In Re Estate of Grabow

Citations: 392 N.E.2d 980; 74 Ill. App. 3d 336; 30 Ill. Dec. 215; 1979 Ill. App. LEXIS 2885Docket: 78-237, 78-237A cons.

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; July 27, 1979; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the probate court's orders approving the second and third final accountings of the estate of Harold Grabow, despite objections from residuary legatee Betty Galvin. Galvin raised two main issues: (1) whether she had the right to know the identities of beneficiaries of a land trust involving estate properties, and (2) whether she could demand a jury trial regarding the executor's accounting. The court ruled that Galvin had no rights in either instance. It stated that while the Illinois Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury, such a right does not extend to probate proceedings unless explicitly provided by statute. The court referenced the Probate Act of 1975, which allows for jury trials only in limited circumstances. Furthermore, the court found that the lack of trust beneficiary information in the accounting did not constitute a valid objection, as the sale of estate properties was properly disclosed, and the appointment of a trust was deemed irrelevant unless fraud was evidenced. Galvin's claims regarding a potential conflict of interest involving a director of the executor bank were unsupported by the record and not previously raised in probate court, limiting the appellate court's ability to offer relief.

The trial court's decision to allow the executor's accountings to designate trusts instead of individuals for the legal title transfer of real estate was not considered an error, as the issue was not raised during the trial. The beneficiary's appeal raised multiple issues, including the propriety of the real estate sales and alleged conflicts of interest regarding the executor's attorney, who testified to prove the will's execution. The Probate Act of 1975 permits attorneys to attest to wills while also serving as executors without intrinsically creating an appearance of impropriety.

The beneficiary's primary concern was her perceived lack of access to estate records, yet she failed to specify which documents she wished to review. The executor indicated willingness to provide access to specified documents, and the court file was publicly available. The beneficiary claimed a right to court review of all estate matters, referencing relevant probate act provisions regarding fiduciary procedures for real estate transactions. However, prior rulings indicated that the question of the executor's authority to sell the property without court approval was moot, as the sale was completed under the will's authority.

Additionally, the beneficiary argued that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to approve the final accounting due to pending appeals. The final accounting was approved on June 16, 1978, while earlier appeals were dismissed on May 2, 1978, and the mandates were reissued on October 26, 1978. The issuance of the mandate was found to properly restore jurisdiction to the probate court, affirming that the court had the authority to proceed with the final accounting despite the pending appeals.

A mandate from the reviewing court is issued no earlier than 21 days after the judgment, unless an affidavit for review intent in the supreme court is filed. The losing party has 56 days post-judgment to file a petition for leave to appeal. If a petition is filed, the mandate may be recalled until the petition is resolved. The jurisdiction of the lower courts is only affected if the petition is filed before the mandate issues. Once the mandate is issued in the circuit court, that court retains jurisdiction until a higher court issues a stay or recalls the mandate, regardless of a subsequent petition for leave to appeal. In this case, the appellant did not inform the appellate court of her intent to appeal further and failed to show whether her petition for leave to appeal was filed before or after the probate court's order approving the accounting. Consequently, the probate court maintained jurisdiction, and the appellant could not claim error for not obtaining a stay or recalling the mandate. Regarding objections to the accounting, the probate court clarified objection timelines and allowed the appellant sufficient opportunity to present her objections, which were ultimately overruled as lacking merit due to insufficient evidence. The court also approved executor fees of $60,000 and attorney fees of $80,000, which were deemed not excessive relative to the estate receipts totaling over $2 million.

Reasonable compensation for executors and their attorneys is determined at the discretion of the probate court, which must consider factors such as the estate's size, the work performed, the skill involved, time expended, and the diligence shown. The probate court's decisions can only be overturned if found manifestly erroneous. The First National Bank of Lockport was appointed as administrator on February 8, 1974, and the estate remains open due to pending attorney fee determinations for Ms. Galvin's initial representation. Over the past 5.5 years, the executor has dealt with multiple appeals from Ms. Galvin and contested the will against 32 heirs and a claim by Susan Johnson, which was settled for $90,000. The executor successfully managed the estate's finances, prepared necessary tax documents, and facilitated the sale of two real estate parcels above their appraised values, including a 160-acre parcel sold to the Village of Romeoville for $1,248,000. The court found the executor’s work to be thorough and beneficial to the estate, affirming the fees approved by the probate court. However, the determination regarding fees for Ms. Galvin's attorney is reserved pending further review.