Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation

Citations: 131 Cal. App. 3d 816; 182 Cal. Rptr. 813; 1982 Cal. App. LEXIS 1461; 1982 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,125Docket: Civ. 20650

Court: California Court of Appeal; May 18, 1982; California; State Appellate Court

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A California Court of Appeals case determined that the plaintiff, Laguna Publishing Company, suffered a violation of its free-speech and free-press rights under Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution due to the defendant, Golden Rain Foundation of Laguna Hills, excluding the plaintiff's giveaway newspaper from the private community of Rossmoor Leisure World. The exclusion was enacted after the plaintiff attempted unsolicited delivery of its newspaper, the Laguna News Post, to the community, which restricts access to resident-approved entries. The defendants included Golden Rain, which controls community access, and Golden West Publishing Corp., which had exclusive rights to deliver its own newspaper, the Leisure World News. The plaintiff's claims included conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act against both defendants. The jury ruled against the plaintiff and awarded Golden West $5,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in exemplary damages. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief to reverse the exclusion and monetary damages under federal civil rights laws or California's constitutional protections. The court ordered a new trial to determine the extent of any damages owed to the plaintiff.

Nine months prior to the trial, the court accepted a defense motion to recognize several uncontested facts regarding Leisure World of Laguna Hills, establishing it as a private residential community with restricted access for authorized individuals only. The court noted that since its inception in 1964, leisure facilities have not been open to the public, and the plaintiff had been denied entry for newspaper delivery since late 1967. While the court allowed the defense to argue that the exclusion did not infringe on the plaintiff's constitutional rights, it later restricted the plaintiff from referencing its free speech claims in front of the jury. This effectively nullified the plaintiff's argument regarding constitutional violations, allowing the trial to focus solely on alleged violations of the Cartwright Act and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Following the jury's verdict, the court, in an equitable proceeding, denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction despite extensive factual findings. The court found little disagreement on the factual events; the dispute lay in legal interpretations of those events. Consequently, the constitutional issue was deemed a legal matter independent of the jury's findings. On appeal, it was determined that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction granting access to Leisure World under conditions similar to those of the Leisure World News, along with a limited new trial focused on the facts surrounding the plaintiff's exclusion, particularly concerning state laws against trade restraint conspiracies. The remainder of the judgment reflecting the jury's decision was upheld.

Both defendants filed petitions for rehearing, which were granted, leading to a reargument of the case. During this period, Golden West indicated its intention to dismiss the appeal, which has since occurred, leaving only Golden Rain opposing the appeal. Following the first rehearing, the court reaffirmed its decision to reverse the trial court's ruling, directing the grant of the plaintiff's application for equitable relief and the further trial of Cartwright Act issues concerning the plaintiff's exclusion from Leisure World.

The constitutional issue raised significant procedural complexities in the trial court, particularly concerning the plaintiff's claim of constitutional deprivation. The plaintiff argued that the trial court's ruling on December 5, 1977, which barred it from addressing its constitutional claims in front of the jury, was erroneous. The exclusion of the plaintiff's newspaper from Leisure World was deemed by the plaintiff to represent state action that infringed upon its rights to free speech and press. The plaintiff based this claim on two theories: (1) Leisure World functions as a municipality under "company town" precedents, and (2) its development was contingent on federally guaranteed financing, thus imparting a public quality to its actions.

The central issue is whether the actions of Golden Rain in excluding the plaintiff's employees from distributing the Laguna News-Post constituted an infringement of free speech and press rights under either state or federal constitutions. The trial court withheld its ruling on the injunction until after the jury trial, ultimately denying the plaintiff's request to compel Golden Rain to allow distribution of the newspaper. This denial suggests that the trial court found no evidence supporting the claim of constitutional rights deprivation. 

The trial court reached certain conclusions of law, notably: (a) the plaintiff has no constitutional right to distribute its newspaper in Leisure World without prior request or subscription from residents, and (b) the plaintiff lacks the right to enter Leisure World for distribution when Golden Rain, acting on behalf of its members, has denied access. The court believes these conclusions are incorrect regarding state constitutional rights, thus entitling the plaintiff to an injunction that would permit distribution of its newspaper under similar conditions as those applicable to the Leisure World News, subject to reasonable regulations by Golden Rain concerning the distribution of all newspapers within Leisure World.

