Gallop v. Cheney

Citations: 660 F.3d 580; 2011 WL 4888821Docket: 10-1241

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; April 27, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

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April Gallop, representing herself and her minor child, appealed the dismissal of her complaint by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The court, presided over by Judge Denny Chin, dismissed Gallop’s claims, which included alleged violations of constitutional rights under Bivens, a common law tort for conspiracy to cause death and great bodily harm, and a violation of the Antiterrorism Act. Gallop accused former senior government officials, including Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, of orchestrating the September 11, 2001 attacks to further political agendas and conceal financial mismanagement involving $2.3 trillion in Department of Defense appropriations. The appellate court found Gallop’s claims to be frivolous, affirming the dismissal for failure to state a valid claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Additionally, Gallop’s counsel was ordered to explain why sanctions should not be imposed for the appeal. The court also mandated amendments to the official case caption. The background noted the 9/11 attacks as a significant event in U.S. history, resulting in nearly 3,000 civilian deaths.

On December 15, 2008, Gallop filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging that on September 11, 2001, while working in the Pentagon with her infant child, E.G., an explosion caused the building to collapse on her, resulting in lasting head and brain injuries for both her and her son. Gallop claims she was knocked unconscious by the blast but managed to escape and later awoke in the hospital. Her complaint posits an alternative narrative to the accepted account of the events, asserting that American Airlines Flight 77 did not crash into the Pentagon but that high explosives were detonated by U.S. military and civilian leaders to create a false narrative of a hijacked plane. She further alleges these officials were aware of the attacks beforehand and aimed to manipulate public perception to facilitate significant political changes, including obscuring a financial discrepancy of $2.3 trillion in a Department of Defense audit revealed the day before the attacks. 

Gallop seeks compensatory and punitive damages based on several claims: violations of her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments via Bivens, the common law tort of conspiracy, and a violation of the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a). On May 6, 2009, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity, that the Antiterrorism Act does not allow lawsuits against U.S. officials, that her constitutional claims were untimely, barred under judicial estoppel, and that her claims were frivolous. The District Court found the complaint frivolous and dismissed it with prejudice, without addressing other arguments. On appeal, Gallop contends the District Court erred in its dismissal, asserting her complaint contained sufficient factual allegations and that she should have been given the opportunity to amend it. The appellate review of the dismissal will assess whether Gallop's claims meet the necessary standard for plausibility, as articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which requires more than mere bare assertions without factual support.

A court can dismiss a claim as "factually frivolous" if the well-pleaded facts are "clearly baseless," meaning they are fanciful or delusional. After a thorough review, the District Court rightly concluded that the limited facts in Gallop’s complaint are frivolous. While she may claim that senior U.S. government officials conspired to commit terrorism, the court is not required to entertain pure speculation. Gallop's complaint lacks a consistent or plausible theory regarding the events of September 11, 2001, particularly concerning American Airlines Flight 77 and fails to substantiate her conspiracy allegations with any corroborating facts. Claims based solely on vague or conclusory statements cannot survive dismissal. The court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice, noting that Gallop's claims were inconsistent with previous assertions made in other cases, and her counsel did not provide new evidence to explain these inconsistencies. Although Gallop argued for leave to amend her complaint, no such request was made, and thus the claim of abuse of discretion is deemed frivolous. The appeal itself, along with the original complaint, is characterized as baseless, warranting potential sanctions. The court has ordered Gallop and her counsel to explain in writing why they should not face double costs and damages of $15,000 within 30 days, with the government's views on the matter to be submitted shortly thereafter. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.