Micah Fialka-Feldman v. Oakland University Board of Trustees

Citation: Not availableDocket: 10-1084

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; May 4, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Micah Fialka-Feldman, a continuing-education student with mild cognitive disabilities, obtained a permanent injunction in December 2009 requiring Oakland University to provide him with on-campus housing after the University denied his housing application. He claimed discrimination based on his disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted him summary judgment, determining that the University was obliged to accommodate his disability by waiving its housing policy. Following the University's appeal in January 2010, Fialka-Feldman moved into a dormitory and completed the OPTIONS program by April 2010, after which he left the University with no intent to return, rendering the appeal moot. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and vacated the district court's unreviewed judgment. Fialka-Feldman was awarded $101,676 in attorney’s fees, which the University did not contest, and the fee award was held in abeyance pending the appeal's outcome.

Article III of the United States Constitution restricts federal courts to hearing only 'cases or controversies,' necessitating that this requirement is met to file and maintain a claim. If circumstances arise that prevent the court from granting effective relief, the case must be dismissed as moot. In this instance, the dispute transformed into an abstract issue with no consequences for either party after Fialka-Feldman exited the OPTIONS program, rendering the district court's order for on-campus housing irrelevant since he is no longer a student. Consequently, any appeal would not yield 'meaningful relief' for either side. 

Fialka-Feldman’s claim for money damages does not reinstate the case, as he did not cross-appeal the relevant judgment. Similarly, a pending award for attorney's fees does not create an Article III controversy where none exists. The case is also not 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' since Fialka-Feldman completed the program and has no plans to return. Past precedents illustrate that cases involving students typically become moot upon graduation, as seen in DeFunis v. Odegaard, where a student’s appeal was rendered moot upon nearing graduation. The same principles apply here; the 'capable of repetition' exception cannot be invoked because Fialka-Feldman will not face the same situation again, making any ruling on the merits purely advisory. Although Fialka-Feldman acknowledges the mootness of his case, the University contests this assertion.

A 'public interest' exception to the mootness doctrine is argued, suggesting federal courts can address non-live disputes that involve significant legal questions beneficial to the public. However, this notion is contested, as the 'case or controversy' requirement prohibits advisory opinions universally, regardless of public interest. Advisory opinions, described by Felix Frankfurter as problematic 'ghosts,' do not become less risky simply due to heightened public concern. The excerpt emphasizes that federal courts must remain vigilant in ensuring their powers align with constitutional authority, particularly on issues of public importance, which necessitate clear, adversarial contexts for decision-making as outlined in United States v. Fruehauf.

The absence of a recognized public interest exception to Article III is reiterated, noting that the Supreme Court has not acknowledged such a doctrine, nor have lower courts established it in relation to mootness. Although Washington state law might allow for considerations based on public interest, mootness under Article III remains a federal issue that must be resolved before jurisdiction is assumed. California courts may adjudicate based on public importance, but federal courts are constrained by the requirement to address actual controversies.

The text also clarifies that while substantive issues may be of public interest, this alone does not grant justiciability if there's no expectation of recurrence of the issue. The court will not adjudicate moot cases solely based on their public significance. The excerpt references instances where public interest has influenced the application of the 'capable of repetition' exception to mootness, yet distinguishes this from establishing a standalone public interest exception. The University’s reliance on Big Rivers Electric Corp. v. EPA is noted, where the court found the matter was not moot due to the potential for recurrence, but this does not substantiate a broader public interest exception.

Big Rivers raises two potential interpretations regarding the public interest exception related to the mootness doctrine: it may either invoke the 'public interest' to apply the 'capable of repetition' exception or serve as non-binding commentary on moot cases. For thirty-six years, no court has recognized Big Rivers as establishing a distinct public interest exception to mootness within Article III. While many state courts do have public interest exceptions allowing them to address matters of 'continuing public importance' even after cases become moot, federal courts operate under limited jurisdiction, which Article III constrains. This distinction is significant, as state courts can relax mootness rules and issue advisory opinions, as evidenced by various state constitutions. 

When cases become moot on appeal, the typical practice is to reverse or vacate the lower court's judgment and remand for dismissal, acknowledging that a party should not be bound by a ruling without the opportunity to appeal, particularly if mootness arises from actions by the prevailing party. In the current case, the University cannot pursue the appeal due to the completion of the program by Fialka-Feldman, and the mootness is not attributed to any fault of the University. Although Fialka-Feldman argues the University could have expedited the appeal, the failure to do so is not considered grounds for unilateral fault. It is common in appellate litigation to allow cases to progress at their normal pace, making it inappropriate to penalize the University for following this norm.

The University’s request for a 28-day extension is deemed a standard legal maneuver and does not indicate negligence in safeguarding rights. The case is considered moot due to the circumstances surrounding it, and thus vacatur is the appropriate course of action. The precedent set in Constangy, Brooks, Smith v. NLRB is noted but found inapplicable; unlike in that case, where the NLRB's compliance with a production order rendered the appeal moot, the University’s compliance with the injunction did not eliminate the potential for meaningful relief. The case only became moot after Fialka-Feldman completed the program, making vacatur suitable. Prior cases, such as Harper v. Poway Unified School District and Cook v. Colgate University, support this conclusion, as they involved similar situations where compliance did not moot the case until completion of the relevant programs. The potential lingering issue of attorney’s fees does not alter the decision to vacate the district court's merits ruling, and the determination of Fialka-Feldman’s status as a 'prevailing party' for fees will be left to the district judge. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as moot, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court.