DeHart v. State Board of Registration in Podiatry

Citations: 293 N.W.2d 806; 97 Mich. App. 307; 1980 Mich. App. LEXIS 2656Docket: Docket 78-3366

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; May 5, 1980; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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On October 4, 1977, the Michigan Board of Registration in Podiatry revoked William W. DeHart, Jr.'s podiatry license due to allegations of wilful and gross malpractice or neglect. DeHart appealed the Board's decision, which was upheld by the Ingham County Circuit Court on August 8, 1978, leading to his current appeal. The Board's findings included serious misconduct involving chelation therapy and unauthorized surgeries on patients, including performing unnecessary bone surgeries, failing to inform patients, and not obtaining consent, particularly in cases involving patients with diabetes. 

DeHart argued that the terms "wilful and gross malpractice" lacked a constitutionally sufficient standard for license revocation. The court disagreed, affirming that these terms were sufficiently specific to inform practitioners of unacceptable conduct that could lead to disciplinary action. The decision referenced precedents where similar standards were upheld in other cases, confirming that the language used provided clear notice of the types of actions that could result in license revocation.

The court does not find that the ruling in State Board of Dentistry v Blumer affects the current case. In Blumer, the court determined that the State Board's reliance on vague standards of "dishonorable" and "unprofessional" conduct in license revocation violated due process due to the board's excessive discretion. The plaintiff argues he did not receive a fair hearing because a key witness had personal bias against him; however, the court concludes that the board could consider this bias when assessing the witness's credibility. The plaintiff also contends that the board improperly used expert medical testimony to determine the standard of care for chelation therapy by a podiatrist, arguing a lack of established podiatric standards. The court distinguishes this case, noting that chelation therapy falls outside the lawful scope of podiatry and is considered allopathic medicine. The board acknowledged that no local podiatrist practiced chelation therapy and accepted factual findings from the hearing examiner but erred in its legal reasoning, which the court deemed harmless. Since the plaintiff acted outside his licensed practice, he was held to the standards of licensed medical practitioners. His practice of chelation therapy involved intravenous injections aimed at various health benefits, which he learned from a medical doctor.

The Podiatry Act defines a podiatrist or chiropodist as a physician authorized to examine, diagnose, and treat ailments specifically related to the human foot, such as abnormal nails, corns, and bunions. Podiatrists are distinct from medical or osteopathic doctors and do not possess general authority to treat broader medical conditions. The plaintiff's argument that chelation therapy falls within podiatry due to its purported benefits for blood circulation and healing in foot surgeries is rejected. The therapy is deemed a broader medical treatment affecting the entire body, thus placing it outside the narrow scope of podiatric practice. Engaging in such treatment constitutes the unlicensed practice of medicine, for which the podiatrist must adhere to medical standards of care. Testimony from Dr. Alvin M. Parfitt established the medical standards for administering chelation therapy, including requirements for comprehensive patient evaluation and monitoring of vital signs and lab tests prior to treatment. The Board concluded that the medical standards for intravenous therapy also apply to podiatrists providing chelation therapy.

The Board concluded that the plaintiff breached the professional standard, supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. The tribunal's findings are typically upheld as the reviewing court does not resolve evidence conflicts or assess witness credibility. The plaintiff's argument, based on the belief that the Board favored Dr. W.E. DeHart's testimony over others, was rejected, as the number of witnesses does not determine the weight of testimony.

The plaintiff also argued that the Board abused its discretion by revoking his license instead of imposing a lesser sanction. Under MCL 338.302(11), the Board may revoke or suspend a license for willful malpractice, and the decision not to intervene was justified due to the plaintiff's seven counts of gross malpractice.

Additionally, the plaintiff claimed the circuit court erred in denying his request to file interrogatories to establish whether the Board members reviewed the entire record. According to MCL 24.281(1), a decision cannot be made if the decision-makers have not adequately reviewed the record. The court upheld the Board's objection, affirming that the Board members had indeed reviewed the evidence and made their decision accordingly. The judgment of the Board was affirmed, with notes indicating that the statutory framework under which the plaintiff's license was revoked has since been repealed and replaced by a new Public Health Code.