Charles S. v. Superior Court

Citations: 168 Cal. App. 3d 151; 214 Cal. Rptr. 47; 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2078Docket: G002601

Court: California Court of Appeal; May 14, 1985; California; State Appellate Court

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Petitioner Charles S. seeks review of an Orange County Superior Court order denying him standing to participate in a permanency planning hearing regarding his 16-month-old grandson, Abel S., and terminating his visitation rights. Charles argues that as a grandparent, he has the right to participate in the proceedings, which he claims are crucial to determining the child's best interests. The case originated when Abel was declared a dependent of the juvenile court due to his mother's mental illness shortly after his birth. Over time, jurisdiction transferred from Los Angeles to Orange County, where a service plan was established for Abel's foster placement, amid concerns about Charles’s understanding of the child's emotional needs. During a scheduled permanency hearing, county counsel objected to Charles's standing, and the trial court denied his motions for participation based on procedural grounds and res judicata, although he was allowed to sit at the counsel table. The court ultimately found Abel adoptable and authorized actions to free him from parental custody, while also ordering no visitation for the mother or grandfather unless conditions improved by a future review date. Charles subsequently filed a writ petition challenging the court's decisions.

Charles argues that the trial court's denial of standing prevents him, as a blood relative with a consistent relationship with the minor, from contributing important insights regarding the child's welfare. He cites In re B.G. and Katzoff v. Superior Court to support his claim for an automatic right to participate in the proceedings. In re B.G. established that foster parents could participate in juvenile court proceedings as "de facto" parents, emphasizing the importance of evaluating all evidence related to the child's best interests during dispositional hearings. The court highlighted that de facto parents should not need to file for guardianship to assert their rights and interests regarding the child's care.

In Katzoff, the appellate court criticized a juvenile court for excluding foster parents from a hearing, stating that their input could have been crucial for determining the child's best interests. The Department of Social Services (DSS) argues that neither case applies because Charles is not a "de facto" parent, given his lack of a day-to-day relationship with the child. However, the rationale from In re B.G. suggests that individuals like Charles, who show a desire to participate and have an interest in the child’s welfare, should be allowed to present their views.

Charles attended all hearings related to his grandson, indicating his commitment to being involved in decisions affecting the child's future. His presence in court on relevant dates further supports his desire to participate. In contrast, Abel's foster parents were absent during a critical hearing. Thus, the argument concludes that Charles should have been permitted to participate, as his input, even if limited, would not disrupt the proceedings.

Charles has the right to participate in the permanency planning hearing, despite the DSS's argument that he has been evaluated and deemed an inappropriate placement. His participation is crucial as he can assert that no in-depth interview or formal evaluation of his home was conducted. The trial court's order may facilitate Abel's adoption, potentially leading to Charles being permanently barred from contact with his grandson, thus emphasizing the need for his involvement. The DSS claims Charles did not comply with the notice requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 1010, which they argue limited their ability to prepare opposition. However, the right to standing in this context is not a factual matter but a matter of right for any blood relative concerned about the child's welfare. The court should allow all relevant evidence regarding the child's best interests rather than impose formal restrictions. The trial court erred by denying Charles the opportunity to express his interest in his grandson's welfare. Therefore, a peremptory writ of mandate is issued to vacate the March 26, 1985 order and to conduct a new permanency planning hearing with Charles's participation. This hearing may be scheduled for June 21, 1985, and Charles is permitted to visit his grandson according to the prior schedule.

All statutory references pertain to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless specified otherwise. The petition lacks clarity regarding additional unspecified matters despite a request for elaboration from Charles' attorney. Section 366.25(d) mandates that if a court finds a minor cannot be returned to a parent or guardian and there is no substantial probability of return within six months, it must develop a permanent plan for the minor. This includes determining if the minor is adoptable and authorizing the appropriate agency to free the minor from parental custody unless certain conditions apply, such as regular visitation maintained by the parents, objections from a minor aged 12 or older, or exceptional circumstances preventing foster parents from adopting. 

Charles' assertion that the trial court should recognize him as a parent or guardian for the application of this section is rejected. Although he identifies as a "de facto parent," this status does not equate to being a "parent" or "guardian" under Juvenile Court Law, thus making section 366.25 inapplicable to him. Additionally, during a chambers conference, it was disclosed that the foster parents were unwilling to adopt the child, a fact that the Department of Social Services (DSS) does not contest.