You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

Franklin v. Morrison

Citations: 711 A.2d 177; 350 Md. 144; 1998 Md. LEXIS 411Docket: 84, Sept. Term, 1997

Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland; June 11, 1998; Maryland; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case revolves around a tort action following a fatal auto accident involving a disabled vehicle operated by Franklin, which led to a collision with a minivan driven by Morrison, resulting in fatalities. The lawsuit was initiated by Morrison's estate against Franklin, Jiffy Lube, and National Carriers. Franklin's vehicle malfunction was linked to Jiffy Lube's negligent service, sparking a cross-claim for indemnity. The court addressed three key issues: Franklin's right to indemnity from a settling defendant, the disclosure of settlement terms to the jury, and the determination of credit against the verdict under the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA). The court denied Franklin's indemnity claim, citing his active negligence, and upheld the trial court's decision not to disclose the settlement agreement to the jury. Moreover, it ruled that the credit against Franklin's verdict should reflect Jiffy Lube's pro rata share. The jury found both Franklin and Jiffy Lube negligent, awarding significant damages, which were reduced due to Maryland's cap on non-economic damages. The court affirmed the lower court's rulings, maintaining the judgment against Franklin and denying further indemnity claims due to the active-passive negligence distinction.

Legal Issues Addressed

Disclosure of Settlement Agreements in Jury Trials

Application: The court considered whether the terms of a settlement agreement should be disclosed to the jury, ultimately deciding against disclosure as the agreement did not meet the criteria for a 'Mary Carter' agreement.

Reasoning: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Franklin's request for disclosure of the settlement agreement's terms.

Restatement of Restitution and the Right to Indemnity

Application: The court explored the grounds for indemnity under the Restatement, concluding that Franklin's claim failed as his negligence was not passive compared to Jiffy Lube's.

Reasoning: Indemnity is permissible unless there is joint participation in the tort and equal culpability, but any rule allowing indemnification from a more negligent tortfeasor is no longer valid.

Tort Indemnity and Active-Passive Negligence

Application: The court analyzed the applicability of indemnity based on the distinction between active and passive negligence, ultimately determining that Franklin could not claim indemnity due to his active negligence.

Reasoning: Under Maryland law, a party guilty of active negligence cannot seek indemnification, a principle supported by earlier cases that established the concept of in pari delicto, where parties are equally at fault.

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) and Credit Calculation

Application: The court applied UCATA to determine the appropriate credit against Franklin's verdict, concluding that the credit should reflect Jiffy Lube's pro rata share rather than the total settlement amount.

Reasoning: The trial court determined that Jiffy Lube’s pro rata share, amounting to $3,403,000, should be credited, as it exceeded the amount contributed by Jiffy Lube for the release.