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Wolf-Lillie v. Kenosha County Sheriff
Citations: 504 F. Supp. 1; 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15691Docket: 77-C-331
Court: District Court, E.D. Wisconsin; December 15, 1980; Federal District Court
Arlene C. Wolf-Lillie filed a civil action against Kenosha County Sheriff Gerald M. Sonquist, claiming violation of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to the execution of an outdated writ of restitution. The case was bifurcated, focusing first on liability. The facts established that on March 2, 1977, a judgment of eviction was issued against Wolf-Lillie, followed by a writ of restitution on March 11, which required her removal from her mobile home. Although the writ's original terms mandated immediate removal, the served copy allowed her five days for voluntary departure, a common practice by the sheriff's department. On April 22, 1977, deputies executed the writ, removing her trailer and personal property, with Sheriff Sonquist not present during this execution. The court needed to determine if her constitutional rights were violated, specifically whether she had a protectable property interest in the lot. The court referenced Supreme Court precedents stating that state law must be consulted to determine property interests. Wisconsin Statutes § 704 establishes tenant rights and protections, leading the court to conclude that Wolf-Lillie indeed possessed a protectable property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, which required due process before such interest could be infringed. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant violated her due process rights by failing to adhere to the statutory eviction procedures mandated by Wisconsin law, specifically sections 299.44-45. While the plaintiff acknowledges that the statutory process provides adequate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, she argues that non-compliance with these procedures constitutes a violation of her rights. The court references prior rulings affirming that the statutory provisions align with due process, emphasizing that state and local officials are obligated to follow established procedures. According to sections 299.44-45, once a court determines a person is entitled to possession, a writ of restitution must be issued and delivered to the sheriff within 30 days, who is then required to execute the writ within ten days and report back to the court. The plaintiff contends that strict adherence to these provisions is mandatory, supported by case law indicating that statutory remedies necessitate compliance with all procedural requirements. The defendant argues that the statute allows for flexibility in execution and that a writ remains valid until relief is granted. Testimony from Dean Robert Boden, who drafted the statute, indicates uncertainty about its jurisdictional nature but affirms that the time limits aim to prevent abuse of the eviction process. The court concludes that the language of section 299.45(5) is indeed mandatory, establishing a non-delegable duty for the sheriff to execute writs of restitution within the ten-day period. The court rejects the defendant's interpretation, stating it undermines legislative intent by granting the sheriff discretion contrary to the standards set for stays of execution. It ultimately finds that a writ not executed within the ten-day window is invalid on its face, despite the defendant's claim that a stay ordered by Judge Fisher rendered the original writ valid. Defendant contends that an oral writ was issued, effective on the execution date. Officer Gaylen Rogers testified about a phone call from Judge Fisher, who supposedly ordered a hold on the execution due to a filed motion. However, Rogers could not specify when he received this call and acknowledged it might have occurred after the ten-day limit. He later mentioned another call from Judge Fisher instructing him to proceed with the writ. Judge Fisher, on the other hand, could not recall these conversations and believed he had not contacted the sheriff’s office regarding this case, though he vaguely remembered discussing the eviction case with Deputy Rogers. Sheriff Sonquist testified about receiving various oral orders from judges but did not recall any related to a writ of restitution. According to Section 299.44(3), a judge must issue a writ of restitution following a judgment unless it would cause hardship, and a stay requires the evicted party to pay all due rent. The statute does not mention oral writs. Based on the statutory requirements and the testimonies, the Court concluded that no valid stay of the writ of restitution was established. The testimonies from both Officer Rogers and Judge Fisher were inconclusive, with neither clearly supporting the notion of a valid oral stay. The statute suggests that a writ must be executed once issued, and the claim of a subsequent oral writ is unsupported. Consequently, the Court determined that the writ executed thirty days after being received by the sheriff was invalid, violating the plaintiff's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff alleges that this execution was part of an unwritten policy in the sheriff's office permitting deputies to execute writs beyond the statutory ten-day period, raising the issue of the defendant's potential liability for this constitutional violation. Plaintiff claims a systematic pattern of abuse by the defendant's deputies, which the defendant allegedly knew about and either approved or tolerated. The defendant counters that there is no "affirmative link" between his actions and those of his deputies, asserting ignorance of the execution of a writ beyond the ten-day limit. Deputy Gransow testified that about 25% of writs were executed late, often at the request of attorneys to delay execution. He was not instructed on handling outdated writs. Attorney Larry Farris reviewed records from the Kenosha County Sheriff's Department from 1976 to 1978, finding that 68 out of 119 executed writs were beyond the ten-day limit. Sheriff Sonquist denied knowledge of the specific writ in question and claimed he was unaware of any late executions during his thirty years in the department. He admitted to providing no formal training to deputies, only instructing them to read the relevant statutes and manuals, which they might not have done. He acknowledged a long-standing practice of allowing individuals five days to vacate before executing writs, which he considered a tradition. The court notes that under Adams v. Pate and Monell v. Department of Social Services, a superior cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely based on respondeat superior; liability requires evidence of a policy or practice that leads to constitutional violations. The Rizzo v. Goode case further stipulates that there must be a pervasive pattern of misconduct by subordinates and an affirmative link to the superior's actions. In Rizzo, no such link was established between the police chief’s actions and the constitutional violations by officers. The district court determined there was no widespread unconstitutional conduct but noted that an "affirmative link" is required for holding supervisors liable for damages related to subordinate actions, as established in Rizzo and further supported by Monell. In Classon v. Krautkramer, the Rizzo standard was deemed applicable for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts in the circuit, including Stringer v. City of Chicago, reinforced that supervisors must demonstrate a connection between their conduct and the constitutional violations committed by subordinates, with mere negligence being insufficient for liability. The court found evidence of a significant issue, observing that approximately 25% to 57% of writs of restitution were executed past the ten-day statutory limit, often due to requests from attorneys, undermining legislative intent. The court established an "affirmative link" between the defendant's actions and the deputies' unconstitutional behavior. Despite the defendant claiming ignorance of the practice, he admitted that deputies received minimal training without follow-up, and an unwritten policy allowed for delays. The sheriff's conflicting testimonies indicated a failure to ensure compliance with statutory duties regarding the timely execution of writs. Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant's inadequate supervision contributed to the unconstitutional actions of his deputies. A trial date will be set to address the unresolved issue of damages in the case involving plaintiff Arlene C. Wolf-Lillie and defendant Gerald M. Sonquist, Sheriff of Kenosha County. The court previously found Sonquist liable for violating Wolf-Lillie's constitutional rights through the execution of an invalid writ of restitution, which led to her eviction. The writ, issued on March 11, 1977, was only valid for ten days but was executed by deputies on April 22, 1977, resulting in the removal of Wolf-Lillie's trailer and personal property from the Lakecrest Mobile Home Park. The mover, Bud DeBoer, testified that after Wolf-Lillie refused to specify a storage location for her trailer, he secured it at his Service Center storage yard. Additional items were later sent to the mover by Wolf-Lillie's former landlord. Wolf-Lillie accessed the trailer multiple times to store and retrieve belongings until DeBoer sold the trailer and its contents for $1,650 in January 1979. The total storage bill amounted to $3,206, leaving a balance of $2,318.01 owed by Wolf-Lillie after the sale. To support her damage claim, Wolf-Lillie called Patrick Elliott, a property damage appraiser, who estimated the current value of the trailer at $4,800 and the trailer skirting at $675, despite not having seen the skirting. This memorandum outlines the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the damages. The witness testified that the actual cash value of personal property at the trailer was $1,316.40, with a replacement value of $3,460.00. He estimated that a person with a lifestyle similar to the plaintiff would have items valued at approximately $2,256.65. Additionally, he valued the items listed in plaintiff's exhibit 1, which he did not see, at $3,965.00. The plaintiff testified she purchased the trailer in 1970 for $4,500.00 and had made repairs due to vandalism, losing cherished family memorabilia when the trailer was taken. She also claimed the sheriff's deputies damaged the skirting during the trailer's relocation, although a witness did not recall any skirting. Mrs. Verna Hehn from the Kenosha County Assessor's Office testified that the trailer was initially assessed at $3,200.00 in 1974, which was later reduced to $2,000.00 following the plaintiff's protest. By 1975, the trailer was assessed at $3,000.00, but this did not reflect existing damage. In 1976, a deduction of $1,500.00 was made for vandalism. Mr. Ernie Chioda, a mobile home park manager, valued the trailer at $1,200.00 in 1978, stating it would be worth $1,800.00 if in excellent condition. Mr. DeBoer noted the trailer was in very poor condition when moved in 1977, contradicting the