Clipp v. Weaver

Citations: 439 N.E.2d 1189; 1982 Ind. App. LEXIS 1418Docket: 4-1281A192

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; September 22, 1982; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Mary Clipp and Ruth Joanne Clipp, as the Administratrix of Gerald Clipp's estate, appealed the Kosciusko Circuit Court's summary judgment in favor of Charles Weaver. The court's decision was reversed. The case centers on two main issues: the standard of care a boat operator owes to a guest and whether Weaver waived the standard of care issue by not raising it in his initial answer or at the pre-trial hearing.

On May 26, 1976, a collision occurred on Lake Wawasee while Weaver operated his boat with Gerald Clipp as a guest, resulting in Clipp's death. Clipp alleged Weaver's negligence caused the fatal incident. Weaver subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted, leading to this appeal.

The appellate court reviewed the summary judgment for any genuine issues of material fact and proper application of the law. Clipp contended the trial court improperly applied Indiana's motor vehicle guest statute (Ind. Code 9-3-3-1), which limits a host's liability to willful and wanton misconduct. The court determined that this statute applies only to motor vehicles on public highways and is not relevant to boats, which are governed by a more specific statute (Title 14). The court concluded that the specific provisions regarding boats take precedence over the general motor vehicle laws, thus establishing that the standard of care for a boat operator should be based on ordinary care, not the more restrictive motor vehicle statute.

Weaver argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the motor vehicle guest statute by failing to recognize its relevance alongside Indiana law in establishing the standard of care owed to guests. This argument draws on the Seventh Circuit's decision in *McDonnell v. Flaharty*, which determined that a boat owner is liable only for willful, wanton, or intentional misconduct towards guests. However, the excerpt clarifies that federal court decisions are not binding on state courts regarding state law, serving only as persuasive authority.

In *McDonnell*, the court underscored Indiana's policy to promote hospitality, reflected in the low duty of care owed by hosts to guests, supported by similar statutes for vehicles and aircraft. Weaver cites Indiana tort cases that differentiate duties owed by landowners to various types of entrants, asserting that the limited liability for social guests aligns with the promotion of hospitality policy.

The excerpt distinguishes *McDonnell* from the current case by noting that liability in *McDonnell* arose from the inherent instability of a pontoon boat, whereas the current issue involves the operation of a boat rather than its condition. The distinction between premises liability and operational liability is further illustrated by *Munson v. Rupker*, which asserts that an automobile owner owes a duty of reasonable care to guests. The court emphasized that once an automobile is in motion, the owner must exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring passengers, contrasting the lesser duty owed to a trespasser or licensee on real estate.

The excerpt outlines the legislative background and judicial interpretation regarding the standard of care owed by boat operators to their guests in Indiana. It highlights that the case led to the enactment of the "willful and wanton" standard, codified in the motor vehicle code as IC 9-3-3-1. Clipp contends that any policy statements about watercraft hospitality must originate from the legislature due to the strict construction of statutes derogating common law, as supported by B.G.L. v. C.L.S. The court agrees, noting that the Indiana legislature has clearly defined the standard of care in IC XX-X-X-XX, mandating that boat operators must act in a "careful and prudent manner" while considering the rights and safety of others.

The court finds that the term "careful and prudent manner" establishes a standard of ordinary care, rather than one limited to willful or wanton misconduct, as supported by precedent cases. Consequently, it concludes that boat operators owe a duty of ordinary care to all individuals, including gratuitous guests. The trial court's prior application of a different standard was deemed erroneous. 

Additionally, Clipp argues that Weaver waived his right to invoke the motor vehicle guest statute by not mentioning it in pleadings or pre-trial discussions; however, this argument is rendered moot by the court's decision on the standard of care. The court reverses the trial court's summary judgment and remands the case for further proceedings. Judge Young dissents, advocating that boat operators should only be liable for willful or wanton misconduct, aligning with interpretations of similar host-guest relationships in other contexts.

Issues have been consolidated and renumbered for clarity. Both parties concur that no willful or wanton conduct is present. According to Indiana Code (IC) 9-1-1-2, a "vehicle" encompasses any device capable of transporting persons or property on public highways, excluding human-powered devices, certain rail vehicles, fire trucks, ambulances, and specific machinery not designed for general highway transportation. A "motor vehicle" is defined as a self-propelled vehicle, excluding farm tractors or implements of husbandry. The term "public highway" refers to any publicly maintained way open for vehicular travel.

IC 14-1-1-1 defines "watercraft" as any device for transportation on public waters, including various types of boats, and stipulates that "person" encompasses any individual or entity. "To operate" indicates the control or navigation of a watercraft. There is some ambiguity about whether a boat qualifies as a vehicle, with a cited case suggesting that "vehicle" typically refers to land-based transportation. Title 14, enacted in 1957, would take precedence over earlier statutes regarding boats. Clipp alleges that Weaver was negligent in operating the boat, referencing that prior to the motor vehicle guest statute, drivers owed passengers a duty of reasonable care.