Taylor v. Bartow County, Ga.

Citations: 860 F. Supp. 1526; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11548; 1994 WL 455108Docket: 1:93-cr-00135

Court: District Court, N.D. Georgia; June 6, 1994; Federal District Court

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The case involves Sandra N. Taylor, the Plaintiff, against Bartow County, Georgia, and Naomi Tish Johnson, in her capacity as Clerk of the Bartow County Superior Court. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia is addressing motions for summary judgment regarding alleged violations of First Amendment rights. The Court denies the Plaintiff's motion and grants the Defendants' motion, vacating a previous order to clarify factual background and legal standards.

The factual background outlines Plaintiff Taylor's employment history beginning in 1978, where she served as a deputy clerk and was critical of the management style of her then-supervisor, Grady Jefferson. During the lead-up to Jefferson’s departure and Johnson’s election, Taylor supported candidate Steve Stewart and actively campaigned for him, including soliciting votes at work. Disputes arise concerning whether Taylor supported Johnson’s candidacy; Taylor claims she did not, while Johnson believes she did. Taylor engaged in campaign activities using her vacation and sick leave but also made negative comments about Johnson’s potential leadership at work, suggesting that Johnson would not provide any improvements over Jefferson. The interactions included discussions about office management and a potential partnership between Taylor and Stewart, which ultimately did not materialize. The Court's order elaborates on procedural and substantive due process issues, the application of the Pickering test, and qualified immunity in the context of the case.

Plaintiff expressed doubts about the definiteness of her appointment under Defendant and communicated her unwillingness to work for Defendant if elected. She publicly criticized Defendant's leadership potential, suggesting no change from the previous Clerk, Mr. Jefferson. Upon learning of Defendant's candidacy, Plaintiff conveyed her inability to support her but hoped it wouldn't affect their friendship; Defendant acknowledged that it did hurt her feelings. After Defendant's election victory, Plaintiff congratulated her and expressed a desire for amicability, to which Defendant responded that she bore no grudges. During a campaign debate, Defendant pledged to retain the current Clerk's office staff, including Plaintiff, and indicated to Plaintiff's husband her intention to keep Plaintiff on. However, rumors circulated about Plaintiff's potential termination, and later, Defendant sought advice on how to dismiss her.

Defendant hired two new employees before the end of 1992, but these individuals were not made deputy clerks. Although the political support of other deputy clerks is unclear, several were known to have supported Defendant's opponents. After the election, while most deputy clerks sought to work under the new administration, Plaintiff was not reappointed. Plaintiff claimed there were no rifts with her colleagues and that she performed her duties satisfactorily, but evidence indicated otherwise. Other clerks reported discomfort in interacting with her, citing her avoidance of colleagues and reluctance to engage in work-related communication. Testimonies from colleagues detailed her withdrawal from team responsibilities, poor attitude, and selective cooperation, leading to a breakdown in teamwork and communication within the office.

Plaintiff struggled to complete work due to the absence of colleagues and the Plaintiff's frequent court appearances, which led to increased pressure and longer hours for the author. Despite these challenges, former Clerk Mr. Jefferson attested to Plaintiff's good performance and stated that assignments to go to court were made by him, not Plaintiff. Plaintiff denied ever expressing a desire not to work for Defendant and maintained that her court appearances were at Mr. Jefferson's direction. Testimonies indicated that the Clerk's office experienced low morale prior to December 31, 1992, but improved afterward. Following the election, Defendant expressed a desire to move past tensions but later decided not to rehire Plaintiff, citing pressure from her family due to Plaintiff's support for a losing candidate. On December 31, 1992, Defendant informed Plaintiff of her termination, claiming it was a last-minute decision. Separation documents noted Plaintiff's performance as good to excellent, and Defendant offered a recommendation, though there were suggestions these statements were made to protect her own employment prospects. Additionally, while a county resolution in 1983 established personnel policies that should govern all elected officials, Mr. Jefferson did not agree to these policies and allowed inconsistencies in employee benefits. Plaintiff, believing the county policy applied to her, was not provided with a notice of termination reasons or a hearing prior to or following her termination.

