Northwest Towing & Recovery v. State

Citations: 919 N.E.2d 601; 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 2; 2010 WL 86140Docket: 18A02-0905-CV-409

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; January 11, 2010; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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In the case 919 N.E.2d 601 (2010), Northwest Towing Recovery (Appellant) contests the trial court's ruling that limited its storage-fee lien to $1500 against vehicle owner Frances Brinkley (Appellee). The vehicle was towed and stored at Northwest's facility at the request of the Muncie Police Department following a fatal accident involving Frances’s son, Steven Brinkley, who was subsequently convicted of related charges. Northwest accrued over $3600 in storage fees and sought to recover this amount. The trial court's decision was based on Indiana Code section 32-33-10-5(b), which governs lien limitations, and Northwest argued that Frances was not the "real party in interest" under Indiana Trial Rule 17(A). Additionally, Northwest claimed a lien under Indiana Code section 9-22-5-15, arguing that the trial court's order violated its due process rights. Frances cross-appealed, asserting the trial court abused its discretion in imposing any fee for the vehicle's return. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the fee limitation was appropriate and finding no errors in the trial court's judgment. The narrative includes background on the towing contract between Northwest and the City of Muncie, the accident details, and the legal proceedings that followed concerning the vehicle's evidence preservation.

On January 8, 2007, the State filed a Motion for Amended Order regarding the preservation of evidence, asserting that Northwest was charging the Muncie Police Department $20 per day to store a Nissan in an "interior police bay." The State requested the Court to mandate that the vehicle be stored in a secure outdoor location instead, citing cost concerns. At no point did the State seek to release the vehicle to the Defendant, Brinkley, or his mother, nor did they request payment for storage fees. Brinkley was convicted and sentenced on August 27, 2007, during which time he could have asked the Court to release the vehicle to his mother, who later inquired about its return after his appeal. 

On September 15, 2008, Brinkley’s mother filed a motion to retrieve the vehicle, leading to a Court order on October 28, 2008, for its release. However, Northwest had titled the vehicle in its name after receiving the order. Subsequently, on December 23, 2008, a motion was filed against Northwest for failing to release the vehicle. After a hearing on February 2, 2009, the Court ordered Northwest to transfer the title back to Frances Brinkley and release the vehicle upon her payment of $1,750 for towing and storage fees. The trial court noted that Northwest failed to provide evidence of proper title acquisition and determined that the Muncie Police Department should cover storage fees incurred until Brinkley's sentencing. From that date until October 28, 2008, Frances was responsible for a maximum fee of $1,500 for storage, while also liable for specific towing fees totaling $250. Northwest was ordered to bear costs from the date of the Court's order until the vehicle was returned. Both Northwest and Frances Brinkley appealed the Court's decision.

An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision contradicts the facts or reasonable deductions from those facts. Northwest contends that the trial court's order should be vacated because Frances was not a party to the criminal proceedings, violating Trial Rule 17(A), which mandates actions be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Northwest argues that Frances's lack of party status invalidates the trial court's jurisdiction. However, it is noted that criminal courts may have jurisdiction over non-parties under certain circumstances, as highlighted in WTHR-TV v. Cline. Even if Northwest claims the trial court shouldn't have considered Frances's involvement, the principle of invited error applies, meaning Northwest cannot benefit from an error it caused or neglected. Since both parties were represented by counsel and participated in the proceedings without timely objection until after the ruling, Northwest has waived the right to contest this issue on appeal.

Furthermore, Northwest argues that the trial court incorrectly limited its storage charges to $1500, claiming no statutory cap exists on such charges under Indiana Code section 9-22-5-15(a). This statute states that entities performing work on vehicles have a lien for the reasonable value of their charges, which Northwest believes was not appropriately recognized by the trial court.

Indiana Code section 32-33-10-5(b), effective since 2005, establishes that individuals or businesses involved in towing, repairing, storing, servicing, or maintaining motor vehicles possess a lien on those vehicles for reasonable charges related to these services, capped at $1,500 for storage. In the event of conflicting statutes, specific statutes take precedence over general ones unless there is clear intent to supersede. Although Indiana Code section 9-22-5-15(a) appears to allow unlimited storage fees, it applies only when the vehicle owner requests services, which did not occur in this case. Evidence showed that the Muncie Police Department requested the vehicle's storage, and a court order confirmed this. Consequently, Northwest cannot claim the full storage fees under section 9-22-5-15(a) and is limited to $1,500 under section 32-33-10-5(b).

Regarding the transfer of title, Northwest argued that the trial court violated its rights by ordering the title to be returned to Frances, asserting it had properly obtained the title by foreclosing on its lien. However, Northwest failed to provide legal authority or evidence supporting its claim of a proper title acquisition. The trial court found that Northwest titled the vehicle in its name after being ordered to return it to Frances. Therefore, the trial court's decision to order the title transfer back to Frances was deemed a proper exercise of discretion.

Frances, in her cross-appeal, argues against liability for storage fees incurred by Northwest, claiming her son’s actions led to these fees. However, precedent from *Jones v. Harner* establishes that a vehicle owner can be held liable for storage fees even without prior consent if they subsequently permit storage to continue. In this case, both Frances and her son were aware of the vehicle's storage and did not request its return until after a significant delay, indicating acquiescence to the charges. The trial court found that Frances should pay storage fees from August 27, 2007, until the vehicle's return on October 28, 2008, affirming the $1500 fee imposed. Although Frances suggests that Northwest could have sought judgment against her son instead, the court concluded that Northwest was entitled to pursue Frances for the fees. Ultimately, the judgment of the trial court is upheld, affirming Frances's liability for the storage fees.