The trial court determined that no constitutional violation occurred when Golden Rain excluded the plaintiff's unsolicited newspaper from distribution within Leisure World, ruling as a matter of law rather than fact. Key undisputed facts include the structure of Leisure World as a residential community comprised of nonprofit mutual corporations responsible for property maintenance, with Golden Rain owning and maintaining all common areas. Residents are not automatically members of Golden Rain; membership requires an application and financial obligations. Initially, the Leisure World Foundation (LWF) managed the community and published the Leisure World News, which was labeled a "house organ" by Golden Rain. LWF faced financial losses in the early years, with advertising revenues only partially covering costs. By 1967, despite operational deficits, two former LWF employees sought and received permission to publish a separate newspaper, the News Advertiser, targeting audiences outside Leisure World.

Smith and Birchall operated an office for the News Advertiser within the space provided by LWF, allowing them to fulfill their roles in producing the Leisure World News. Both publications shared advertising clients, with the same sales team handling sales for both. Consequently, the Leisure World News absorbed many operational costs for Birchall, Smith, Weiner, Inc., the firm created to publish the News Advertiser. Despite increased costs, the Leisure World News generated a net income of $44,630 from a gross of $318,616 in 1971.

From 1967 to 1971, LWF delivered the Leisure World News to all residences in Leisure World without objection from Golden Rain, under an understanding that no competing newspapers could be distributed unsolicited within the community, except by mail. This exclusivity led to a meeting between competing newspaper publishers and LWF's Edward Olsen, where complaints about LWF subsidizing the News Advertiser were raised. Olsen defended LWF's actions as necessary to recover losses from previous years.

In 1972, Birchall, Smith, Weiner, Inc. began communication with LWF, leading to the purchase of the Leisure World News for $48,000, payable at $1,000 per month, contingent on the continuation of publication. Edward Olsen acknowledged that the newspaper's profitability hinged on its ability to distribute unsolicited within Leisure World, asserting it would lose value without such access. By the end of 1972, Birchall, Smith, Weiner, Inc. reported a gross of $559,112, while Olsen and Musch formed a new corporation, the Professional Community Management Corporation, to manage functions previously handled by LWF.

Pressure from various publishers, including the plaintiff, led to a written agreement on March 30, 1973, between Golden Rain and Birchall, Smith, Weiner, Inc., which was partially owned by individuals also involved in the management of Leisure World. This agreement allowed Golden West to deliver over 10,000 copies of the Leisure World News weekly to all residents for an annual fee of $3,600, effectively continuing unsolicited deliveries as before. Despite this arrangement, it was claimed to competitors, including the plaintiff, that deliveries complied with Golden Rain's rules requiring subscriptions for newspaper delivery. However, no evidence indicated that any Leisure World resident requested this delivery or was even aware of the agreement. Furthermore, there is doubt regarding whether the Golden Rain board had the authority to enter into this agreement, as their articles of incorporation and bylaws do not grant them the power to decide which publications could be delivered unsolicited. The bylaws also stipulate that membership in Golden Rain is not automatic; residents must apply for membership in both the Mutual and Golden Rain. The agreement has been characterized as a "cosmetic subterfuge," suggesting it lacked genuine authority or legitimacy.

Exhibit "I," the articles of incorporation, includes amendments where each specifies the voting member count. The most recent amendment dated February 8, 1971, indicated that 7,379 members were eligible to vote on the amendment. At that time, approximately 20,000 residents in Leisure World lived across 12,000 residences, indicating that many residents were not members of Golden Rain. Consequently, Golden Rain's actions to subscribe to the Leisure World News on behalf of these residents lacked proper authority and were seen as presumptuous or deceptive. 

