People v. Fife

Citations: 392 N.E.2d 1345; 76 Ill. 2d 418; 30 Ill. Dec. 300; 1979 Ill. LEXIS 332Docket: 51423

Court: Illinois Supreme Court; June 8, 1979; Illinois; State Supreme Court

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Gregory Fife was convicted by a jury for the unlawful delivery of cannabis, specifically for delivering more than 30 but less than 500 grams. The appellate court remanded the case to the circuit court to investigate a potential conflict of interest involving Fife's court-appointed trial counsel, who was a special assistant Attorney General. During the evidentiary hearing, the trial counsel claimed she informed Fife of her limited role; however, Fife contended he was unaware of this until after his conviction. The appellate court ultimately reversed the conviction due to the identified conflict of interest and ordered a new trial, despite dissenting opinions. The Attorney General acknowledged that there was no effective waiver of the conflict by Fife. At the time of Fife's representation, the Attorney General's office prohibited staff from representing defendants in criminal cases, a policy that was later modified. The current policy allows for representation under specific circumstances, requiring written applications for exceptions that disclose potential conflicts and obtain client waivers. The Attorney General argued that appointing a special assistant Attorney General for limited work would not inherently create a conflict when representing defendants in criminal cases.

The Attorney General opposes a per se rule of conflict of interest for defense counsel who also serve as special assistant attorneys general in noncriminal matters, arguing that such a rule is not supported by prior court decisions (People v. Coslet, Kester, Meyers, and Stoval), which did not involve the Attorney General. He contends that this rule would complicate the appointment of attorneys in less populated counties. Conversely, the defendant argues that the right to effective assistance of counsel necessitates undivided loyalty, which could justify overturning his conviction. He acknowledges his counsel's diligence but raises concerns about potential subtle influences that could affect her independence. The defendant asserts that a per se conflict of interest rule, which does not require a showing of actual prejudice, is consistent with and even mandated by previous cases, regardless of the burden it may impose on the Attorney General's operations. 

The excerpt highlights conflicting appellate court rulings on this issue, noting that some districts have adopted a rule without requiring proof of actual prejudice, while others remain undecided or have overruled previous decisions. It references the fundamental right to effective counsel as established in Glasser v. United States and underscores the importance of counsel's loyalty, illustrated by the reversal of convictions in Stoval and Coslet due to conflict of interest situations where counsel's commitments compromised their ability to represent their clients fully.

Coslet affirmed the Stoval rule that a per se conflict of interest exists when a defendant is represented by defense counsel who is also a special assistant Attorney General, particularly when the defendant is not adequately informed of this relationship and does not provide a knowing waiver. This decision is supported by previous cases such as People v. Kester and People v. Meyers, which emphasize the importance of effective assistance of counsel. The court recognizes potential pressure on defense counsel due to their affiliation with the Attorney General's office but believes that thorough disclosure and informed waivers can mitigate these issues. The ruling extends to scenarios where lawyers from the same firm have affiliations with the Attorney General while representing criminal defendants. The court decided that this ruling should apply prospectively to offenses occurring after the filing of this opinion, to maintain sound judicial practices and avoid inequity. Consequently, the appellate court's judgment is affirmed, with the noted qualification regarding the prospective application of the ruling.