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Village of Plainfield v. American National Bank & Trust Co.
Citations: 323 N.E.2d 841; 25 Ill. App. 3d 1026; 1975 Ill. App. LEXIS 3658Docket: 74-49
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; February 19, 1975; Illinois; State Appellate Court
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of an annexation proceeding initiated by the Village of Plainfield. The village sought to annex territory but faced objections, including one asserting that the State of Illinois owned property within the proposed annexation area, thus requiring consent from the Governor under section 7-1-2 of the Municipal Code. This section mandates that annexation of state-owned real estate in unincorporated areas adjacent to municipalities is contingent upon obtaining the Governor's written consent. The court referenced a precedent where failure to secure such consent was deemed a fatal flaw in a similar case. The contested property included parts of public highway right-of-way, with the village arguing that the dedication of these rights did not constitute ownership requiring consent. However, the defendants contended that Illinois law interprets "owner" broadly to include easement holders, thereby necessitating the Governor's consent for annexation. The court noted that the consent provision in section 7-1-2 had not been previously interpreted by any court, highlighting the unresolved nature of the legal definitions involved. In Woodward Governor Co. v. City of Loves Park, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that a railroad with an easement is considered an "owner" under the disconnection statute, allowing it to sign the disconnection petition. The court emphasized a liberal interpretation of the term "owner" in the context of the Cities and Villages Act of 1941, stating that it encompasses more than just fee simple title holders and should consider the purpose of the statute and surrounding circumstances. The decision referenced prior cases where railroads with right-of-way interests were ruled as "owners." Additionally, in Nicholson v. Village of Schaumburg Center, the court required signatures from both the fee owner and the grantor with an easement in a disconnection petition. In American Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Chicago Heights, the court ruled that a city, as an easement holder for public highway purposes, was not an "owner" and could not block disconnection efforts. The court distinguished this case from others and concluded that land dedicated to the State of Illinois for highway purposes is protected under the disconnection statute, regardless of whether the State holds a fee simple or other interest in the land. The trial court upheld an objection to the inclusion of State highway property in an annexation attempt due to lack of prior written consent from the Governor. The court also ruled that the territory described in the ordinance was not contiguous to the Village. The proposed annexation included multiple subdivisions and was irregularly shaped, intersected by Interstate Route 55. Contiguity was challenged based on the presence of a 60-foot-wide highway (Route 30) that connected two parcels only at a narrow corridor approximately half a mile long, passing beneath I-55. According to Section 7-1-1 of the annexation statute, only contiguous territory can be annexed. Case law indicates that "territory" cannot consist of two separate tracts under one petition, requiring physical adjacency to existing municipal boundaries. The trial court found that the proposed annexed territory failed to meet these contiguity requirements, citing several instances of noncontiguity. Notably, one parcel was separated from the others by 3,700 feet, and another parcel was connected only at a single point, deemed a "Euclidian point," creating a disjointed boundary. The court referenced past decisions that reinforced these interpretations of contiguity, concluding that the circuit court's judgment was well-supported by the evidence and should not be overturned on appeal. Annexation of the highway in question cannot proceed without prior written consent from the State of Illinois, rendering the contiguity of the corridor and the parcels it connects irrelevant to the decision. The parcels east of I-55 are isolated from the remaining territory intended for annexation, demonstrating a complete lack of contiguity. Plaintiffs argue that the irregular shape of the annexation is justified as it targets only subdivided and inhabited areas requiring municipal services. They cite a precedent where annexation connected by a bridge was permitted due to a "unity of purpose and facilities." However, the court clarifies that this concept is merely a facet of contiguity, not an exception to it. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument for noncontiguous parcels to be included in a single annexation petition based on unity of purpose. After objections were raised, the plaintiffs moved to amend the annexation ordinance by excluding contested parcels, but the court denied this motion and a request for continuance. The plaintiffs claimed that the proposed amendment would resolve the ordinance's defects, referencing another case that allowed amendments prior to a hearing. However, the court distinguished this case, noting that the amendment was offered only after the hearing concluded and did not involve perimeter land. The court emphasized the necessity of strict compliance with statutory procedures in annexation cases, affirming that it acted within its discretion by refusing the amendments. The judgment of the circuit court was upheld.