Baker v. City of Detroit

Citations: 504 F. Supp. 841; 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16442; 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1784Docket: 5-71937, 5-72264

Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan; November 17, 1980; Federal District Court

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The case involves plaintiffs Kenneth Baker and others, including members of the Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association, against the City of Detroit and its officials regarding the police department's affirmative action program. Following a lengthy trial, the court upheld the program in an opinion dated October 1, 1979, while noting the necessity for an established end-date for the program. The Board of Police Commissioners subsequently met to determine this end-date, which the court reviewed and deemed reasonable. The court requested the parties to draft a final order, but they could not reach an agreement. Consequently, the court issued its final opinion, affirming the City’s promotion practices under the 50/50 Black/White formula for promotions from Sergeant to Lieutenant, and acknowledged the affirmative action promotions that had occurred until that point. The Board had convened multiple times to finalize a termination point for the program. Additionally, motions for costs and attorney's fees were pending from the City defendants and intervenors, respectively.

Public hearings included active participation from plaintiffs' counsel. On December 20, 1979, the Board of Police Commissioners adopted a resolution acknowledging the Detroit Police Department's history of unlawful racial discrimination in hiring and promotions, initially identified in July 1974. The Board noted ongoing adverse effects from past discrimination, supported by documents and statistics from the Department, highlighting significant under-representation of Black individuals in the ranks of sergeant and lieutenant. 

The Board received a presentation from the Chief of Police outlining goals for an Affirmative Action Plan, which was deemed essential for improving operational effectiveness in crime prevention and resolution. It was determined that the objectives of enhancing law enforcement and remedying past discrimination necessitated a specific promotional ratio. Evidence suggested that a 50/50 promotional ratio would bolster the Department's capability and ensure equitable promotional opportunities for all personnel. The Board concluded that this ratio is the most effective means to address the impact of past discrimination and enhance public safety, affirming that all individuals considered for promotion were substantially equally qualified for their roles.

The Board of Police Commissioners resolves to incorporate the written presentation of exhibits and documents related to the adoption of its Affirmative Action Plan. It asserts that the proposed program and the Chief's recommendations will fairly achieve the plan's objectives. The Board sets an end-goal of 50% Black officers in the ranks of sergeant and lieutenant, contingent upon significant demographic changes in Detroit or unforeseen circumstances. A validated, race-neutral promotional model is deemed crucial to prevent future discrimination and to eventually conclude the Affirmative Action Plan. The Board has received legal counsel confirming the plan's legality and acknowledges its obligation to address the effects of past unlawful practices. The Chief of Police is directed to promote individuals from specified Personnel Orders in accordance with the Affirmative Action Resolution and relevant city charter provisions. Additionally, the Department is tasked with developing a job-related, validated, and racially-neutral promotional model for these ranks. The court has previously recognized the 50% racial goal as reasonable, citing case law that supports the correlation between labor market demographics and racial balance in promotions. Disputes regarding the final decree's form remain, with plaintiffs considering a possible state court challenge to the program based on state law.

The defendants seek a court order to mandate the continuation of the City of Detroit's affirmative action plan. The court previously determined that the City has a constitutional obligation to implement affirmative action promotions. The issues of historical discrimination and operational necessity have been thoroughly litigated. The court emphasizes that the voluntary adoption of this plan by the City places the court in a position to evaluate the program in light of challenges from white plaintiffs. If no affirmative action had been voluntarily instituted, a lawsuit from black officers for past discrimination might have led to the court mandating an affirmative action plan.

A novel question arises concerning the implications of a court's ruling that upholds a voluntarily adopted affirmative action plan. The court asserts that such a plan should carry the weight of a court order for several reasons: it promotes judicial efficiency by preventing future disputes over the plan, it reinforces the City's constitutional duty to maintain affirmative action, and it encourages voluntary compliance with affirmative action policies. The court references the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guidelines, which advocate for protection against Title VII liability for entities engaging in voluntary affirmative action.

The court draws parallels between the procedural dynamics of this case and those of consent decrees, suggesting that a similar collaborative resolution would likely have occurred had a lawsuit been initiated by black officers or the U.S. Government. The court concludes that a voluntary affirmative action plan should be treated as having the same enforceability as a judicial judgment, thus providing essential protection against ongoing challenges to its validity.

In a voluntary affirmative action context, an employer or municipality may implement a program after self-assessment, which can be challenged legally. Courts review such plans for reasonableness based on historical discrimination, similar to their role in evaluating affirmative action consent decrees. The legal framework established by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Weber outlines a "zone of reasonableness" that should apply to challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court asserts that the evidence in this case exceeds Weber's requirements, affirming its authority to mandate the continuation of the affirmative action program in Detroit. The City of Detroit requested this relief, and similar cases, like Johnson v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, reinforce the court's position.

Regarding attorney's fees, the City of Detroit did not seek fees from the plaintiffs, but intervening defendants, the Guardians, requested fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k). These intervenors, who are black police officers benefiting from the affirmative action plan, argued that their intervention was necessary for their interests, especially after concerns arose about the constitutionality of promotions. The plaintiffs contend that it would be unjust to require them to pay fees, citing the Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC precedent that fees can only be awarded if their lawsuit was frivolous. The court allowed the intervenors' participation despite objections from the plaintiffs.

In DPOA v. Young, the court addressed the complexities of reverse discrimination cases, highlighting that such suits differ significantly from typical discrimination claims. Employers who voluntarily implement affirmative action face challenges, particularly when they must prove past discrimination to justify these measures. The Supreme Court’s decision in Weber established that voluntary affirmative action could be permissible as a temporary fix for severe imbalances in historically segregated job categories, allowing employers to avoid self-incrimination.

At the time of trial, the Weber ruling had not been established for state employers, although its applicability was under consideration in a related case. To mitigate the employer's challenges in reverse discrimination claims, the court permitted intervention by parties with a vested interest in presenting evidence of past discrimination. This decision was supported by the need to ensure that affected black officers could voice their concerns, especially given the plaintiffs' request for the demotion of black officers who had received promotions through affirmative action.

During the trial, the City defendants ultimately provided substantial evidence of past discrimination. Although the necessity of the intervenors' counsel could be debated in hindsight, their presence was beneficial, as they safeguarded the interests of the intervenors and contributed valuable evidence regarding past discrimination. The court concluded that awarding attorney's fees to the intervenors was warranted, recognizing their role in underscoring the necessity of the City’s affirmative action program as a response to historical injustices.

The Detroit Police Lieutenant's and Sergeant's Association (LSA) was deemed responsible for these fees since it represented all Lieutenants and Sergeants in Detroit, and had financed the litigation through a special assessment of its members. The union faced a dilemma in balancing the interests of its white and black members in relation to affirmative action promotions, ultimately opting to align with the majority opinion against affirmative action.

The union's actions are deemed contrary to the interests of its black officers, especially since these officers have succeeded in litigation. The court finds it just for the union to cover the legal fees of its minority officers, given that the intervenors' counsel played a critical, albeit subordinate, role in protecting their interests. Normally, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing defendant can only recover attorney's fees if the plaintiff's suit is found to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Conversely, prevailing plaintiffs are generally entitled to attorney's fees unless special circumstances arise. This two-tiered standard is rooted in the notion that plaintiffs, acting as "private attorneys general," help eliminate unlawful discrimination and should not be deterred from filing claims. 

However, the court asserts that the typical Christiansburg rule does not apply in this case due to its unique circumstances. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act supports the idea that, in some cases, those defending against discrimination claims may also be entitled to enforce civil rights and seek attorney's fees. The court cites Shelley v. Kraemer, emphasizing that the intervenors, who were defendants in this instance, could have just as easily been plaintiffs. The court advocates for a liberal interpretation of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act, suggesting that the procedural posture should not be a deciding factor. Consequently, since the intervenors have vindicated their rights, the court determines it is just and reasonable for the union to pay their attorney's fees, rejecting the restrictive application of the Christiansburg rule in this context.

An award of attorney's fees is deemed appropriate, with the Court emphasizing the necessity of counsel for intervenors, who aided in defending their rights. The Lieutenant's and Sergeant's Association is ordered to cover reasonable attorney's fees for both black and white officers, as the Court finds this just, although the amount should not be burdensome. The intervenors were minimally involved in pre-trial discovery and played a secondary role at trial. Counsel for plaintiffs and intervenors are encouraged to agree on a fee amount, failing which the Court will set one post-appeals. Regarding costs, all parties are to bear their own due to the unique nature of the case. The Court concludes that the City's Affirmative Action Plan is reasonable and necessary, mandating the Association to pay the fees while all other parties will absorb their own costs.

The document also clarifies the distinction between ordinary and reverse discrimination cases, noting that affirmative action programs inherently affect opportunities for whites. The legal analysis for reverse discrimination claims is different, focusing on whether the affirmative action plan is a reasonable response to past discrimination, with such determinations resting solely with a judge, as there are no jury issues presented. The Court acknowledges that the case's outcomes regarding the City of Detroit's affirmative action plan are based on established facts.

There is no dispute regarding the operation of the affirmative action plan by the Board of Police Commissioners or past discrimination within the Detroit Police Department, as the plaintiffs failed to present counter-evidence. Instead, they argued that evidence of past discrimination was irrelevant since they were innocent parties and should not be affected by affirmative action. The court's findings on past discrimination are crucial to assessing the reasonableness of the City’s affirmative action plan. In reverse discrimination cases, the judge, not a jury, determines the legality of affirmative action in light of historical discrimination. The court referenced a Fifth Circuit case, Downing v. Williams, which underscores that legal determinations regarding constitutional standards are the judge’s responsibility.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's ruling against a constitutional duty for "stacked deck" affirmative action, which favors minorities over majority candidates, was discussed. This court acknowledges the Ninth Circuit's position but emphasizes that in cases of severe underrepresentation due to past discrimination, race-conscious affirmative action is necessary to rectify historical injustices. Merely allowing access without addressing past discrimination would perpetuate it. Thus, the court concludes that the City of Detroit has an affirmative constitutional obligation to implement a race-conscious affirmative action plan, aligning with the precedent set in DPOA v. Young, which is binding in this circuit.

The case Alexander v. Bahou involved the mayor and fire chief of Syracuse seeking to implement affirmative action measures for minority hiring in the police and fire departments, which was obstructed by New York State Civil Service Law. They filed a federal lawsuit to gain authority to deviate from state law, leading to intervention by the Justice Department and the filing of a Title VII suit. The matter concluded with a consent decree approved by the district judge. 

Additionally, Case No. 5-71937 was initiated on October 7, 1975, by Kenneth A. Baker and others, while Case No. 5-72264 was filed by Hanson Bratton and others, later removed to federal court. A Motion to Intervene was granted on July 6, 1978. At the trial's outset, intervenors reached a stipulation with plaintiffs to remove a relief request from the complaint. During a hearing on March 19, 1980, it was clarified that any attorney's fees sought were to be charged to the union rather than the individual plaintiffs, a point unopposed by union counsel. The court concurred that attorney's fees should be borne by the union. Furthermore, the court noted the potential for defendants to be viewed as "private attorneys general" entitled to favorable standards for fee awards, as cited in Prate v. Freedman. The court's decision to award attorney's fees stands as a final, appealable order, regardless of the determination of the specific amount, supported by Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley.