State Ex Rel. Baker Manufacturing Co. v. City of Evansville

Citations: 261 Wis. 599; 53 N.W.2d 795; 1952 Wisc. LEXIS 334

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; June 3, 1952; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court

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Baker Manufacturing Company sought certiorari to review the Evansville board of review's decision to uphold the assessment of its personal property for 1949. The circuit court quashed the writ on October 16, 1951, prompting the company to appeal. The company argued its property was assessed at 60% of its full value, while other properties were assessed at approximately 35%, leading to an unfair tax burden. At a hearing on August 23, 1949, company representatives, including attorney Nitcher, presented evidence suggesting that property assessments in the city were consistently around 31% of sale prices, contrasting sharply with the company's 60% assessment. The company also highlighted discrepancies in the assessment of other personal properties, which were valued as low as 12% to 30% of their market value. During the hearing, the city attorney consistently objected to questioning the city assessor, Phillip T. Smith, on his valuation methods, citing concerns over the integrity of the assessment roll. These objections were upheld, preventing a thorough examination of the assessor by the company's counsel. The hearing ended without any resolution or scheduled continuation. Subsequently, the city clerk informed the company of an informal meeting to discuss the assessment scheduled for September 21, 1949.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Nitcher attended an informal meeting of the board of review, which was called to order but did not involve the taking of testimony. The company had previously requested that all proceedings be recorded, as mandated by sec. 70.47 (8)(e) Stats., yet the clerk noted that recording was omitted due to the meeting's informal nature and lack of specific request for a record. This failure to record is one of the company’s errors on appeal. The meeting was described as informal, characterized by disagreement, and ended abruptly without substantive action being taken, thus the board’s proceedings did not require a verbatim report. 

On October 17, 1949, a notice for a new meeting was issued with ten hours’ notice, which the taxpayer did not attend. This meeting involved examination of the assessor and witnesses regarding the company’s property assessment. Previous case law (State ex rel. Kappa Sigma Building Asso. v. Bareis) indicated no notification was necessary for hearings affecting assessments, based on an earlier statute. However, this was changed by the enactment of sec. 70.47 (7) in 1949, establishing a requirement for forty-eight hours’ notice for hearings following objections. 

The October 18 meeting was not an adjournment of the prior meeting and required statutory notice, which was not provided. Consequently, the objector and their attorney's absence from this meeting was not waived, and the lack of proper notification is a critical issue.

At the hearing on October 18th, the city attorney called the assessor as a witness to answer questions about the assessment, similar to those previously objected to by the company's counsel. These questions were intended to support the assessor's oath and certificate. The answers reinforced the tax roll, leading the board of review to confirm the 1949 valuation of Baker Manufacturing Company's personal property. However, the meeting lacked legal standing due to the absence of the objecting taxpayer and the failure to provide statutory notice, rendering the testimony inadmissible for supporting the assessment. As a result, the confirmation of the assessment was jurisdictionally erroneous, and the 1949 assessment must be invalidated.

In 1950, Baker Manufacturing Company objected to its property assessment, which was confirmed by the board of review. The company sought a writ of certiorari for judicial review, but the circuit court quashed the writ on October 16, 1951. The company appealed, claiming its real estate was assessed at 100% of its true value, while other real property in Evansville was assessed at 60%-70%. Additionally, the company's personal property was assessed at 100% of cash value, whereas others were assessed at 50% or not included at all. The company alleged it was denied a fair hearing by the board of review, despite being represented at multiple hearings.

During these hearings, the company presented data relevant to the assessment, which showed significant discrepancies in the assessed values. The city objected to the assessor answering questions about these discrepancies, arguing it would impeach his certificate. The city attorney asserted that taxpayers had no right to inquire about the assessor's rationale. However, the court determined this was contrary to the law, as the board’s rulings violated the taxpayer’s statutory rights. According to Sec. 70.48, Stats., the assessor must appear and disclose all pertinent information during board hearings, and the examination is not limited to questions from the city. The assessor's certificate, required by Sec. 70.49, indicates the roll is complete and valuations are made in good faith but does not guarantee the absence of errors. Questions about the methods used by the assessor do not inherently contradict his certificate.

Inquiry into the assessor’s actions cannot contradict the prohibition against impeachment of their own affidavits, as stated in sec. 70.49. Legislative intent, indicated in sec. 70.48, mandates that assessors must disclose information relevant to inquiries. Denying taxpayers the right to examine such matters constitutes reversible error. Baker Manufacturing Company presented evidence of property omissions from previous tax rolls, which the city dismissed, arguing that inclusion in the 1950 roll negated the issue. However, sec. 70.44 clarifies that omitted properties must be re-entered for each year of omission, and taxpayer objections regarding these omissions were improperly excluded from evidence. Taxpayers have the right to demonstrate that properties, which should have been assessed multiple times, were underassessed, leading to discrimination against them. The judgments in these cases must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Sec. 70.32 and sec. 70.34 require assessors to value real and personal property at full market value, presuming a sale between willing parties. Uniformity in taxation is not achieved if different fractions of value are applied across property classes; instead, uniformity must adhere to the constitutional requirement of equal treatment for all real and personal property based on value.

Determining the true, current value of property varies in the absence of significant sales, but once established, all property types should be taxed equally. Discrepancies in the assessment of real versus personal property may indicate discrimination, which is unconstitutional. Evidence presented by the taxpayer suggests potential discriminatory practices by the city, though it remains uncertain. The taxpayer faced obstacles in querying the assessor regarding uniformity in assessments, as objections were raised against such inquiries.

The city is allowed to employ experts to assist the assessor, but the assessment board's decisions must be made by a majority, not solely by one expert. Mr. Wallace was hired as an expert, but the additional staff he brought were classified as clerical help, not part of the assessment decision-making process. 

The company requested the board to subpoena certain witnesses, asserting that the board was required to produce them. However, since the board had not received a request from the assessor to compel witness attendance, it acted within its discretion by merely issuing subpoenas. The board's authority to examine witnesses is also discretionary. 

The board provided subpoenas for the taxpayer to use at its discretion, which was deemed sufficient. The board's informal hearings do not support dual roles for counsel as both witnesses and advocates, which can lead to confusion about their capacity during proceedings. A witness who was also counsel contributed to uncertainty, and the trial court's critique of this behavior was justified. Ultimately, judgments were reversed, and cases were remanded for further proceedings aligned with this opinion.