T.D.J. Development Corp. v. Conservation Commission

Citations: 629 N.E.2d 328; 36 Mass. App. Ct. 124; 1994 Mass. App. LEXIS 194Docket: 92-P-1094

Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; February 28, 1994; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court

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T.D.J. Development Corporation filed a notice of intent with the North Andover Conservation Commission to fill 250 square feet of bordering vegetative wetlands for a roadway project, which the commission approved with forty-six conditions. The plaintiff objected to several conditions and appealed to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) under G.L. c. 131, § 40, and also sought declaratory judgment and certiorari review in Superior Court. The DEP issued a superseding order removing the contested conditions. In the Superior Court, the judge granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, determining that the town’s by-law was less stringent than the Wetlands Protection Act and ruled that the DEP's superseding order governed the project. He found two of the commission's conditions (15 and 29) arbitrary and capricious, while condition 37 was deemed reasonable. On appeal, the commission contested the judge's determination regarding the by-law's stringency and the validity of the three conditions imposed. The Wetlands Protection Act allows local governments to enact more stringent regulations, which supersede state standards if consistent. The commission argued that the town's by-law offered greater protection than the state act.

The commission's argument centers on the distinction between its by-law, which regulates all activities within the buffer zone, and State regulations that only require regulation if activities will "alter" a wetland resource area. Under the State regulations, a notice of intent is only needed when an alteration to a protected area is demonstrated. Although "alter" is broadly defined, proof of causation is required. In contrast, the town by-law mandates a notice of intent for any work in the buffer zone, thereby expanding its regulatory scope and alleviating the burden of proof required by State law.

Additionally, the commission asserts that its by-law is more stringent because it includes protections for erosion control, sedimentation control, and recreation, beyond the eight interests covered by the act. This broader scope allows for the imposition of conditions that might not be permissible under State law, signifying that the commission's regulations offer greater protection to wetland resource areas.

The judge found certain conditions imposed by the commission, specifically the no-cut and no-construction limitation in the buffer zone and the requirement for a double siltation barrier, to be invalid as they were deemed arbitrary and lacking evidentiary support. However, the requirement for dumpsters to be placed outside wetland resource areas was deemed reasonable. The review standard for the plaintiff’s complaint is 'arbitrary and capricious' due to the discretionary nature of the commission's actions concerning wetlands protection, which aligns with precedents related to special permits under zoning laws.

The judge applied the appropriate standard of review but found insufficient evidence to conclude that the commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its decisions. A decision is deemed arbitrary and capricious only if no reasonable basis exists to support it, as established in Cotter v. Chelsea. The plaintiff bears the burden to prove that the commission's conditions do not relate reasonably to the by-law's protective interests, which include public and private water supply, groundwater supply, and wildlife habitat.

The commission has the authority under the by-law to impose conditions deemed reasonable to fulfill the chapter's objectives. The no-cut and no-construction limitation was justified based on research indicating the necessity of buffer strips for protecting water quality and wildlife. The imposition of a double siltation barrier to prevent erosion was within the commission's regulatory authority, despite the lack of evidence proving its necessity over a single barrier; a double layer may provide better protection.

The requirement for a dumpster to store waste materials away from wetland resource areas was also deemed reasonable, as it helps prevent contamination of the soil and wetlands. The commission's authority to impose these conditions is affirmed, and the Superior Court's judgment is reversed, with instructions to declare the commission's authority regarding conditions 15, 29, and 37 under chapter 178 of the town's by-law.