Summary judgment is authorized under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) when there is no genuine dispute over any material fact, allowing the moving party to obtain judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the significant burden of proving that no material fact dispute exists, which can be satisfied by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Even when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the initial burden remains with the moving party until it shows that no factual issues warrant a trial. If satisfied, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts that indicate a genuine dispute exists. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the nonmoving party is not required to present additional evidence. The court must view the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and must ascertain whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, rather than resolve such issues itself. Facts are deemed material based solely on the governing substantive law, and disputes that do not affect the outcome of the case are not material. Summary judgment can only be granted if the record demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact, and a genuine dispute requires evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to favor the nonmoving party. The standard for determining genuine issues mirrors that for directed verdicts. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot simply rely on allegations or denials but must provide specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

Unsupported allegations or conclusory affidavits cannot effectively support or oppose a summary judgment motion, as established in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and reinforced by case law. Specifically, the non-moving party's allegations must be backed by specific facts to hold probative value. Courts are required to resolve factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party only when their specific facts contradict those presented by the moving party. The underlying principle of Rule 56 is to compel the non-moving party to provide at least one sworn statement of a disputed fact before proceeding with litigation. While there may be debate regarding the necessary specificity of evidence, a higher standard is required, meaning that mere colorable evidence or unsupported claims can lead to summary judgment. Importantly, the court must assume all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-moving party, but is not obligated to resolve all doubts that way. Additionally, procedural due process mandates that an individual cannot be deprived of a property interest without meeting certain legal requirements, which must be determined according to state law, recognizing that property interests can arise from ordinances or implied contracts.

The governing authority of each Georgia county can adopt reasonable ordinances related to local government unless preempted by state law. Specifically, counties cannot take actions concerning the salaries or personnel of elective county offices, except for personnel under their jurisdiction. County commissioners may establish civil service systems for their employees but lack authority over employees of other elected officials unless explicitly allowed by law. Powers of public officers are defined by law, and actions taken beyond their authority are not binding. County commissioners' authority is strictly limited; they cannot create regulations for employees of other elected officials without specific legislative permission. Deputy clerks of the superior court are not county employees but serve at the discretion of the clerk, whose powers and duties they share. Their employment is contingent on the clerk's term, making job security uncertain without legislative authority for guaranteed employment terms.

Clerks of Superior Court in Georgia lacked the authority to assure employment for their staff prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. 36-1-21. Under existing statutes, no merit boards for clerks' employees could be established, contrasting with provisions for deputy sheriffs. Employees of elected officials cannot invoke county commission procedures applicable to county employees. The determination of whether an employment guarantee creates a property interest relies on the specific statute or ordinance, as established in relevant case law. Generally, property interests in public employment are created by state law or contracts, with less formal evidence being acceptable if it indicates "mutually explicit understandings." However, these understandings must align with state law to establish a legitimate claim. A merit system can confer a protected property interest, whereas incomplete ratification procedures do not create such interest. Employee handbooks alone do not establish property interests unless supported by state law or applicable to the employee. The existence of personnel policies does not transform an at-will employee into a contract employee under Georgia law. The ongoing dispute concerns the existence of a property interest under Georgia law, particularly focusing on O.C.G.A. 36-1-21, which allows counties to establish civil service systems via ordinance. Notably, this statute was enacted after Bartow County's personnel policy creation attempt, indicating it does not apply retroactively to the case at hand.

Plaintiff asserts that a statement from the County Clerk indicated that county policy applied to employees of the Clerk of Court, and that employees received a handbook reflecting these policies, which Plaintiff believed were applicable to her. Additionally, Plaintiff references a 1983 County Commission resolution stating that "each elected department head has agreed to be governed by said plan." Defendants counter that this resolution contains a typographical error, claiming the Clerk of Court did not agree to be bound, policies were not adhered to, and state law specifies that deputy clerks serve at the will of the Clerk of Court. 

The Court determined that Plaintiff had no property interest in her position, citing that prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. 36-1-21 in 1986, Georgia law did not permit a Clerk of Superior Court to establish a merit system or personnel policy that would provide a guarantee of employment status for deputy clerks. It emphasized that such authority was lacking and that the statute clearly states deputy clerks serve only during the tenure of their principal. The Court found that any attempt by a Clerk to guarantee employment would contravene state law, rendering such guarantees void and unenforceable.

The receipt of a personnel manual did not create a property interest for Plaintiff as it could not apply to her according to the statute governing her position, of which she was presumed to have notice. The manual was considered an internal policy of the Clerk of Superior Court, similar to that in Wofford, and did not confer any enforceable property interest.

Regarding substantive due process, the Court noted that it does not provide a claim for violation of state-created rights, citing McKinney v. Pate. The analysis of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights would be conducted under the framework of First Amendment jurisprudence rather than as a separate substantive due process violation. 

In the context of First Amendment claims related to political patronage, the Plaintiff argued for evaluation based on principles from Rutan v. Republican Party, while Defendants suggested an analysis under free expression principles from Connick v. Myers. The Court acknowledged a split in circuit interpretations but referenced clear guidance from the Eleventh Circuit in Terry v. Cook.

