Whiteco Metrocom Division v. Village of Downers Grove

Citations: 553 N.E.2d 1145; 197 Ill. App. 3d 174; 143 Ill. Dec. 159; 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 559Docket: 2-89-0612

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; April 24, 1990; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Whiteco Metrocom Division appealed a judgment from the Du Page County circuit court regarding a declaratory judgment against the Village of Downers Grove. Whiteco intended to erect two double-faced outdoor advertising signs on leased property near U.S. Interstate 88, each measuring 60 feet wide, 20 feet high, with a total display area of 1,200 square feet, which complied with the Highway Advertising Control Act's size limitations. Although the Illinois Department of Transportation granted the necessary permits, the Village stated it would deny applications for signs exceeding its own zoning ordinance limits—specifically, a height of 20 feet and an area of 200 square feet for advertising signs in the B-3 zoning district. The core issue was whether the Village's restrictions represented an invalid preemption of the Act's maximum sign size allowances. Whiteco argued that the term "customary use," as referenced in the Act, pertains to the outdoor advertising industry's practices statewide rather than local zoning restrictions. Citing legislative histories and the Act's language, Whiteco contended that Downers Grove's limitations were inconsistent with customary use, as the Act’s standards were intended to govern sign regulations. The court ultimately affirmed the judgment against Whiteco.

Whiteco contends that Downers Grove's stringent sign size restrictions contradict the principle of 'customary use.' The Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971, enacted to comply with the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965, mandates regulation of outdoor advertising signs to safeguard federal funding for state highways. This Act governs the size, lighting, and spacing of these signs, emphasizing that their regulation serves public investment, enhances travel experiences, preserves natural beauty, and ensures orderly advertising displays. The Act recognizes outdoor advertising as a legitimate commercial use of private property adjacent to highways, integral to the economy and business functions.

Section 7 of the Act allows local zoning authorities to impose sign regulations consistent with the Act's intent, overriding Section 6 provisions as long as they remain effective. Legal cases have examined conflicts between municipal regulations allowing smaller advertising sign sizes and the Act's stipulation that stricter regulations may be inconsistent with customary use. The interplay among state interests in preserving federal funding, the advertising industry's needs for effective signage, and local authorities' aesthetic and safety concerns has been described as a compromise or conflict, with Section 1 primarily aimed at securing federal funds and Section 7 providing municipalities the authority to impose additional restrictions.

In National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows, the court invalidated a zoning ordinance that limited sign sizes to 200 square feet, finding it inconsistent with the Highway Advertising Control Act (the Act), which established a minimum size of 1,200 square feet for signs. The court clarified that while a home rule municipality could regulate the height of signs, it could not impose more restrictive size limits than those set by the Act. The ruling emphasized that home-rule municipalities must align with state-established plans, as mandated by the Illinois Constitution.

Conversely, in Dingeman Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Zion, the court upheld Mt. Zion's ordinance that prohibited signs larger than 150 square feet, reversing the trial court's finding of invalidity. The appellate court determined that the Act did not preempt local zoning controls and that municipalities retained the authority to impose more restrictive regulations. The court ruled that if "customary use" set by the Act was viewed as the upper limit, then section 7 of the Act, which allows for stricter controls, remained valid. This reasoning was later affirmed in National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, where the court found that the local ordinance imposed stricter limitations than the Act, and thus, the Act preempted conflicting local regulations.

The court upheld the reasoning from Dingeman, affirming that municipalities have the authority to enact stricter local advertising sign regulations without risking federal highway funding, which was a key motivation for the Act's creation. Whiteco argued that prior cases did not support municipal regulation of state highway advertising signs based on local land use standards. Instead, Whiteco maintained that municipalities are limited to regulating sign sizes according to the 'customary use' standard defined in the Act, which pertains to the statewide sign industry practices referenced in section 1 and aligns with a maximum sign area of 1,200 square feet in section 6. 

Whiteco contended that the trial court's decision undermined the rights intended for the sign industry under the Act and rendered the 'customary use' language ineffective. However, the court concluded that the trial court’s ruling did not infringe upon the sign industry’s rights. The interpretation of statutes is a legal question, and courts must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent by considering the statute as a whole and ensuring that every part retains significance. Despite Whiteco's detailed arguments regarding legislative history, the court found that interpretation of the Act did not require external aids. 

It acknowledged that even assuming 'customary use' in section 7 aligns with the definition in section 1, zoning authorities can still impose regulations on sign size, lighting, and spacing in commercial and industrial areas, provided these regulations align with the Act's intent and customary use. Section 1 establishes that the standards in section 6 are consistent with customary use and that stricter limitations would be inconsistent with the Act's objectives.

The regulatory standard for sign size in Illinois, as stated in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 501, allows for a maximum sign area of 1,200 square feet, consistent with customary usage in the state. Signs smaller than this size are permitted, and only signs exceeding 1,200 square feet would be inconsistent with customary use. The statute ensures that outdoor advertising signs along interstate and primary highways can be as large as 1,200 square feet, unless further restricted within zoned business and industrial areas. 

Whiteco contends that the Downers Grove zoning ordinance, which preempts the 1,200 square foot limit, undermines the rights granted in sections 1 and 7 of the Act, as it suggests that local ordinances need only meet traditional zoning law standards without considering statewide customary usage. The Village of Downers Grove counters that the assertion is incorrect, citing a precedent where statewide needs were considered in zoning matters. 

In its reply, Whiteco disputes Downers Grove's stance on this issue, suggesting that without the Act, local communities might not be obligated to consider sign industry practices, and that the reasonableness of sign regulations should be the standard of validity rather than the customary usage standard referenced in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook. 

Additionally, Downers Grove seeks to strike Whiteco's reply brief for introducing new matters and exceeding the scope of a reply, claiming violations of Supreme Court Rule 341. Whiteco argues that its reply is a proper response to Downers Grove's brief and that any improper portions should be selectively struck rather than dismissing the entire brief.

Downers Grove asserts that the traditional zoning test from La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook should not apply to the analysis of its sign ordinance, which is distinct from zoning classifications as it regulates all signs within a district. The appropriate standard is the "reasonableness" test, focusing on whether the ordinance is rationally related to public health, safety, or welfare. Whiteco acknowledges that La Salle is not the proper test but maintains that the reasonableness test does not encompass statewide sign industry practices. Whiteco's argument that Downers Grove misrepresented its position is deemed unfounded, leading to the striking of that portion of Whiteco's reply brief. The court emphasizes that a motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the other party's well-pleaded facts and is only appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist. The trial court's discretion in granting declaratory relief is acknowledged but not afforded the same deference as in cases involving factual determinations. Ultimately, the court affirms Downers Grove's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that customary industry usage does not invalidate the ordinance, and grants Downers Grove's motion to partially strike Whiteco's reply brief. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.