plaintiff's statements about its condition. The plaintiff described her living situation after losing the trailer, stating she had to live in a one-room studio apartment with shared facilities and suffered emotional distress due to the defendant's actions. She seeks damages for the loss of her trailer and its contents, storage costs, constitutional rights violations regarding unreasonable seizure, emotional harm over three years, and personal inconvenience. The court highlighted that under 42 U.S.C. 1983, damages do not need to be proven to a mathematical certainty, only by a preponderance of the evidence, and recognized the recoverability of both property and intrinsic damages in such actions. A violation of constitutional rights does not entitle a plaintiff to damages greater than what they would have experienced without the violation; thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the violation directly caused her damages. Plaintiffs are expected to mitigate their damages but cannot be coerced into spending beyond their means or taking extraordinary measures. In assessing damages related to the plaintiff's trailer, conflicting testimonies regarding its value were presented: the highest estimate was $4,800, while the lowest sale price was $1,650. Due to irregularities in the sale, the court deemed the sale price unreliable and found the trailer's value to be approximately $3,000, as assessed by the Kenosha County Assessor. The court held the defendant liable for the loss of the trailer, recognizing that the plaintiff could have potentially avoided the loss by arranging for the trailer's relocation, but her financial constraints at the time hindered her ability to do so. Regarding personal property lost with the trailer, the plaintiff claimed damages of approximately $13,000. However, the court found that testimony linking specific items to the plaintiff was insufficient, as Mr. Elliott's suggestions were deemed speculative. The plaintiff's habit of storing and removing items from the trailer indicated a lack of effort to mitigate her losses, particularly since she did not remove cherished family mementos. Consequently, the court denied her claims for damages related to these personal items. Lastly, the plaintiff has an outstanding storage bill of $2,318.01 owed to Mr. DeBoer, who offered to move the trailer at no cost. It remains unclear whether the plaintiff was aware of this offer or believed she would incur charges for the move. Mr. DeBoer's intentions regarding the collection of potential debt remain ambiguous; despite expressing satisfaction with the sale proceeds of the trailer, he indicated a need to consult his attorney before waiving claims. The Court observed that there was no evidence of Mr. DeBoer actively pursuing the matter, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof for damages related to potential storage charges, resulting in no award for that claim. The plaintiff claimed $10,000 for personal inconvenience due to being forced to live in a one-room apartment, asserting this was a direct result of the defendant's actions. The defendant countered that the plaintiff's living situation was a result of her income prior to her eviction and that she had no right to be on the property post-eviction. The Court agreed with the defendant regarding the lack of demonstrated causation between his actions and the plaintiff's living conditions but acknowledged that the defendant’s actions did cause some personal inconvenience, awarding the plaintiff $1,000. Regarding claims of emotional distress and humiliation, the Court found difficulty in establishing a direct link between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's emotional state. While the plaintiff exhibited sensitivity and emotional outbursts in court, the Court determined that her distress was indeed a result of the defendant's actions, awarding her an additional $1,000. Lastly, the plaintiff sought damages for violations of her constitutional rights. Citing Carey v. Piphus, the Court noted that nominal damages could be awarded for constitutional violations in the absence of actual injury. The plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were found to have been violated due to the seizure of her trailer under an invalid writ of restitution, affirming the importance of these constitutional rights. A grievous injury to the plaintiff's constitutional rights has been established, with the Court awarding $4,000 in damages despite acknowledging that monetary compensation cannot fully restore her prior position. The defendant's motion to dismiss, based on the claim that the plaintiff would not satisfy any judgment or accept relief, is denied. The plaintiff has consistently rejected monetary compensation, demanding instead the return of her trailer and initiation of criminal proceedings against the defendant. The Court has made it clear that it cannot provide such relief but will ensure that the defendant receives a formal satisfaction of judgment, addressing any concerns he may have regarding compliance. The total damages awarded to the plaintiff amount to $9,000, broken down as follows: $3,000 for the trailer, $1,000 for physical inconvenience, $1,000 for emotional distress and humiliation, and $4,000 for injury to her constitutional rights. The defendant is ordered to pay this sum into the Court, which will hold the amount for up to 45 days, after which the judgment will be vacated if the plaintiff does not execute a satisfaction of judgment. The order was finalized on December 15, 1980, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.