Maywood Mutual Water Co. No. 2 v. City of Maywood

Citations: 23 Cal. App. 3d 266; 100 Cal. Rptr. 174; 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 1210Docket: Civ. 36931

Court: California Court of Appeal; February 2, 1972; California; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Maywood Mutual Water Company No. 2 filed an appeal against the City of Maywood concerning a declaratory relief action regarding the responsibility for relocating parts of its water distribution system due to street improvements. The mutual water company, established in 1920 to serve an unincorporated area now within Maywood, received the entire water system from the Laguna Land and Water Company, which was never recorded. The subdivision maps indicated streets to be dedicated to public use but did not note any easements for the water distribution system, and the water company did not participate in recording these maps. 

The trial court ruled that the water company's rights to use the public streets were subordinate to the city's rights for public use. However, the appellate court found that the April 6, 1920 conveyance implied an easement for the water distribution system throughout its service area, despite the absence of the term 'easement' in the conveyance. The court emphasized that the conveyance was intended to grant the necessary easement privileges, allowing the water company to fulfill its purpose of providing water service. This interpretation aligns with relevant California Civil Code provisions and case law, affirming the water company's established rights to maintain its distribution system.

The incompletion of the water distribution system at the time of conveyance does not invalidate the plaintiff's easements. It is established that a right of way can be granted without specific location or dimensional details, as long as the servient land is adequately described. If a right of way's location is not defined, a reasonably convenient way is presumed to be intended, limiting the exercise of rights to a portion of the land. The parties' intent regarding the easement can be determined by considering the actual uses at the time of the grant and reasonable expectations. The conveyance and context indicate the parties intended for the plaintiff to have an easement for its system, with agreements about costs of service connection relocations for subdivision maps recorded before April 6, 1920.

The primary issue on appeal involves portions of the plaintiff's service area where the subdivider dedicated street easements to the county after April 6, 1920. The plaintiff contends its easement predated the dedication, asserting that the dedication could not grant the county any rights that had already been conveyed to the plaintiff. The trial court found that the county's dedication was free of the plaintiff's easement due to a lack of recorded notice of the easement. The court emphasized that the statute governing the dedication required the map to be signed by all necessary parties, including easement holders, implying no easement could exist prior to the dedication without violating the law. The court presumed compliance with the statute, which stands against the uncontested evidence of the 1920 sale of the water works and the creation of an easement. The question of statutory compliance is not at issue in this case.

The recordation in question did not notify the county of water distribution easements. It is acknowledged that a physical inspection would not have disclosed the easement. The core issue is whether the county can be regarded as a bona fide purchaser for value, as outlined in Civil Code § 1214. It is established that a public entity accepting a dedication does not qualify as a purchaser who provides 'valuable consideration.' The best argument presented by the defendant is that the county, by accepting the streets in the subdivision, incurred an implied or express duty to maintain them; however, this does not equate to the consideration contemplated by § 1214. All property owners have certain obligations regardless of how they acquired their rights, meaning mere ownership does not convert a donee into a purchaser. Although there may be social arguments for treating public entities like bona fide purchasers, that determination lies with the Legislature.

The trial court referenced the case of Airways Water Co. v. County of L.A., which shares similar facts but differs in that the water company had joined in the dedication. This difference warrants distinct treatment. In that case, the water company's priority was denied not by subsequent actions of its grantor but by its own dedication acts. The trial court incorrectly suggested that the plaintiff should be bound by the subdivider's actions due to a 'unity of interest,' but the evidence does not support this claim. The conveyance of the water system to the plaintiff was in exchange for all capital stock, with no indication of a common enterprise or agency relationship. The plaintiff's by-laws state that stock is tied to specific lots and can only be transferred with the land, indicating the subdivider could not retain shares for personal benefit. The absence of authority supporting the trial court's assumptions is noted, and since the plaintiff did not join in the dedication, the ruling aligns with the precedent set in Airways Water Co. As for tracts where streets were dedicated after the water works were conveyed, no actions have occurred to subordinate the plaintiff's interests to those of the defendant.

Defendant is responsible for covering the costs of relocating plaintiff’s facilities when necessary for the defendant's benefit, as established in the cited case. The judgment has been reversed with concurrence from Justices Stephens and Reppy. The record indicates that three mutual water companies were involved, all in similar legal standings against the defendant city, but only one, Maywood Mutual Water Company No. 2, pursued an appeal. 

The Laguna Land and Water Company, the property owner, has agreed to transfer wells, pumps, and related equipment to a purchasing party in exchange for all capital stock of the purchasing party. Furthermore, the company will complete the water distribution system to ensure it adequately serves all lots within the Laguna Mutual Water District No. 2 at its own expense.

The Restatement of Property outlines that the extent of an implied easement is inferred from the circumstances at the time of conveyance, considering not only the current use of the dominant tenement but also reasonable expectations for future uses. 

Legislative changes in 1961 repealed a provision that limited public acquisition of land for highways, allowing for fee title acquisition. The implications of this repeal require further clarification through a relevant case. The enforceability of the duty owed to the public by any member remains an open question, referencing the case of Clay v. City of Los Angeles.