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Christensen-Towne v. Dorey
Citations: 2002 ME 121; 802 A.2d 1010; 2002 Me. LEXIS 135
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; July 31, 2002; Maine; State Supreme Court
Peter Dorey appeals a protection from harassment order issued against him by the District Court, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance, and violated his due process rights. Dorey received notice of the hearing only 55 minutes prior, which he claims impeded his ability to prepare. The court had previously issued a temporary order after Kathleen Christensen-Towne filed her complaint on December 19, 2001, setting a final hearing for January 3, 2002. Dorey was served the summons and protection order shortly before the hearing and requested a continuance due to his recent injury and lack of notice. The court denied his request and proceeded with the hearing in his absence. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine confirmed that the District Court had personal jurisdiction over Dorey as he had received proper service, despite the timing. The court recognized that the statute requires personal service but does not specify a timeframe for this service. It noted that the court’s awareness of Dorey’s situation from his phone call indicated he was informed. However, the court found that Dorey had presented adequate grounds for a continuance, and the denial of this request was an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order and remanded the case for a new hearing. A motion for continuance must be filed at least four days prior to the trial date, unless the grounds for the motion were unknown, in which case it should be filed as soon as possible after becoming known (M.R. Civ. P. 40(b)). Any application to the court requires a written motion unless made during a hearing or under specific discovery rules (M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)). The burden of proof lies with the party requesting the continuance to demonstrate sufficient grounds, and the court's ruling is subject to review only for abuse of discretion, requiring the party to show that a continuance serves the interests of justice (Provenzano v. Deloge, 2000). Even without a formal motion, similar principles apply to the court’s refusal to delay proceedings (State v. Greenwald, 1982). A mere phone call to the clerk's office does not constitute a valid motion for a continuance (M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)). In the case at hand, the court abused its discretion by denying Dorey’s request for a continuance, given that he received notice of the hearing only fifty-five minutes prior and had insufficient time to prepare a defense or file a proper motion. The judgment was vacated and remanded for a new hearing. Other contentions raised by Dorey were not addressed. Additionally, the relevant statutes outline the process for filing harassment petitions and the requirements for service of orders and hearings.