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Roselle v. Village of South Orange
Citations: 91 A.2d 489; 21 N.J. Super. 598
Court: New Jersey Superior Court; October 8, 1952; New Jersey; State Appellate Court
The Village of South Orange appeals a judgment from the Law Division regarding two issues: the court's decision to set aside a resolution that denied a scavenger license to the Roselle partnership, and the order to issue the license immediately. In 1945, the village enacted an ordinance requiring a license for refuse collection and limited the issuance to one licensee, establishing a fee scale for services. This arrangement was challenged by a taxpayer in McKim v. South Orange, where the Supreme Court ruled that the municipality's approach lacked statutory justification. The court emphasized that municipal authority permits either self-collection of refuse or contracting for such services, which must involve public bidding for contracts exceeding $1,000. The exclusive licensing method imposed by the village was deemed a violation of public policy, as it effectively forced residents to pay a private contractor without competition, undermining the principles of fair bidding. Although refuse disposal is critical for public health, the court noted that any changes to this policy should come from the Legislature. Following this decision, the Legislature enacted a new law on April 12, 1946, likely aimed at addressing the issues identified by the court. N.J.S.A. 40:162A-1 and -2 empower the governing body of first-class counties' villages to regulate refuse collection and license public scavengers. Section 1 allows for ordinance-based licensing, while Section 2 permits the governing body to limit the number of licenses based on village needs. On June 17, 1946, the village adopted an ordinance for general licensing and regulation, imposing fees and requirements for licensees, but did not express any intention to limit the number of licenses issued. The village contended that limitations could be established administratively through resolution, a view rejected due to the clear statutory language mandating ordinances for such limitations. Judicial precedent confirms that explicit statutory language is binding, and actions required by law cannot be executed through resolution if the statute specifies ordinance. The resolution in question merely granted a license to one applicant, citing technical non-compliance by another, suggesting that a license would have been issued without such non-compliance. The court highlighted that the statute does not require licenses to be granted by ordinance; rather, it allows for limitations through an ordinance followed by resolutions for individual licenses. The trial court found that neither the ordinance nor the resolution adhered to the statutory requirements for limiting licenses. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, noting that the issue of a potential monopoly from limiting licenses was not relevant since the ordinance did not impose such a limit. The legality of the statute regarding license limitation was deemed outside the current case's scope.