In May 1973, the plaintiff's general manager communicated with the presidents of each mutual corporation, expressing concern over the denial of a request to distribute the News-Post in Leisure World. The manager alleged that Leisure World management preferred to limit independent media distribution, leading to increased mailing costs for their newspaper. They argued that residents should have the freedom to choose their news sources and criticized the unfairness of restricting one newspaper while allowing another.

Four months later, the president of Golden Rain responded, confirming that while the News-Post was permitted to deliver newspapers in Leisure World, it must comply with community regulations, allowing delivery only to subscribers. This response was supported by the presidents of 11 mutuals. Golden Rain and Golden West maintained that under the March 30, 1973 agreement, all residences were considered paid subscribers, justifying their delivery practices.

Golden Rain lacked both legal and apparent authority to represent any resident not a member, as not all residents of Leisure World were members. From 1967 to 1973, no "subscription" agreement existed, allowing Leisure World News exclusive access to distribute free newspapers, excluding the Laguna News-Post and other publications. This arrangement was enforced by LWF, the publisher of Leisure World News, under a management contract with Golden Rain, which was aware of the situation but did not intervene. Defendants claimed the arrangement was simply a policy for a "house organ," but it was LWF's president, Edward Olsen, who confirmed that the exclusivity was adopted to recover past losses. Although Golden Rain owned the premises, LWF employed security to enforce the exclusivity. 

Despite ongoing litigation, Golden Rain’s argument that Leisure World News functions as a "house organ" does not address the crucial issue: both it and the excluded newspapers carry advertising. The similarities between the Leisure World News and the plaintiff’s publication, particularly their advertising content, are pivotal to the case. The Leisure World News is a direct competitor for advertising revenue within a targeted affluent audience of 20,000 residents, which is a significant factor in the case's outcome. The financial implications are substantial, illustrated by the Leisure World News's gross revenues of $1,873,204, stemming from an initial investment of $1,000, highlighting the impact of exclusive advertising access on its success.

The plaintiff's newspaper and the Leisure World News are found to be direct competitors for local advertising revenue. The plaintiff claims that its exclusion from competing for these advertising dollars led to the current dispute, which it was not allowed to present to the jury concerning constitutional implications. From 1964 until May 1, 1972, the management company, LWF, with the implicit agreement of Golden Rain, distributed the Leisure World News to all Leisure World residences without solicitation. Starting in 1967, LWF and Golden Rain began excluding all other free newspapers, including the plaintiff's, from circulation unless residents subscribed to them. After May 1, 1972, during which the management company president was a shareholder in Golden West, this exclusivity continued. An agreement on March 30, 1973, aimed to categorize all Leisure World residents as "subscribers" to the Leisure World News, despite not all being members of Golden Rain. Consequently, the plaintiff was effectively barred from reaching Leisure World residents, limiting its advertising opportunities while the Leisure World News, a similar publication, benefited from these privileges. Golden West generated significant advertising revenue shortly after its establishment, raising the question of whether the plaintiff's exclusion constituted a violation of its constitutional rights to free speech and press. The analysis of this issue must take into account the presence of state action, as constitutional rights typically concern conflicts between citizens and the government.

The first group of cases discussed originates from Marsh v. Alabama (1946), where the Supreme Court ruled that a company town's exclusion of individuals from exercising free speech was unconstitutional, equating the company town to a municipality under the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision established that true municipalities cannot limit free speech rights. In contrast, the court found that Leisure World, while having attributes resembling a company town, did not qualify as such because it consisted solely of private residences with no commercial businesses, thus failing to meet the criteria for state action under free speech claims.

The document further examines the evolution of free speech rights within the context of private property, particularly in regional shopping centers, beginning with Diamond v. Bland (1970). In this case, the court allowed the exclusion of solicitors at a shopping center, determining that the plaintiffs had alternative communication channels and their activities were unrelated to the shopping center's purposes. However, this precedent was later overturned in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979), where the California Supreme Court ruled that free speech activities not interfering with commercial operations could not be prohibited by private property owners, thereby expanding free speech rights in such contexts.

