Keener v. CITY OF HERRIN

Citations: 919 N.E.2d 913; 235 Ill. 2d 338; 335 Ill. Dec. 888; 2009 Ill. LEXIS 1322Docket: 107658

Court: Illinois Supreme Court; October 8, 2009; Illinois; State Supreme Court

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The Illinois Supreme Court case, 919 N.E.2d 913 (2009), involves Jennifer Keener as the appellee against the City of Herrin, the appellant. The court addressed whether the City was granted absolute immunity under Chapter 745 ILCS Section 10/4-107 for releasing a person in custody, specifically regarding an incident where the police were not present at the accident scene. The court aligned with the appellate court's findings on jurisdiction, concluding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the plaintiff's motion, rendering her appeal untimely. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of both the circuit and appellate courts and dismissed the appeal without addressing the substantive issue.

The background reveals that Chelsea Keener, arrested for underage alcohol consumption, was released on a $1,000 I-Bond and later struck and killed by a car while walking on a public street. Jennifer Keener, as the personal representative of Chelsea's estate, filed a negligence complaint against the City, asserting liability under the Survival Act and the Wrongful Death Act. The circuit court originally dismissed the complaint but allowed for an amended version, which included additional counts of willful and wanton misconduct. The City moved to dismiss again, asserting immunity under the Tort Immunity Act and claiming no special duty was owed to Chelsea. Ultimately, the case was dismissed, with the court noting the plaintiff's decision to stand on the pleadings without further amendment.

A stamp indicated that a judicial secretary was to send a copy of the record sheet to all attorneys of record, which did not occur. On April 17, 2006, the plaintiff responded to the defendant's motion to dismiss. Following this, a status hearing was requested by the defendant and conducted on August 7, 2006, where attorneys appeared, and the motion to dismiss was reconsidered. The plaintiff's counsel learned of the dismissal on that date, asserting that no notice was sent to the attorneys. He claimed that both parties had previously requested that the motion to dismiss be held in abeyance pending a deposition of Officer Quinn Laird, a request that defense counsel did not confirm.

In the plaintiff's motion to reconsider, filed on August 17, 2006, it was noted that the dismissal was unknown to both parties, and it sought relief under section 2-1401, citing the lack of notice regarding the September 13, 2005 ruling. On August 25, 2006, the court granted the motion to reconsider but ultimately dismissed the case again. The defendant subsequently filed a 'Special Appearance' to challenge the court's jurisdiction over the motion to reconsider, arguing that the plaintiff had a responsibility to monitor her case and that section 2-1401 could not excuse her attorney's negligence.

On September 5, 2006, the court acknowledged the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on September 18, 2006. The appellate court raised the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte, referencing the precedent set in Granite City Lodge No. 272, which established that the time for filing an appeal is not extended due to a lack of actual notice of an order disposing of a posttrial motion, provided the order is publicly expressed at the proceedings.

The appellate court recognized the requirements set forth in previous cases but did not elaborate on them. It distinguished this case from Granite City by noting that the plaintiff, Jennifer, did not appeal the September 13, 2005, dismissal order but instead filed a motion for relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On August 25, 2006, the circuit court granted Jennifer's petition but subsequently dismissed her amended complaint after reviewing new evidence. The appellate court stated that Jennifer's appeal required a different analysis than Granite City, as that case did not involve an appeal following a section 2-1401 petition.

Furthermore, the appellate court differentiated this situation from Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., where the claimant was unaware of a final order due to lack of notification. In Mitchell, after the circuit court granted a section 2-1401 petition and reentered the judgment, the appellate court found it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal from the reentered judgment, reasoning that the failure to receive notice was not a valid ground for vacating the order under section 2-1401. The court emphasized that relief under section 2-1401 is inappropriate when the goal is merely to reenter the same order to extend the appeal period. The appellate court concluded that in this case, unlike in Mitchell, the section 2-1401 petition was supported by more than just a lack of notice, distinguishing the circumstances significantly.

The appellate court determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of Jennifer's section 2-1401 petition, as there was a cross-appeal in a related case but not in this one. The court noted two separate orders from the August 25, 2006, docket entry, with Herrin not appealing the circuit court's grant of Jennifer's petition. Therefore, the appellate court stated it could not assess the circuit court's decision to vacate its earlier order. The analysis highlighted that the circuit court lost jurisdiction 30 days after its September 13, 2005, ruling, rendering Jennifer's September 18, 2006, notice of appeal untimely and ineffective. The court emphasized reviewing only matters of record, rejecting claims made in supplemental briefs by both parties regarding the August 8, 2005, case management conference. The docket entry from that date indicated an imminent ruling, and the court's final order on September 13, 2005, clearly dismissed the case without reason to delay an appeal. Counsel had a duty to ensure the appeal was filed in a timely manner, aligning with precedent established in Granite City and Mitchell.

Plaintiff's counsel failed to check the court file for over a year, discovering a critical order only on August 7, 2006, despite a final order from September 13, 2005, which required an appeal to be filed within 30 days. Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) mandates that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the final judgment or after the last postjudgment motion is resolved. The plaintiff did not file a timely postjudgment motion or appeal, making the September 18, 2006, notice of appeal untimely unless the 'motion to reconsider' could be viewed as a valid section 2-1401 petition. However, there is no evidence in the record supporting the appellate court's claim that the circuit court treated it as such. The plaintiff did not meet the requirements for section 2-1401 proceedings, nor did the circuit court indicate it was acting under that section. The motion to reconsider was granted without a basis related to new evidence, and the circuit court did not notify the defendant about a section 2-1401 petition, which is necessary for establishing personal jurisdiction. The circuit court's actions were inconsistent with section 2-1401 procedures, as it ruled before the defendant had time to respond. Overall, the circuit court's ruling pertained solely to the motion to reconsider without any reference to a section 2-1401 petition, leading to the conclusion that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the case.

The circuit court's ruling indicates it did not grant a section 2-1401 petition, but rather a motion to reconsider, which it lacked jurisdiction to do. Section 2-1401 allows for the vacatur of final judgments older than 30 days, requiring the petitioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a meritorious claim existed in the original action and that they acted diligently in presenting their case. The court dismissed the plaintiff's action as meritless after the motion to reconsider, indicating that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a valid claim. The court's ability to dismiss the case based on the same evidence contradicts the idea that a valid section 2-1401 petition was granted. Furthermore, since the court's ruling was framed as a motion to reconsider, which was filed after the jurisdictional deadline, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review it. Consequently, the judgments of both the circuit and appellate courts were vacated, and the case was dismissed, with concurrence from all justices involved.