Vega v. Lakeland Hospitals at Niles and St Joseph, Inc

Citations: 705 N.W.2d 389; 267 Mich. App. 565Docket: Docket 253739

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; October 26, 2005; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Jodie Vega, Conservator of the Estate of Jeffrey Hurley, a Minor v. Lakeland Hospitals at Niles and St. Joseph, Inc., the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to grant defendants' motion for summary disposition based on the expiration of the statutory period of limitations for a medical malpractice claim. The claim accrued on December 13, 1999, but the plaintiff did not file her complaint until December 11, 2002, well after the two-year limitations period had expired, despite having sent a notice of intent on November 8, 2001, which tolled the limitations period for 182 days.

The plaintiff argued that the statutory grace period should apply due to Jeffrey's alleged insanity under M.C.L. 600.5851(2), and claimed that applying M.C.L. 600.5851(7) violated equal protection rights. However, the court found that M.C.L. 600.5851(1) and (7) explicitly exclude medical malpractice claimants from the disability grace period. Defendants contended that Jeffrey had reached his eighth birthday when the claim accrued, making the two-year limitations period applicable. The court agreed that the limitations period was not extended and concluded that the statutory provisions were rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, thus upholding their constitutionality.

The ruling emphasized that the trial court's decisions on motions for summary disposition and statutory interpretations are reviewed de novo, with the intent of the Legislature being the primary focus of statutory interpretation.

A court must apply clear and unambiguous statutory language as written, while ambiguous language allows for judicial construction. In the context of the case, the plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly granted summary disposition because, despite the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, M.C.L. 600.5851(1) permits her to file her claim due to Jeffrey's insanity at the time the cause of action arose. The court must determine if the disability grace period in M.C.L. 600.5851(1) applies to medical malpractice claims. 

Previous rulings have defined insanity under M.C.L. 600.5851(1) concerning medical malpractice, but the specific query remains unaddressed. When interpreting statutes, every word and phrase must be considered without rendering any part meaningless, and the legislative intent should be discerned from the statute's language. A specific provision will prevail over a general one, and more recent statutes take precedence over older ones, particularly when the newer statute is both specific and recent.

The court asserts that M.C.L. 600.5851(1), in conjunction with M.C.L. 600.5851(7), clearly excludes medical malpractice claimants from the disability grace period. M.C.L. 600.5851(1) states that individuals under 18 or insane at the time a claim accrues have one year to file after the disability is removed, but does not extend the limitations period specified in section 5852.

M.C.L. 600.5851(7) stipulates that if a medical malpractice claim accrues to a person under section 5838a and the individual is under eight years old, they must commence the action by their tenth birthday or within the limitations period defined in section 5838a, whichever is later. For individuals who are eight years or older at the time the claim accrues, the standard limitations period applies. The language in M.C.L. 600.5851(1), which begins with "Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8)," indicates that subsections (7) and (8) exclude certain claims from the general provisions of subsection (1). Subsection (1) applies to all claims under the RJA, except for medical malpractice claims, which are specifically governed by subsection (7). The latter was enacted in 1986, making it more specific and recent than subsection (1), which dates back to 1948. As the plaintiff filed her complaint after the two-year limitations period for medical malpractice claims, the court concluded that she was correctly excluded from the disability grace period of subsection (1), affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary disposition in favor of the defendants.

The plaintiff's argument that M.C.L. 600.5851(7) violates equal protection by imposing a shorter statute of limitations on certain minors compared to others was found not to hold. The court analyzed that both minor and adult medical malpractice claimants are uniformly excluded from the disability grace period, thus maintaining equal treatment among them. Furthermore, while medical malpractice claimants are treated differently from other claimants, this differentiation does not constitute a violation of equal protection guarantees, as previously established in Bissell v. Kommareddi.

M.C.L. 600.5851(7), part of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, was designed to limit the liability period for healthcare providers regarding malpractice claims by preventing minors from pursuing actions that accrued as much as eighteen years prior. The court found that the classifications within the statute rationally related to this purpose, aligning with the precedent set in Bissell. The plaintiff's argument, which references the grace period for insane individuals in M.C.L. 600.5851(1), was deemed unpersuasive in light of Bissell's reasoning. Consequently, the court held that M.C.L. 600.5851(1) and (7) do not violate equal protection rights by excluding medical malpractice claimants from the insanity grace period, affirming the lower court's decision. 

In dissent, Judge Jansen contended that the trial court erred in granting a summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that M.C.L. 600.5851(7) does not limit the saving provisions for insane claimants whose claims accrued post-eighth birthday. Jansen emphasized that the insanity saving clause under M.C.L. 600.5851(1) should apply, allowing additional time beyond the standard two-year limitation for bringing malpractice claims, particularly highlighting that the claim accrual occurs at the time of the alleged malpractice act, regardless of when the claimant becomes aware of the claim.

M.C.L. 600.5851(1) provides disabled plaintiffs with additional protection from statutes of limitations under the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), rather than serving as a tolling provision. Michigan courts affirm that claims can be filed beyond the limitations period until the disability is removed, regardless of whether the limitations period has expired. However, this provision is subject to limitations under M.C.L. 600.5851(7). The interpretation of these statutes must adhere to the plain meaning intended by the Legislature, with courts refraining from speculating beyond the statute’s language. 

M.C.L. 600.5851(7) stipulates that a person under eight must file a claim before their tenth birthday if the claim accrued before reaching eight. Once a person turns eight, the claim is subject to the limitations outlined in section 5838a. Although the standard two-year limitations period applies to those over eight, it does not restrict the saving provision in M.C.L. 600.5851(1) for insane plaintiffs, allowing the limitations period to commence only after the disability is removed.

The statute's language indicates that while M.C.L. 600.5851(7) limits claims for malpractice that accrued before age eight, it does not restrict claims that accrued after age ten. Instead, it directs the reader to the limitations in M.C.L. 600.5838a, which permits plaintiffs to invoke the grace period in section 5851(1). Therefore, the argument that all medical malpractice claims are excluded from the disability grace period is rejected, and the decision to grant summary disposition in favor of the defendants is deemed improper, warranting reversal and remand for further proceedings.

Robert M. Shuman, M.D., in an affidavit, stated that Jeffrey's disability impairs his ability to understand his legal rights. The standard statute of limitations for medical malpractice in Michigan is two years, as established by Burton v. Reed City Hosp. Corp. and codified in M.C.L. 600.5805(6) and M.C.L. 600.5838a(2). M.C.L. 600.5851(8) is determined not applicable in this case, and M.C.L. 600.5851(1) does not need to be addressed for the current appeal. Historically, the age of majority was 21 until 1972, and M.C.L. 600.5851 was enacted in 1948, with M.C.L. 600.5851(7) introduced in 1986 as part of Tort Reform, specifically referenced in Bissell. The factual issue of whether Hurley was insane is not disputed on appeal, and the grace period under M.C.L. 600.5851(1) applies to insane plaintiffs in tort actions for sexual abuse, except when insanity is based on repressed memory. A claim based on insanity must be filed within one year of the removal of the disability, provided the disability existed at the time the claim arose. Infants in medical malpractice cases have one year from the end of their minority to file a claim, regardless of the two-year limitation.