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins established that state constitutions can grant broader free speech rights than the federal Constitution. The Court ruled that California's state Constitution did not violate the property rights of shopping center owners or tenants under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments by allowing expanded free speech rights. The case emphasized that because the public was invited to the shopping center, individuals retained their free speech rights, provided these rights did not interfere with the merchants' property rights. This conclusion was influenced by the concept of state action, as discussed in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, and referenced the idea that private property rights are subject to governmental regulation for public welfare, as articulated in Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court. Ultimately, the Pruneyard decision suggested that individual rights, including property rights, are subordinate to societal interests, allowing for the regulation of private property use in favor of public welfare and free speech rights.

Constitutional provisions are designed to protect individual property rights while ensuring that these rights do not harm society. The interests of the individual must yield to the general welfare when conflicts arise. The Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) case highlights that property rights are adaptable and must respond to societal needs, ensuring they do not facilitate conduct detrimental to public health, safety, or morals. The case discusses the emergence of gated communities, such as Leisure World, which, despite being private, resemble municipalities due to the daily influx of service providers and vendors. The exclusion of certain individuals, while allowing others, raises issues of discrimination, particularly when a community imposes restrictions that limit residents' choices. This scenario draws parallels to constitutional cases involving discrimination and "state action," as seen in historical lunch-counter cases and the Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner decision. The underlying principle is that First Amendment rights should receive equal consideration alongside property rights, particularly when state law supports discriminatory practices.

Respondents sought an injunction against their exclusion from a privately owned shopping center, claiming a violation of their First Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment granting the injunction, ruling that the shopping center had not been dedicated to public use, thus not allowing respondents to exercise First Amendment rights unrelated to the center's operations. The Court clarified that the property did not lose its private status merely because the public was invited to conduct business with tenants. 

The decision referenced previous cases, notably indicating that if the situation involved discriminatory restrictions on free speech, the outcome might have differed. The Court emphasized that the First and Fourteenth Amendments limit state actions, not the rights of private property owners using their property for private purposes without discrimination. 

This discussion led to a review of California case law, particularly Mulkey v. Reitman, which struck down Proposition 14, a measure limiting the state's ability to legislate against discrimination in housing. The California Supreme Court demonstrated state action in Proposition 14's enforcement, establishing it as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court linked this to Shelley v. Kraemer, asserting that state support for discrimination constitutes significant state action under the equal protection clause.

The application of the Shelley doctrine extends beyond direct state involvement in court actions to encompass any racially discriminatory acts supported by state agencies, even when conducted by private individuals acting on personal motivations. Relevant case law, including Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth. and others cited in Mulkey, illustrates the concept of significant state involvement necessary to classify private conduct as unconstitutional state action. In Mulkey, Proposition 14 was deemed unconstitutional for denying equal protection under the law, as established under Civil Code sections 51 and 52. 

The discussion contrasts Leisure World with a "company town," establishing it as a hybrid entity with town-like characteristics that may necessitate compliance with constitutional guarantees when discrimination is involved. Although Golden Rain, as a private property owner, can exclude unsolicited newspapers, once it permits one, discriminatory exclusion of another infringes on free speech and press rights under state law. 

Golden Rain's argument against discrimination, based on the notion of "meaningful similarity," fails when comparing the Leisure World News to the plaintiff's newspaper; both are competitors for advertising in the same market, with the Leisure World News having exclusive access to residents. The conclusion is that unconstitutional discrimination against the plaintiff's newspaper is evident.

Golden Rain's actions in excluding the plaintiff's newspaper from Leisure World were found to violate the free speech and free press rights guaranteed by the California Constitution. The court emphasized that, having allowed the unsolicited delivery of the Leisure World News, Golden Rain could not then discriminate against the plaintiff's newspaper deliveries. Despite Golden Rain's concerns regarding residents' privacy and investment expectations, which were referenced in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the management's decision to permit one type of unsolicited delivery created an obligation to allow others. The court noted that the delivery process for the plaintiff's newspaper would not significantly intrude on residents' privacy compared to existing practices. If unsolicited deliveries were deemed intrusive, Golden Rain should uniformly prohibit all such deliveries, including the Leisure World News. The ruling clarifies that the decision does not extend to allowing other uninvited solicitations, but rather ensures fairness in the context of newspaper deliveries within Leisure World.