The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes between political patronage cases and those involving free speech, emphasizing the necessity to maintain clarity between the two. The political patronage analysis is deemed relevant for mass discharges, while the Pickering/Connick balancing test is applied when a single employee is terminated. In this instance, the court finds that the Pickering/Connick analysis is appropriate because the case does not involve an elected official punishing supporters of an opponent; rather, some deputy clerks who campaigned against the defendant remain employed. The plaintiff's argument that the court misinterpreted precedent and imposed a numerical test for applying the Elrod/Branti standard is rejected. The court references the Fourth Circuit cases of Jones v. Dodson and Joyner v. Lancaster to reinforce its decision, emphasizing that in cases with mixed motivations for termination, the Pickering balancing test is applicable rather than strict scrutiny. The court further clarifies that the precedent set in Jones supports its conclusions, as it characterized political patronage discharges as narrow exceptions not relevant to situations of personal loyalty or insubordination. The plaintiff's failure to adequately address the implications of these precedents undermines her position.

A deputy sheriff, Joyner, actively campaigned for a political opponent of the defendant, resulting in his discharge due to creating distrust and low morale. The court determined that Joyner's political activities were the direct cause of his termination, asserting that this case did not involve "raw political patronage" as established in Elrod and Branti. Instead, the court analyzed the case under the Pickering test, favoring the defendants. In a similar case, the plaintiff argued that the defendants' statements indicated a political patronage motive for not hiring him, citing concerns about loyalty to the new administration. However, the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that this was not a "raw political patronage" case but rather related to "personal, political loyalty," which is not subject to Elrod/Branti scrutiny. Other deputy clerks who did not support the defendant were reappointed, indicating no discriminatory practice. The court emphasized the need to consider the entire record rather than isolated statements. The plaintiff's claims were deemed broad and conclusory, lacking sufficient evidence to counter summary judgment, distinguishing this case from precedents like Rollins and Searcey, which involved different legal issues.

Plaintiff did not invoke Rule 56(f) to postpone the motion for further evidence, leading the Court to find that the record lacks sufficient specific facts supporting her claim. The Court assesses the case as potentially a mixed motive scenario, where Plaintiff's termination relates to both her political expression and affiliation, thus necessitating a Pickering balancing test rather than a pure Pickering analysis. The Court emphasizes that if an employee is discharged based on political affiliation or activities, the defendants must justify their actions under the established Pickering-Givhan-Connick standards.

A critical threshold issue is whether the employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern, requiring an examination of the content, form, and context of the speech, as well as the speaker's intent. The distinction between speaking as a citizen versus as an employee is paramount, aiming to prevent federal courts from adjudicating trivial employee complaints. Statements that blend public and personal issues may still be considered matters of public concern.

If the speech is deemed to involve public interest, the Court will apply the Pickering balance, weighing the employee's rights as a citizen to address public issues against the State’s interest in maintaining efficient public services. Factors influencing this evaluation include whether the speech disrupts government operations, hinders the employee’s duties, negatively affects relationships with colleagues, or undermines workplace harmony.

Key factors in evaluating an employee's speech include its manner, time, place, and choice of words, as well as whether it was publicly or privately spoken, and the forum used. The context of the speech is also critical, particularly whether it aims to improve workplace performance or arises from personnel disputes, its potential to disrupt the workplace, and the degree of public interest involved. When speech involves both public and personal concerns, the presence of personal speech is considered in the Pickering balance. Courts cannot dissect a single expression into protected and unprotected parts but may separate multiple statements over time for the Pickering test. In this balancing, speech unrelated to public concern cannot be used to argue that it was a motivating factor in adverse employment actions, although employers may use such speech to demonstrate non-retaliatory reasons for employment decisions.

The Connick and Pickering issues are legal questions for the court, while Mt. Healthy issues are factual. An employee must prove that protected speech was a substantial factor in adverse employment decisions, after which the employer must show the same decision would have occurred without the protected conduct. Defendants contend that the specifics of the Plaintiff's speech—such as disparaging comments about the Defendant at work and campaigning—render it unprotected. In contrast, the Plaintiff asserts that factual disputes exist regarding the nature and impact of her statements, referencing a legal precedent that suggests isolated remarks should not lead to termination.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff's speech and its impact in the clerk's office were unprotected due to improper campaign activities, such as soliciting votes during work hours. These actions negatively influenced the Pickering balance, which evaluates the rights of public employees against the interests of their employers. Additionally, Plaintiff's behavior created strain in working relationships, including hostility towards colleagues and avoidance of interactions, which culminated in a tense office atmosphere that improved only after her departure. Mr. Stewart's acknowledgment of Plaintiff's potential position as Chief Deputy introduced a personal interest that further weighed against her in the analysis. While the Defendants did not claim Plaintiff was terminated for poor performance, they argued that her attitude and actions adversely affected the office's overall performance. The Court noted that an employee's individual performance does not need to suffer for termination to be justified. The Court also sought clarification on whether to analyze unprotected speech under the Pickering test or through a Mt. Healthy factual determination, indicating that if Plaintiff's protected speech was a significant factor in her termination, summary judgment would not be appropriate.

