Upper Deerfield Tp. v. SEABROOK HOUS.

Citations: 605 A.2d 1160; 255 N.J. Super. 682

Court: New Jersey Superior Court; January 27, 1991; New Jersey; State Appellate Court

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The case involves an appeal by Seabrook Housing Corporation against a conviction for violating Upper Deerfield Township Ordinance 50-7, which mandates obtaining a certificate of occupancy prior to selling existing structures. The property in question had been uninhabitable and vacant for 15 years prior to its transfer on November 15, 1989. The township did not conduct an inspection or issue a certificate of occupancy before the sale occurred. As a result, Seabrook was fined $100 and ordered to comply within two weeks, prompting the appeal with a stay on the judgment.

In challenging the ordinance, Seabrook bears the burden of proof to demonstrate its invalidity, specifically showing that the ordinance lacks a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, morals, or welfare. Zoning ordinances are presumed valid unless proven to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The relevant statutes, N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 and N.J.S.A. 40:48-2.12a, empower municipalities to enact ordinances for public safety and health regulations concerning buildings and their occupancy. The ordinance in question prohibits the sale, rental, or leasing of any structure without a certificate of occupancy issued by the Housing Officer.

A certificate is required to confirm that a building or unit is suitable for human habitation and complies with all relevant ordinances of Upper Deerfield Township. Tenants are prohibited from subleasing or allowing use of a property without adhering to this requirement. Real estate brokers or agents acting on behalf of an owner are considered the owner's agents; if charged with a violation, they may defend themselves by showing they notified the owner of the need for a certificate of occupancy, provided this notice was sent certified or signed by the owner.

Zoning ordinances must respect constitutional guarantees and be reasonable, applying without unnecessary discrimination. They are upheld unless there is no substantial relation to their intended public objectives. The right to own property includes the right to dispose of it, which is equally protected. Provisions regarding occupancy permits are generally valid if reasonable and within municipal powers, following proper adoption methods. An ordinance requiring a certificate of occupancy before selling property must relate to public health, safety, and welfare.

If such a requirement lacks a substantial relationship to these public interests, it is invalid. Municipal police powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily and must align with due process standards. In the context of this ordinance, requiring an occupancy permit for selling an abandoned structure does not relate to a legitimate government purpose, thus failing to meet due process criteria as established in various legal precedents.

The ordinance in question fails to fulfill a governmental purpose, as the structure was unoccupied and boarded up at the time of sale and complaint issuance, with an intention for demolition. Chapter 50 of the township ordinance states its goal is to regulate property conditions essential for safe and sanitary occupation, indicating that an occupancy permit is necessary only for structures intended for habitation, not for abandoned ones. Substantive due process requires that zoning regulations be reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious, with a clear relationship between the means and ends. Acts beyond a municipal corporation's jurisdiction are considered void. The issuance of a fine by Upper Deerfield Township for not obtaining an occupancy permit before selling the abandoned structure exceeds their authority. Citing Phillipsburg v. Schultz, the court concludes that requiring occupancy permits for vacant structures contradicts fundamental zoning principles and is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Consequently, the ordinance is deemed invalid, and the municipal court's decision is reversed, with the fine vacated.