To avoid discrimination against constitutional guarantees of free speech and press, access to a private, gated community for exercising these rights must be equitably measured. Property owners retain control over who enters the community, but they must act fairly toward individuals wishing to exercise their constitutional rights, which have been exclusively granted to the Leisure World News by Golden Rain, without resident consultation. Concerns raised about an "equal time" entitlement for differing viewpoints are unfounded, as the rule pertains strictly to Golden Rain’s discriminatory practices allowing only one entity to deliver unsolicited news to residents. The argument that this infringes on privacy and freedom of association is acknowledged, yet it does not address the case's realities. Golden Rain's communication permitted newspaper deliveries under certain regulations, indicating no objection to associates of the plaintiff entering for this purpose. The distinction between unsolicited and subscription-based deliveries does not inherently threaten privacy or association rights. Furthermore, if there are concerns about unsolicited deliveries, Golden Rain could lawfully require that only residents distribute such publications, adhering to established legal precedents.

Golden Rain has the authority to end unsolicited newspaper deliveries to residents if they notify it of their preference. However, the decision to exclude certain newspapers, including the plaintiff's, originates solely from the owner of the common areas, not the residents themselves, indicating the exclusion lacks genuine consideration of the residents' preferences. As a result, the plaintiff's newspaper was treated as unsolicited as much as any other. The court will reverse the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's injunction to stop the exclusion, as there is a legal basis for this reversal. The court does not need to address whether state action exists due to the federally insured financing of Leisure World. 

Regarding damages, the court agrees with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a right to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the discrimination was limited to free-speech rights under the California Constitution and did not constitute a federal constitutional violation. The court emphasizes that the "state action" involved does not equate to the level of conduct necessary for a federal damages claim under § 1983. The rights protected under the California Constitution, particularly regarding free speech, are distinct and carry significant weight due to the economic impact of Golden Rain's exclusion of the plaintiff's newspaper.

The plaintiff lacks a claim for damages under the federal civil rights statute but argues that the exclusion of its newspaper from Leisure World by Golden Rain was unconstitutional under the California Constitution, especially since the Leisure World News had previously been granted exclusive access. The court's earlier ruling, dated December 5, 1971, indicated that there were no grounds for money damages, as the trial court believed that any potential constitutional right was not "self-executing." The plaintiff contends this was an error, claiming it should have been allowed to present evidence of damages linked to the violation of its free speech rights. It is assumed for argument's sake that the plaintiff could demonstrate actual compensatory damages from its exclusion. The central issue is whether the California Constitution's free speech clause allows for monetary damages without enabling legislation. The plaintiff references privacy rights cases, particularly Porten v. University of San Francisco, which established that certain constitutional rights are self-executing and provide individuals with a right to seek damages for infringements, suggesting a parallel to its own situation regarding free speech rights.

The constitutional provision regarding the right to privacy is recognized as self-executing, as confirmed in *Emerson v. J.F. Shea Co.* and supported by Witkin, who states that such provisions are presumed effective without legislative action unless explicitly stated otherwise. The unresolved issue of this amendment's implications was highlighted, particularly in relation to the precedent set by *White v. Davis*, which focused on injunctions rather than damages. The court acknowledged an error in previously dismissing *Porten* as authority for claiming damages based on state constitutional rights, particularly since the right to privacy was historically established. The case *Melvin v. Reid* is referenced to illustrate that California courts have long recognized the right to privacy, rejecting the notion that it existed solely as common law. The *Melvin* court affirmed that the California Constitution ensures the right to pursue happiness free from unwarranted attacks on one’s character or reputation. It concluded that the publication of damaging information about an individual after they had reformed constituted a violation of their constitutional right to happiness. This interpretation affirms the possibility of seeking damages for violations of rights under section 1 of article I of the California Constitution without requiring enabling legislation.

