Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc.

Citations: 38 Cal. App. 3d 519; 113 Cal. Rptr. 277; 1974 Cal. App. LEXIS 1071Docket: Civ. 13297

Court: California Court of Appeal; April 9, 1974; California; State Appellate Court

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In Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transport, the Court of Appeals of California addressed an accident involving a car and a truck, where both drivers sued each other for personal injuries. A jury determined that neither party was entitled to recover damages. The plaintiff, Cheryl Jean Downing, appealed on three grounds: (1) the trial court erred in its jury instructions; (2) the truck driver, Newton Wilson Mikesell, was negligent as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court allowed improper cross-examination.

The accident occurred on April 2, 1971, on State Highway 74. Downing was driving a 1970 Datsun while Mikesell operated a 1969 GMC truck with a mobile home trailer. Both vehicles were traveling west on a four-lane road when Mikesell began to turn right at Sanderson Road, moving from the slow lane into the fast lane, partially obstructing traffic. Downing attempted to pass the truck but collided with it after believing it would turn left instead of right. 

On appeal, Downing argued that the jury instruction regarding overtaking another vehicle was inappropriate since the truck was turning right. However, the court noted that Downing did not object to the instruction or propose an alternative, which forfeited her right to contest it on appeal. The court referenced several precedents indicating that failure to raise such objections at trial limits the ability to challenge jury instructions post-verdict.

The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by not providing a specific jury instruction pertaining to the legal conditions under which a vehicle may pass to the right, as outlined in Vehicle Code section 21754. Although this instruction would have been suitable, the plaintiff did not request it, and parties in civil cases are responsible for proposing comprehensive jury instructions according to their case theories; thus, the court was not obligated to provide additional instructions. The plaintiff also claims the truck driver was negligent for failing to signal before turning, asserting that the jury recognized this negligence by ruling against the driver’s cross-complaint. However, even if the truck driver was negligent, contributory negligence must also be considered. The rear driver has a duty to maintain a proper lookout and control of the vehicle to avoid collisions, and whether the rear driver was negligent is primarily a factual question for the jury. Evidence indicated that the plaintiff may not have noticed the truck's turn signals or braking, suggesting possible contributory negligence on her part. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly allowed questioning about a prior accident from 1969, which aimed to establish a history of negligence. Generally, evidence of prior accidents is inadmissible if used solely to imply a tendency toward negligent behavior.

The prohibitory rule against admitting evidence of prior accidents is based on its limited probative value compared to potential prejudicial effects, distractions from relevant issues, and unfair surprises. In this case, evidence of a prior accident was deemed inadmissible because it did not support the plaintiff's claim, which did not include kidney damage from the current accident. The evidence was also ruled out for impeachment purposes since the plaintiff did not deny having prior kidney issues nor sought damages for them. The defense's questioning regarding the previous accident was inappropriate.

The core of the issue was whether the mention of the prior accident constituted reversible error, potentially leading to a miscarriage of justice. The case was closely contested, with substantial evidence of the truck driver's negligence as reflected in the jury's decision against him. However, the evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was questionable, relying on a single witness's testimony regarding the truck's signals. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the truck driver, likely influenced by the defense's insinuation of the plaintiff's accident-proneness.

The conclusion drawn is that the improper admission of prior accident evidence likely affected the jury's decision, suggesting that the plaintiff could have achieved a more favorable outcome if not for this error. The judgment was reversed, with concurrence from Justices Gabbert and Kaufman. A petition for rehearing was denied on April 30, 1974, and a request for a Supreme Court hearing was denied on June 5, 1974. Notably, the plaintiff had previously communicated that she was not seeking damages for her kidney condition in this trial, countering the defense's claims. Additionally, evidence regarding the truck's signal operation was inconsistent, further complicating the defense's position.