Stoller v. Village of Northbrook

Citations: 516 N.E.2d 355; 162 Ill. App. 3d 1001; 114 Ill. Dec. 200; 1987 Ill. App. LEXIS 3464Docket: 87-515

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; October 13, 1987; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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On January 8, 1987, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a trial court's grant of a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of plaintiff Russell Stoller against the Village of Northbrook. The village's motion to reconsider the TRO was denied on January 13, 1987, followed by a failed motion to dissolve the TRO on February 10, 1987. Subsequently, the village appealed the February 10 order. Stoller's complaint, filed on December 22, 1986, alleged harassment and delays by the village after being granted a building permit for his property at 1620 Pfingsten Road. After the initial permit issuance on May 12, 1986, the village claimed the permit was void and mandated Stoller to meet specific requirements, which he asserted he fulfilled. The village later imposed a stop order on construction, citing additional requirements and a false need for an easement for drainage, which Stoller contested. An affidavit from Wayne Hanson, the village's director of development, indicated that Stoller's proposed sewer extension did not align with the village's approved plans. The court ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings.

Approval for Stoller's construction is dependent on the granting of easements outlined in a revised engineering plan, which Stoller has not yet provided to the village. Hanson asserts that easements are typically part of the building permit process, referencing specific sections of the Northbrook Municipal and Building Codes to support this claim. Consequently, the village has barred Stoller from commencing work until the easement is granted. In response, Stoller filed for an injunction against the village to prevent obstruction of construction. 

During a court hearing on December 22, 1986, Judge Siegan determined that no emergency justified immediate action and postponed the case. Stoller subsequently sought a change of venue, which was granted, leading to Judge Albert Green taking over. On January 8, 1987, Judge Green heard Stoller's request to connect water and sewer lines, allowing the connections despite the village's insistence on compliance with the easement requirements, including for storm sewers. While permitting Stoller to occupy his new home, Judge Green maintained that the village could still pursue its claim for the easement. 

On January 12, 1987, the village attempted to reconsider the TRO, but Judge Green denied the motion. The village later sought to dissolve the TRO and filed a motion to dismiss Stoller's injunction complaint, both of which were denied by the court on February 10, 1987.

On February 18, 1987, the village filed a notice of appeal concerning a February 10 interlocutory order, focusing on two key issues: the court's jurisdiction under Rule 307 and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dissolve a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The court affirmed its jurisdiction, noting that a denial of a motion to dissolve a TRO is indeed appealable under Rule 307. This rule allows appeals from certain interlocutory orders, including those related to injunctions, provided that the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days of the order. It clarified that filing a motion against an interlocutory order does not extend the deadline for the appeal notice. Several cases were cited as precedents for these Rule 307 issues. The excerpt also recounted a related case involving a corporation and an employee accused of disclosing trade secrets, detailing the timeline of the TRO, its extensions, and subsequent preliminary injunction, highlighting procedural aspects relevant to the appeal process and the importance of timely filing.

All States contended on appeal that the trial court improperly issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). The appellate court clarified that a TRO or the denial of a motion to dissolve it is an appealable order under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1). The court found that All States' motion to dissolve the TRO was timely but concluded that All States could not challenge the TRO's issuance or the denial of its dissolution on appeal. This was because All States only filed a notice of appeal against the preliminary injunction order granted on May 15, despite the motion to dissolve being denied on March 15. All States failed to appeal within 30 days of the denial, thus forfeiting their right to contest it.

The document also referenced the Trophytime case, where a plaintiff's late notice of interlocutory appeal—filed almost four months after the denial of an injunction—resulted in lack of jurisdiction for the appellate court. In the Wise case, the appellate court allowed an appeal because the defendants filed within 30 days after the denial of their motion to dissolve the injunction, not the issuance of the initial injunction. Similarly, the village in the current case filed its notice of interlocutory appeal within the required 30 days after the denial of its motion to dissolve the TRO, thus maintaining its right to appeal, even without contesting the original TRO issuance.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the case and upheld the trial court's decision to deny the village's motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order (TRO). It noted that Illinois courts have used various terms for preliminary injunctions, but the Illinois Supreme Court has clarified that a TRO issued with notice is effectively the same as a preliminary injunction. The January 8, 1987, TRO was treated as such since it was issued after a hearing. The trial court has broad discretion in dissolving temporary injunctions, and the appellate court's review is limited to whether that discretion was abused. The party benefiting from the TRO must demonstrate a fair question about their rights to maintain the order. The village's arguments regarding the appropriateness of the TRO were deemed irrelevant for this appeal, which only addressed the denial of the motion to dissolve the TRO. The court found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision to preserve Stoller's rights until a final determination. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings.