Taylor v. Bell

Citations: 21 Cal. App. 3d 1002; 98 Cal. Rptr. 855; 1971 Cal. App. LEXIS 1140Docket: Civ. 36631

Court: California Court of Appeal; December 10, 1971; California; State Appellate Court

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Doris Kistler Bell, the defendant, appealed a judgment holding her liable for five promissory notes in favor of the deceased Joseph L. Taylor, with prejudgment interest and costs awarded to the plaintiff, Edwin Ryland Taylor, the executor of Taylor's estate. Bell's appeal did not contest the merits of the judgment but focused on procedural issues, claiming the trial court improperly continued the trial on July 18, 1969, without justification, violating her rights under the Code of Civil Procedure.

During the trial, Bell changed attorneys multiple times, ultimately representing herself. After various continuances, including one from March 3 to March 24, 1969, the trial began on May 20, 1969. The court allowed her to present witnesses and evidence for her defense. On June 6, 1969, Bell testified and called 17 witnesses. However, when a key witness, Lloyd Taylor, was unavailable due to work commitments, Bell's request for a continuance to accommodate his testimony was denied after she failed to substantiate its critical nature. The court eventually vacated the case's submission and rescheduled a hearing for July 18, 1969, to allow Bell to present Lloyd Taylor's testimony, which had not been provided earlier.

The legal order stipulated that if the defendant was unable to re-serve a witness due to the witness being out of state, the trial would be postponed until the witness returned. The clerk of the superior court issued a notice on July 15, 1969, confirming that the trial continuance requested by the plaintiff’s counsel was granted, with the new trial date set for August 28, 1969. This extension was based on the plaintiff's counsel's indication that the witness, Lloyd Taylor, would not return from Arizona in time for the original date. 

On July 18, 1969, although the plaintiff’s counsel, the defendant, and three other witnesses were present in court, the case was officially continued to August 28. During this session, one witness, Thomas Depuy, expressed his upcoming international travel on the new trial date, and the court could not address the legality of taking his testimony then. The defendant initially refused to excuse Depuy but later agreed when informed of his travel plans. Two other witnesses were ordered to return on the new date. 

When the trial resumed on August 28, Lloyd Taylor appeared voluntarily and was examined by the defendant, but his testimony was deemed non-material. The defendant did not call the other ordered witnesses but did present two new witnesses. After both parties rested, the court proceeded to announce its intended decision later that day. 

The findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed on October 28, 1969, with judgment entered the following day. The appellate court concluded that the defendant's appeal lacked merit for several reasons, noting that the continuance was granted to ensure her access to Taylor's testimony, not for the plaintiff’s benefit. The court also asserted its authority to call witnesses and reopen cases for additional evidence as necessary to uphold justice. The defendant did not demonstrate any prejudice from the continuance order.

The granting or denying of a continuance is subject to the trial judge's broad discretion, with appeals on such decisions rarely showing reversible error. The relevant California Rules of Court specify that continuances in civil cases require a good cause showing. The specific Code of Civil Procedure sections cited by the defendant do not apply here, as personal presence of a party is not essential when an attorney is present. The trial court retains discretion regarding the necessity of an affidavit for continuance, and oral representations from counsel may suffice. The defendant's arguments regarding deposition rights were undermined by her own actions in excusing a witness, which indicated a waiver of those rights. The trial judge is not obligated to assist pro se litigants beyond ensuring justice is not inadvertently denied. The defendant's failure to object to the continuance during the trial precludes her from raising it as an error on appeal, which would only constitute procedural error without resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed, with no basis for reversal. A petition for rehearing and a Supreme Court review were both denied.