US Ex Rel. Johnson v. Gilmore

Citations: 860 F. Supp. 1291; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11672; 1994 WL 456014Docket: 93 C 4082

Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; August 17, 1994; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jasper Johnson filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 1974 murder conviction and subsequent 15 to 45-year sentence, which was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court in 1976. Johnson asserts he was denied leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court and that both his motion for habeas relief and post-conviction petition were denied. In July 1993, he raised twelve grounds for relief, including claims of trial court errors regarding evidence exclusion, jury instructions, and alleged inadequate assistance of counsel, among others. 

The court must first determine if Johnson met two procedural requirements before addressing the merits of his petition: exhaustion of state remedies and avoidance of procedural default. Exhaustion requires that all state avenues be pursued before federal intervention, emphasizing federal-state comity. The court cited previous rulings to illustrate these procedural principles. Consequently, Johnson's petition was ultimately denied.

Respondent Jerry D. Gilmore failed to address the exhaustion of state remedies in his Answer, violating Rule 5 of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires respondents to inform the district court about the exhaustion status of a prisoner's state remedies. The case Truitt v. Jones establishes that if respondents do not explicitly state their position on exhaustion, the defense is waived. Although the Supreme Court in Granberry allows appellate courts to revisit exhaustion issues in exceptional cases, the current court finds that Gilmore has waived this defense by not properly addressing it.

Johnson, the petitioner, asserts he has exhausted his state remedies by filing a post-conviction petition that was denied as untimely, claiming all meaningful remedies are exhausted. He cites Harris v. DeRobertis, which clarifies that a habeas claim cannot be dismissed for failure to exhaust if a post-conviction petition would be untimely unless Illinois law indicates that a petitioner could demonstrate a lack of culpable negligence for the delay. Johnson's petition was denied based on its untimeliness, and there is no Illinois precedent provided by the Respondent indicating a way to show lack of culpable negligence. Consequently, Johnson has adequately pursued available state remedies, satisfying the exhaustion requirement.

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner must raise issues during state court proceedings, as established in Wainwright v. Sykes. Johnson's claims meet this procedural requirement as well.

A federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented to state courts, as established in Picard v. Connor. A convicted state prisoner waives constitutional objections not raised in the highest state court unless they can demonstrate cause for their default and prejudice from the alleged constitutional errors, as noted in Nutall v. Greer. In this case, the Respondent argues that Johnson did not appeal issues 1 and 4-12 to the Illinois Supreme Court and fails to establish cause or prejudice for the procedural default. Johnson claims the issues were raised appropriately. The determination of whether issues were appealed focuses on the last state court's opinion, which was from the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Johnson. This court examined multiple issues, including the amendment of the record, exclusion of evidence, and sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court disregarded any amendments to the record and found ground one of Johnson's petition, regarding the record amendment, to be without merit. Consequently, grounds 9-12 of Johnson's petition cannot be considered without a showing of cause and prejudice. A cause and prejudice exception exists, allowing petitioners to overcome procedural defaults by demonstrating external factors for their failure to raise issues, a fundamental miscarriage of justice, or ineffective assistance of counsel. However, non-constitutional errors not raised on direct appeal are barred regardless of cause and prejudice.

Johnson's petition fails to establish cause and prejudice for not raising issues in state court. He does not identify any factors contributing to his failure or demonstrate that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred, which requires proof of actual innocence due to a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court precedent indicates that ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be cited as a cause for procedural default unless that claim was also exhausted in state court. Therefore, Johnson’s ineffective assistance claim is procedurally barred due to his failure to raise it previously.

The Respondent asserts that several claims presented to the Illinois Appellate Court are based on independent and adequate state grounds, which federal courts will not review if they do not involve federal questions. A state court decision is considered to rely on state law if it is clearly articulated. The doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds prevents federal courts from addressing state prisoner claims if the state decision is based solely on state law, in order to avoid advisory opinions. The Supreme Court established that the presumption of reliance on federal law applies only when it is evident that the state court primarily based its decision on federal law. This presumption will not apply universally in habeas cases; instead, federal courts must first ascertain that the state court’s decision primarily rested on federal law before applying it.

A Federal District Court must first establish the existence of a predicate before applying the conclusive presumption of Harris. In the current case, the Illinois Appellate Court's decision primarily relied on state criminal and evidentiary laws rather than federal law, indicating that grounds two through eight are based on independent and adequate state grounds. Although Johnson did not raise due process challenges in the Illinois courts, the Seventh Circuit may still analyze state evidentiary matters concerning the U.S. Constitution. Generally, state evidentiary rulings do not form a basis for granting habeas corpus, as they are typically state law issues and rarely constitute constitutional violations. However, a writ may be issued if a state evidentiary ruling violates due process by resulting in a fundamentally unfair trial. To prove the denial of due process, the petitioner must demonstrate that the evidentiary error was significantly prejudicial, undermining the trial's fairness. The focus is on whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighed its probative value to the extent that it violated due process. Even if an evidentiary error occurred, it may be deemed harmless if it is unlikely to change the trial's outcome or affect the defendant's right to a fair trial, as some constitutional errors can be considered insignificant and not necessitating automatic reversal of conviction.

The court determines that the evidence in question does not have a prejudicial effect that greatly outweighs its probative value. Specifically, evidence regarding an argument between Johnson and the victim, as well as Johnson's flight to Arkansas post-shooting, was deemed to have minimal exculpatory significance since the jury was already aware of these facts. Johnson's claims regarding restricted cross-examination lack merit as his counsel failed to establish a proper foundation for impeachment, thus not prejudicing Johnson’s case. The court also finds that Johnson did not receive an unfair trial under the Due Process Clause.

In addressing Johnson's assertion that jury instructions were erroneous, the court emphasizes that jury instructions must be evaluated within the context of the entire charge. For a federal court to reverse a state conviction based on jury instructions, it must be shown that the instructions violated a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The absence of a separate instruction on accident did not constitute constitutional prejudice, as the existing instruction on death by misadventure sufficed.

Regarding the claim of insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court notes that all evidence must be viewed favorably to the state. Johnson's admission to shooting the victim and prior abuse of the victim support the conclusion that a rational trier of fact could find all elements of murder established. Finally, the issue of replaying a recorded conversation does not amount to a constitutional violation, as the second playback was necessary for clarification. Johnson fails to prove that any alleged errors had a prejudicial impact that compromised the fairness of his trial.

Johnson must demonstrate that the prosecutor's closing argument caused actual prejudice affecting the jury to succeed on his claim regarding prejudicial remarks. The burden is on him to show that the remarks resulted in "actual prejudice" as per Brecht v. Abrahamson. Johnson asserts that the prosecutor referenced facts not in the record. The court applies a two-part test from United States v. Swiatek to evaluate such claims: first, whether the remark was improper in isolation, and second, whether it deprived Johnson of a fair trial when viewed in the context of the entire record. The Illinois Appellate Court found that Johnson did not make necessary objections, indicating the issue was waived unless it resulted in a denial of a fair trial, which the court did not find. 

Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, raised in ground nine, Johnson can introduce this claim for the first time in a habeas petition. To prove ineffective assistance, he must show his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and that there’s a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different without the errors. A strong presumption exists that counsel provided adequate assistance, which Johnson failed to overcome based on the record.

In ground eleven, Johnson claims new exculpatory evidence emerged post-decision. He argues this new eyewitness testimony, not presented to the jury, violated his rights. However, according to Guinan v. United States, the law does not permit a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in a habeas context. The principle asserts that judges are not accountable for disregarding evidence unknown at the time of conviction, emphasizing that a wrongful conviction must be linked to a legal error to qualify as a "miscarriage of justice."

A federal court lacks the authority to rectify non-constitutional errors in habeas corpus proceedings under section 2254. Johnson's petition is impacted as follows: ground one is moot because the appellate court did not evaluate the amended materials; grounds two through eight are barred due to their resolution based on independent state law and lack of constitutional significance; grounds ten and twelve are procedurally barred for not being properly presented in state courts; and grounds nine and eleven are dismissed on their merits. Consequently, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. Johnson may additionally contend that his counsel's failure to address certain issues constitutes a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, referencing Strickland v. Washington. A hearing was held on November 19, 1976, shortly after the Illinois appellate court issued its opinion.