The California Constitution's protections for free speech and free press support the conclusion that plaintiffs have a direct right to sue for damages due to their exclusion from Leisure World. This right is recognized under Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution, and is further supported by Civil Code Sections 1708 and 3333. Section 1708 mandates that individuals must refrain from harming others' rights, while Section 3333 allows for compensation for any detriment caused by the violation of non-contractual obligations. Given that the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by discriminatory exclusion, it logically follows that they are entitled to recover damages. 

The trial court erred in preventing the plaintiff from presenting evidence of damages related to this exclusion. Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the defendants conspired to limit access to Leisure World, which should have been considered in evaluating whether there was an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act. The trial court's prior rulings hindered the jury's ability to consider the wrongful nature of the exclusion as part of the conspiracy claim. The court's limitations on jury instructions regarding the constitutional violation were improper, highlighting a failure to recognize the impact of the discriminatory exclusion on the case's legal theories. The defendants' argument regarding the legality of the overt acts in restraining trade is deemed irrelevant in this context.

Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by not allowing it to argue the unconstitutional nature of its exclusion, which is a relevant factor for the jury to consider in determining whether the exclusion constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade. The court agrees, noting that an unreasonable restraint can arise from illegal actions, not just legal ones. Discrimination against the Laguna News-Post due to its unconstitutional exclusion from Leisure World should have been considered by the jury under appropriate instructions to evaluate potential collusion leading to an unreasonable restraint on trade per Business and Professions Code section 16720. If the jury finds such a restraint, it would then assess whether the plaintiff suffered business injuries as a result, as outlined in section 16750. 

The trial court's earlier ruling on December 5, 1977, was erroneous, rendering the arguments made by Golden West regarding substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict against the plaintiff irrelevant. The plaintiff is entitled to a new trial to establish whether Golden West influenced Golden Rain's unconstitutional exclusion of the newspaper, which could have led to an unreasonable restraint of trade causing damages within the statute of limitations. 

Despite the appeal dismissal against Golden West, the plaintiff may still pursue claims against Golden Rain for possible involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Regarding the factual issues related to the cross-complaint under the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Trade Practices Act, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdicts, and the judgment on these matters is affirmed. An item deemed without substantial controversy is struck due to lack of evidentiary support. The judgment denying the plaintiff's application for an injunction to end its exclusion from Leisure World is reversed, with directions for the trial court to grant the application under specified terms and conditions.

Golden Rain or any controlling entity over Leisure World's entry rights may permit unsolicited delivery of giveaway newspapers, including the Leisure World News, to residences that have not requested such delivery. In this scenario, the plaintiff is allowed to deliver its newspaper to these residences, adhering to the same delivery rules that apply to other newspapers, such as the Los Angeles Times. If a resident expressly declines unsolicited delivery of the Laguna News-Post in writing, the plaintiff must cease delivery to that resident but may verify the request independently. The trial court has determined that excluding the plaintiff from Leisure World constituted unconstitutional discrimination, directing a jury trial to assess damages related to this exclusion, including: 1) whether the plaintiff incurred damages as a result of the illegal exclusion, as outlined in sections 1708 and 3333 of the Civil Code; 2) whether there was an agreement between Golden Rain and Golden West that resulted in the unconstitutional exclusion, constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 16720, subdivision (a) of the Business and Professions Code; and 3) any actual damages arising from such restraint over the four years preceding the lawsuit, evaluated per section 16750.1 of the Business and Professions Code. The judgment is affirmed, with each party bearing its costs on appeal. Additionally, one concurring judge expressed reservations regarding the majority's view that a discriminatory violation of press freedom can lead to a direct cause of action for damages outside recognized tort law and statutory restrictions on trade practices, arguing the lack of supporting authority for this position.

A constitutional provision being self-executing does not determine the available remedies for enforcement; injunctive or declaratory relief may be provided without monetary damages. The free press provision in the California Constitution is not self-executing as it does not create a direct cause of action for damages upon violation. Article I, section 2, subdivision (a) establishes the right to freely express sentiments but lacks sufficient clarity to dictate the extent of rights and liabilities, which raises questions about its applicability to private entities. In contrast, the right to privacy, added to the California Constitution, has a legislative history indicating it was meant to be enforceable against both governmental and private intrusions, allowing for direct damage claims as established in cases like White v. Davis and Porten v. University of San Francisco. These cases do not support damage claims under the free press provision. Additionally, Civil Code sections 3333 and 1708 provide general principles but do not substantiate a new legal claim for damages under the free press provision outside established tort law. A petition for rehearing was denied on June 16, 1982, and the Supreme Court declined to hear the case on August 18, 1982.

