People v. Montalvo

Citations: 128 Cal. App. 3d 57; 183 Cal. Rptr. 242; 1982 Cal. App. LEXIS 1210Docket: Crim. 38558

Court: California Court of Appeal; January 20, 1982; California; State Appellate Court

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John Montalvo appeals his conviction for forcible rape, sodomy, and false imprisonment involving a knife, as adjudicated by a jury. He raises two main arguments: the testimony of the victim, Corrine T., was inherently improbable and insufficient to support the conviction, and he is entitled to presentence good-time and work-time credits. 

The evidence against Montalvo indicates that on February 16, 1980, he approached Corrine at a drive-up window of a Jack-in-the-Box in Long Beach, entered her car, requested food, and eventually coerced her to drive him to a motel. There, he threatened her with a knife, forced her into a motel room, and committed the sexual acts after a period of intimidation. Post-incident, Corrine reported the assault, and medical tests corroborated sexual activity. Montalvo's defense claimed the acts were consensual, despite his admission of the events.

The court finds Corrine's testimony credible, dismissing Montalvo's argument as meritless. It notes that the bizarre nature of Montalvo’s actions does not undermine the victim's account. Regarding sentencing, the trial court imposed an 11-year prison term, consecutive to a prior sentence, and expressed uncertainty about Montalvo's entitlement to conduct credits, leaving that determination to the appellate court. The court affirmed Montalvo's right to appeal following the sentencing discussion.

The court clarified that the Department of Corrections is responsible for calculating the total sentence length, which would likely result in approximately 12 years and 8 months rather than a simple sum of previous sentences totaling 16 years and 8 months. The court referenced a prior sentence of six years and eight months for attempted robbery with a weapon, imposed on July 11, 1980, along with an additional eleven-month sentence from July 28. The total unstayed prison term indicated by the clerk's abstract is 17 2/3 years, which also includes 151 days of actual local time served. 

The court emphasized that it is the trial court's responsibility, not the appellate court's, to determine the credit for presentence confinement as mandated by Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (d). This section requires the trial court to ascertain and record the days of custody eligible for credit during sentencing. The court must also ensure that relevant parties are informed of the days in custody prior to sentencing, allowing for any disputes to be resolved at that time. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Sage (1980) reinforced that it is the sentencing court's duty to adjudicate custody credits, clarifying that the Department of Corrections cannot supplant this responsibility.

A trial judge can seek input from counsel if uncertain about applicable law during sentencing. In this case, the trial court granted the defendant credit for 151 days of presentence custody but did not allocate conduct credits, which should be calculated at one day for every two days served, totaling 75 days, unless evidence suggested otherwise. The Attorney General requested a remand to assess whether all 151 days were connected to the conduct of the conviction per Penal Code section 2900.5(b). The Attorney General argued that an unauthorized sentence, which exceeds the court's jurisdiction, can be corrected by a reviewing court. However, the trial court had sufficient information to determine the custody period, and any error in the 151-day finding resulted from misinformation rather than a lack of jurisdiction. Unlike cited cases where the court acted beyond its authority, this trial court's decision was based on valid information. Additionally, the trial court failed to combine consecutive sentences for multiple offenses as required by Penal Code section 1170.1, but this oversight became irrelevant due to subsequent events where the robbery convictions were reversed and remanded for a new trial. The judgment was modified to include an additional 75 days of credit and affirmed as modified. A petition for rehearing was denied, and the opinion was subsequently modified.