denied.