Leisure World News was allowed entry into Leisure World without any consent or invitation from its residents. The plaintiff sold its newspaper to Media General, which had acquired Golden West's assets, while Laguna Publishing Company retained its legal claims against both Golden Rain and Golden West. As a condition of the sale, Laguna had to settle with Golden West, which was confirmed by the superior court under sections 877 and 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal regarding Golden West was dismissed on October 27, 1981. There is speculation that Golden Rain might solicit written requests from each Leisure World residence for newspaper delivery, which would necessitate granting the same solicitation opportunity to the plaintiff.

The constitutional issue in this case has always been a legal matter, leading to frustration with Golden Rain's counsel for their claims that the court's legal principles were improperly drawn from facts. Golden West contested the earlier statement of fact, arguing that the trial court found no conspiracy, based on a determination that the exclusion of the plaintiff's newspaper did not constitute a constitutional deprivation. The assertion that a conspiracy existed is unsupported by the facts presented. During oral arguments, Golden West's representative attempted to refute Mr. Olsen’s claims about the rationale behind the policy excluding other newspapers, but the court found no direct contradiction to Mr. Moses' testimony. The court had previously ruled that no constitutional rights were violated by the exclusion of the plaintiff’s newspaper, rendering arguments about substantial evidence irrelevant.

A constitutional analysis must begin with a hypothesis that disregards any factual findings. Due to prior litigation, stock in Birchall, Smith, Weiner, Inc. owned by Olsen and Musch was returned to Smith and Birchall. There is a divergence in interpretation between the defendants regarding an agreement; Golden Rain asserts that it does not classify Leisure World residents as "subscribers," while Golden West cites testimony indicating it was intended for them to be subscribers to the Leisure World News. Leisure World, with around 20,000 residents, possesses its own infrastructure and governance, and many residents are not members of Golden Rain, making Golden Rain’s subscription claim irrelevant for those individuals. Golden Rain's correspondence indicated that another entity could deliver newspapers to subscribers, which diminishes the relevance of arguments regarding privacy and association rights. The case is not expected to significantly impact constitutional law, despite Golden Rain’s strong assertions. The dispute primarily concerns financial interests between two newspapers regarding advertising revenue rather than genuine issues of free speech or property rights. The court granted a motion to exclude jury references to the plaintiff’s claims of constitutional rights violations, stating that even if a violation occurred, it does not entitle the plaintiff to damages.

Insufficient allegations in the Complaint prevent the Plaintiff's claim from being addressed under the Federal Civil Rights Act, specifically the 1983 sections, which would be relevant if the Plaintiff sought damages for a violation of the right to a free press due to restrictions on delivery at Leisure World Laguna Hills. The Complaint fails to demonstrate conduct under color of State law, a requirement of the Act. Additionally, the alleged conduct occurred beyond the statute of limitations, dating back to 1967, while the Complaint was filed in 1973.

The court must decide whether to issue an injunction restraining the Defendants from excluding the Plaintiff from Leisure World Laguna Hills, with the possibility for additional evidence to be presented regarding this issue after a jury deliberates on claims under the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The discussion includes whether there is a right to recover damages for violations of the State Constitution, noting that while inverse condemnation allows recovery for property takings, no State statute addresses free press or free speech violations. The Unruh Act provides a right to damages for civil rights violations, but the California Constitution may not be self-executing in other contexts.

The case is characterized as a commercial dispute within the newspaper business rather than a significant constitutional issue. Although the constitutional right to freedom of the press is referenced, the underlying matter is perceived as primarily commercial. The California Constitution's language affirms the inalienable rights of individuals, including the protection of property and pursuit of happiness, but the relevance to this case is questioned.