Defendants contend that instances of non-protected speech and activities should be considered in the Pickering analysis as they relate to the Plaintiff’s protected speech. If the speech instances are unrelated, the focus shifts to whether termination would have occurred without the protected speech. Conversely, if the instances are related, a Pickering analysis is warranted. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's speech and actions are sufficiently intertwined with the campaign and election context, meaning that both protected and unprotected speech are subject to Pickering scrutiny. It asserts that all relevant speech and actions stemmed from campaign-related activities, implying that without these, the contested behaviors would not have occurred.

Regarding qualified immunity, the Court emphasizes that "clearly established constitutional rights" must be interpreted with specificity, ensuring that a reasonable official would recognize when their actions violate these rights. The qualified immunity defense is robust, shielding officials from liability except in cases of clear constitutional violations. Defendants argue that the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's actions could be seen as disruptive, warranting termination for undermining the office's integrity. In contrast, the Plaintiff claims her termination was due to protected speech and political affiliation violations, contradicting established law. The Court draws parallels to Dartland, where speech that undermined a supervisor's authority justified the employer's actions despite being protected. It concludes that the Plaintiff cannot circumvent qualified immunity by broadly claiming First Amendment rights and must demonstrate whether a reasonable employer would know that termination was unlawful under the specific circumstances of this case, including her political support and behavior following the election.

The Court determines that the Defendant qualifies for qualified immunity based on the Pickering analysis, asserting that even if there was a misapplication of the Pickering test, it would not necessarily conclude that the Plaintiff's termination was unlawful. Consequently, the Court vacates its prior order from March 15, 1994, denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, grants the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, and dismisses the Plaintiff's claims. 

The Plaintiff's characterization of her actions at work as "not actively campaigning" is disputed, with evidence suggesting she may have solicited support for a candidate. Additionally, while the Plaintiff claimed to have never stated she would hate to work for the Defendant, the record confirms she expressed she would not work for the Defendant. The Defendant's knowledge or beliefs about other employees' political activities are deemed irrelevant, as established in precedents concerning political patronage claims. 

The discussion regarding procedural due process is reiterated from a previous order, and it is clarified that Georgia law (O.C.G.A. 36-1-21) does not apply to this case. The analysis applies equally to deputy clerks of court, as both clerks and sheriffs have the statutory authority to appoint deputies. The performance bond requirement for deputy clerks parallels that of deputy sheriffs, and the statute regarding deputy clerks explicitly states their duties are contingent upon the principal's retention. Relevant case law does not alter this conclusion.

Fulton County, Georgia has a civil service system that includes deputy clerks of superior court, as established in Foster v. Brown. In Schneider, plaintiffs argued for continued employment based on a pension plan with a ten-year vesting period and an employment handbook referring to "Career Service." They contended that an unwritten custom ensured continued employment, but the court of appeals found this custom did not constitute a mutually explicit understanding, contrasting it with the informal tenure system in Perry. The court noted that even if O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 applied, the outcome would remain unchanged since a second enabling ordinance and a written application from the Clerk of Court were both absent.

The document distinguishes cases where personnel policies were lawfully established, emphasizing that this case differs as it does not involve questions of applicability of such policies to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs criticized the application of the Pickering standard instead of Elrod but the court maintained that the context did not involve "raw political patronage." This position aligns with Lovell v. Floyd County, where the court also declined to apply Elrod and Branti due to a lack of evidence that political allegiance was a dismissal factor. The court concluded that since other deputy clerks who supported the defendant’s opponents were not terminated, the Elrod/Branti/Rutan standards were not applicable in this case.

The Court identifies that the language from the court of appeals mirrors the causation language established in Mt. Healthy, but notes that the focus in Kurtz and Eiland is on the Pickering balancing test. There is inconsistency in whether to evaluate the Pickering balance first or the Mt. Healthy causation second. For summary judgment, it is deemed appropriate to assume causation and address the Pickering issue first, as both the Connick and Pickering matters are legal questions, in contrast to the factual nature of the Mt. Healthy issues. The Defendant’s remarks about familial pressure to terminate the Plaintiff negate the need to assume causation. Although the Plaintiff claimed she would "hate" to work for the Defendant, her undisputed statement that she would not work for Defendant renders this factual dispute irrelevant. The Plaintiff raised a factual issue regarding her court appearances but it is undisputed she also left the office for other discussions, and Mr. Jefferson's affidavit does not contradict this. His affidavit lacks personal knowledge regarding countering other deputies' statements. The Plaintiff's arguments aimed to question the Defendant's motivation for her termination and to invoke Elrod/Branti protections, but the Court concluded that this case does not warrant that analysis. Even if political affiliation influenced her termination, it was not the sole reason, thereby excluding Elrod/Branti applicability. Additionally, the Court was unable to locate the cited cases of Kurtz and Eiland, which address relevant legal questions.