Muller v. Firemen's Fund Insurance

Citations: 682 N.E.2d 331; 289 Ill. App. 3d 719; 224 Ill. Dec. 770; 1997 Ill. App. LEXIS 440Docket: 1-96-3139

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 27, 1997; Illinois; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Ricarda Muller filed a three-count complaint against Firemen's Fund Insurance Company, alleging breach of her automobile insurance contract (count I), entitlement to extra-contractual relief due to vexatious delay in handling her claim (count II), and a request for arbitration of her claim (count III). The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Firemen's on count II and ruled for Firemen's on counts I and III, leading Muller to appeal. The incident in question involved a multi-vehicle accident where Muller was knocked unconscious and could not identify the vehicle that struck her. Her personal injury lawsuit against the responsible drivers was dismissed due to her inability to identify them. Muller then sought uninsured motorist benefits from Firemen's, which denied her claim, asserting that she could not prove the involvement of an uninsured vehicle as defined in her policy. This policy defined "uninsured motor vehicle" to include hit-and-run vehicles whose operators cannot be identified. Muller's complaint against Firemen's included allegations of breach of contract for failing to provide benefits, claims of unreasonable delay under Illinois Insurance Code Section 155, and a request for arbitration. Firemen's denied the allegations and cited affirmative defenses, including that Muller could not provide identifying information about the vehicle involved. The trial court denied Firemen's summary judgment motion, influenced by deposition testimony from one of the accident's defendants, who indicated uncertainty about the number of cars involved. The appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case.

Muller's trial against Firemen's Fund Insurance Company involved stipulated evidence rather than live testimony. Key stipulations included that Firemen's issued policy No. VZE 1071 65 47 to Ricarda Muller, which was active on March 19, 1986, the date of the accident. Muller was involved in an accident while driving her 1984 Oldsmobile Toronado in Prospect Heights, Illinois, during which her vehicle was struck by unidentified vehicle(s). Neither Muller, nor any witnesses, nor Firemen's could identify these vehicles or confirm their insurance status or whether they left the scene. The parties agreed that issues regarding proximate cause, injury, and damages would be arbitrated based on the court's ruling on uninsured motorist coverage. Following Muller's case-in-chief, which involved her counsel discussing the complaint and stipulations, Firemen's moved for a directed verdict on all counts. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Firemen's only for count II, a decision Muller did not appeal. Firemen's counsel then urged the court to assess whether Muller had proven by a preponderance of evidence that she was struck by a vehicle that fled the scene, which was central to the case.

After a detailed discussion between counsel and the trial judge regarding the terms 'hit and run' and 'cannot be identified' in the insurance policy, the judge determined that the stipulated facts did not establish coverage for the plaintiff, Muller. As a result, judgment was entered in favor of the defendant, Firemen's, on count I, and Firemen's was not compelled to arbitrate the claim, leading to a judgment in their favor on count III. Muller's post-trial motion for vacating the judgment or for a new trial was denied, prompting her to file a timely appeal.

The case is notable as it involved no evidence beyond the parties' stipulations and the insurance contract. While appellate courts generally defer to trial courts' judgments based on evidence, this deference does not apply when only documentary evidence is present. In such cases, courts independently evaluate the facts. Illinois law places the burden of proving coverage on the claimant, which in this case was Muller. She contended that the stipulations negated the need for additional evidence and established coverage, asserting that the trial court's denial of a directed finding suggested she had presented a prima facie case. Muller argued that Firemen's failure to present rebuttal evidence meant there was insufficient justification for the judgment against her.

Firemen's countered that Muller could not satisfy her prima facie case since she could not identify the vehicle or its operator. However, it was concluded that this requirement was unnecessary and inconsistent with the policy language that defines an uninsured motor vehicle as a 'hit and run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified.' The stipulations confirmed that Muller's vehicle was struck by another vehicle whose owner and operator remain unidentified.

The key issue is whether the vehicle that struck Muller qualifies as a 'hit and run' under Illinois law. Section 143a of the Illinois Insurance Code requires automobile insurance policies to cover damages for bodily injury from hit-and-run vehicles, but neither the statute nor Muller's policy defines 'hit and run.' In the absence of a definition, courts interpret terms by their plain and ordinary meanings, often referencing dictionaries. Black's Law Dictionary defines a 'hit and run accident' as involving a driver who leaves the scene without identifying themselves, while Webster's defines it as leaving without assisting or complying with legal obligations.

The stipulations indicate that neither Muller nor the insurance company can identify the vehicle that struck Muller, implying that the driver did not meet the obligations of section 11-403 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which requires drivers involved in accidents to provide their identity. Thus, Muller's accident fits the common definitions of a 'hit and run.' This reasoning aligns with the precedent set in Walsh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., where the court held that an unidentifiable driver also falls under 'hit and run' coverage, even in situations where the insured fears for their safety.

Firemen's argues that the distinguishing factor in the Walsh case was the plaintiff's ability to describe the driver and the vehicle involved in the hit-and-run. However, the court's decision hinged on the interpretation of 'cannot be ascertained,' which included scenarios where the insured's actions, such as fear, contributed to the inability to identify the vehicle. In contrast, Muller was rendered unconscious during the accident, preventing her from identifying the vehicle that struck her. While the Walsh plaintiff identified the make of the vehicle, this distinction does not justify denying coverage for Muller, who was unable to provide details due to her condition. The stipulations and terms of Muller's policy indicate that she was involved in an accident with an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle, qualifying her for uninsured motorist coverage. The judgment favoring Firemen's on counts I and III of Muller's complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for arbitration as per the insurance policy. Judges Hourihane and South concur.