Carty v. City of Ojai

Citations: 77 Cal. App. 3d 329; 143 Cal. Rptr. 506; 1978 Cal. App. LEXIS 1218Docket: Civ. 49176

Court: California Court of Appeal; February 1, 1978; California; State Appellate Court

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Edwin L. Carty and his family (plaintiffs) successfully challenged two city ordinances in a California court, seeking to void these ordinances that re-zoned their property from a commercial use (C-1) suitable for a shopping center to a service commercial zoning (CPD), thereby nullifying a potential sale of the property for such development. The court found the ordinances void on two grounds: their arbitrary and discriminatory nature, and the city being estopped due to prior agreements regarding the zoning. Initially, in 1965, the property was outside city limits and zoned for commercial use under county regulations. The annexation of the property into the City of Ojai was contingent upon the Cartys’ consent to retain the C-1 zoning, which was granted. However, in 1971, the city rezoned the property, prompting the Cartys to seek legal remedy. The city of Ojai, predominantly residential with a population of about 6,000, had previously adopted a General Plan aimed at strengthening its central business district, which considered the impact of outlying commercial developments.

The 1963 plan opposed extending 'C-1' zoning, yet the annexation of the West Ojai addition and 'C-1' zoning were completed. Six years later, the property was rezoned 'CPD' after further review by the planning commission. In 1968, planning consultants recommended limiting development outside the downtown area, but implementation faced economic obstacles. Efforts were made to redevelop downtown, widen Maricopa Road, and improve utilities. In 1967, an assessment of about $51,000 was levied against the Cartys for infrastructure costs. In late 1969, the city manager pushed for prioritizing the central business district plan and reviewing 'C-1' zoning on Maricopa Road. Throughout 1970, discussions continued regarding zoning studies near the West Ojai addition. In January 1971, the Cartys aimed to sell five acres for a shopping center, with assurances from the city manager that it was permissible under current zoning. Following a submitted plan by Mr. Rose, the planning commission postponed approval to study the proposal further. By early 1971, concerns arose about excessive 'C-1' zoning, leading to a committee's recommendation to evaluate the retention or removal of 'C-1' zoning on Maricopa Highway. A moratorium on zoning was recommended pending further study, which passed with a narrow vote. The city council later confirmed the planning commission could recommend zoning changes after public hearings. On August 4, the commission recommended rezoning undeveloped 'C-1' properties, including the Cartys', to 'CPD', which disallowed retail use, citing the general plan and the Hahn-Wise report as justification. After a public hearing on August 24, five ordinances were passed to rezone the properties, finalized on September 21, and later upheld in a referendum. Subsequently, Mr. Rose canceled the property purchase, leading to litigation.

The judgment declaring two ordinances void and restoring the Carty property to its original 'C-1' zoning lacks legal and factual support. The city exercised its legislative powers appropriately when adopting the ordinances, which re-zoned the Carty property from 'C-1' to 'CPD'. The court's finding that the rezoning aimed to obstruct the proposed shopping center development was contested, as it claimed the change was arbitrary and discriminatory. Key findings included the absence of changes in land use patterns from 1965 to 1971, a surplus of 'CPD' zoned property in 1971, and the city council's prior rejection of reasons for the new zoning during the 1965 annexation. The Carty property was not uniquely targeted; all undeveloped 'C-1' properties along Maricopa Road were re-zoned 'CPD'. The evidence reviewed indicated a rational basis for the rezoning, concluding that it was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.

The trial court failed to adhere to established legal principles, as highlighted in *Lockard v. City of Los Angeles* and *Sunset View Cemetery Assn. v. Kraintz*. In *Sunset*, the court dealt with a cemetery association's application for a building permit that was denied based on a narrow interpretation of "cemetery purposes." After a writ of mandate was issued to compel the permit, the county enacted an emergency ordinance to prohibit the use, which the court found to be without a legitimate emergency and discriminatory. The current case lacks evidence that the ordinance was part of a zoning plan or that it was contemplated before the court's prior decision; it appears to have been enacted solely to obstruct the respondent's plans.

Unlike *Sunset*, the officials here had prior intentions to promote community development in line with the general plan, making the rezoning ordinances appropriate. The issues in question were thoroughly examined, contrasting with *G. D Holland Construction Co. v. City of Marysville*, where summary judgment was improperly employed. The findings of the trial court regarding the lack of rational support for the rezoning ordinances were not substantiated by the record.

Regarding equitable estoppel, the doctrine requires that a party may not deny facts that they led another to believe were true, resulting in reliance and detriment. The elements include the party being aware of the facts, intending their conduct to be relied upon, the other party being ignorant of the true facts, and reliance causing injury. While estoppel can apply to government actions when necessary for justice, it cannot negate strong public policy.

Equitable estoppel can be applied to government entities similarly to private parties, but additional considerations must be addressed. The governing rule allows for estoppel against the government if the elements justifying estoppel against a private party are present and the injustice from not applying estoppel outweighs any public interest or policy concerns. The case references City of Long Beach v. Mansell as foundational, emphasizing that estoppel may not be applied if it undermines significant public policy. 

In the context of Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, the Cartys claimed they lost a purchaser due to the city's zoning changes, while the city defended its legislative authority to manage growth through zoning. The court found that the Cartys' reliance on the city's conduct lacked strong support, noting no promises were made regarding the duration of the zoning classification. It highlighted Carty's extensive public service experience, suggesting he was aware of legislative limitations. The court reaffirmed that the police power is ongoing and cannot be restricted by contracts or previous agreements, underscoring the state's inherent right to regulate for public welfare.

Carty is presumed to have been aware that a government entity can modify zoning laws. His reliance on the indefinite duration of the 'C-1' zoning designation for his property is deemed unjustified, especially given his public life experience. The alleged 'injustice' does not warrant invoking equitable estoppel against the government in exercising its legislative powers. Since the adoption of the city’s general development plan in 1963, public officials have consistently worked towards implementing it, overcoming obstacles to align zoning with this plan. The enactment of two rezoning ordinances was part of this responsibility, and applying estoppel would undermine public policy. The case of Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. supports this conclusion, indicating that entitlement to a building permit cannot be assumed based on previous permissions. The Orange County Building Code requires that permit applications comply with current laws, not just past approvals. A landowner can't claim a better position without applying for a permit. The judgment is reversed, with the court affirming that legislative determinations must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, emphasizing the separation of powers and the courts' limited role in reviewing legislative actions.

The courts' role is to assess whether legislative actions have exceeded constitutional limits. In this case, the court's task is to evaluate if there is a reasonable basis for the zoning authorities' actions; if the reasonableness of the ordinance is debatable, the legislative decision should be upheld. Appellate courts are not bound by the trial court's findings on the reasonableness of zoning ordinances if the matter is debatable, and they will examine various factual elements, including property characteristics and development trends.

Opinions regarding property suitability do not determine the outcome; zoning authorities have discretion, and their actions are upheld if debatable. Legislative actions are presumed valid, and judicial notice acknowledges that zoning plans take time to develop. Immediate construction that could undermine a zoning plan is discouraged during its formation. The trial court's review requires thorough examination beyond the ordinance's text, considering its purpose and circumstances of adoption. Such inquiries typically necessitate a trial, including cross-examination and evidence creation for thorough appellate review. The city's affidavits did not legally validate the interim rezoning ordinance, and the trial court improperly granted summary judgment, obstructing petitioners from presenting evidence of discriminatory intent regarding their project.