Coursey v. Superior Court

Citations: 194 Cal. App. 3d 147; 239 Cal. Rptr. 365; 1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 2029Docket: C001815

Court: California Court of Appeal; August 18, 1987; California; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Loretta A. Coursey is the petitioner in a dissolution of marriage case involving her ex-husband, Gene Coursey, concerning visitation rights for their 14-year-old daughter, L. Following a stipulated minute order granting Gene regular visitations, L. refused to visit him on November 9, 1986. In response, Gene sought a contempt order against Loretta, claiming she willfully violated the visitation agreement. The trial court found Loretta in contempt, imposing a $500 fine and a five-day jail sentence, which was stayed contingent upon L. completing the scheduled visitations. Loretta was also ordered to pay $1,000 in attorney's fees to Gene.

Loretta challenged the contempt finding, arguing there was insufficient evidence to prove she had the ability to compel L. to visit Gene or that she willfully disobeyed the order. The court agreed with Loretta, determining that the contempt adjudication should be annulled. The case highlighted that at a settlement conference prior to the incident, L.'s therapist indicated she suffered from 'Parental Alienation Syndrome,' which contributed to her reluctance to visit her father. The visitation order included provisions for encouraging contact between L. and both parents, but the circumstances surrounding L.'s refusals were central to the court's decision.

On November 14, 1986, Gene filed a contempt declaration against Loretta, claiming she knowingly failed to facilitate their daughter L.'s visitation with him on November 9, 1986. Attorney Baber attested to Loretta's awareness of the visitation order issued on October 31, 1986, due to her presence in court that day. Gene supported his claim with a declaration from Michael Sexton, detailing communication regarding the scheduled visitation and confirming that L. did not visit her father on the specified date.

Loretta moved to quash the order to show cause, but the motion was denied after a hearing. During the contempt hearing on November 25-26, 1986, Gene testified about the visitation order and L.'s refusal to visit. Loretta invoked her right against self-incrimination when called to testify, while her attorney, Gisi, confirmed he communicated L.'s refusal to Baber. 

Loretta's counsel argued that the burden of proof rested on Gene to show Loretta's willful failure to encourage the visitation. The trial court found Loretta was aware of the court order and indicated that she, rather than L., contacted Gisi regarding the visit. Ultimately, the court concluded that Loretta had control over L. and did not enforce the visitation order, interpreting this as willful contempt of the court order. The court emphasized that the order remained effective until altered or superseded, and noncompliance without substantial justification constituted contempt.

Loretta Coursey was found in contempt of a visitation order after the trial court determined she was aware of and had previously complied with the order. On November 9, Loretta’s attorney informed Gene Coursey's attorney that visitation would not occur, with no evidence presented to suggest Loretta's physical incapacity, only mental or emotional reluctance. Following this contempt ruling, the trial court assessed the appropriate penalty, considering testimony from Katherine Moore about L.'s fear of her father and from Gene. A commitment order for contempt was filed on December 2, 1986.

Loretta argues against the contempt ruling, claiming insufficient evidence that she could compel visitation or that she willfully disobeyed the order. The court emphasized the importance of child-parent visitation and acknowledged various remedies for visitation failures, including altering visitation rights or custody. However, it noted that contempt proceedings are criminal and require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, placing the burden on the movant without assistance from the contemnee. The court's review focuses solely on whether substantial evidence supported the contempt charge. It concluded that the evidence presented was legally insufficient. Key elements for establishing contempt include the existence of the order, the accused's knowledge and ability to comply, willful disobedience, and adherence to due process.

In reviewing a contempt adjudication, the primary focus is on the trial court's jurisdiction to issue the judgment, with evidence reviewed solely to determine if substantial evidence supports that jurisdiction. A party can only be held in contempt if they possess the ability to comply with the court order. In this case, Loretta claimed she lacked the ability to ensure her 14-year-old daughter visited Gene as mandated by the visitation order. The court agreed, noting no evidence was presented to show Loretta could compel her daughter to comply, especially given the daughter's reluctance. The court highlighted that common knowledge does not support the assumption that a parent can control a teenager's actions against their will. No proof of Loretta's relationship with her daughter or her ability to enforce compliance was provided during the hearing. The trial court’s finding that failure to comply indicated an ability to comply was erroneous, as it improperly shifted the burden of proof onto Loretta. Consequently, due to the lack of substantial evidence regarding her ability to compel visitation, the contempt adjudication against Loretta was annulled.

Loretta was not found to have willfully violated the visitation order, leading to the annulment of the contempt judgment against her. For a contempt finding, the accused must have intentionally disobeyed the order, as established in legal precedent. The allegations against Loretta included refusing to instruct or encourage her daughter, L., to visit her father on a specific date. However, there was no substantial evidence to support these claims. The only evidence presented was Loretta's participation in a phone call with Attorney Gisi, the content of which was protected by attorney-client privilege, and did not indicate any action taken by Loretta. Thus, it could not be concluded that she supported her daughter's decision to refuse the visit. Loretta's actions were consistent with her duty to communicate her daughter's decision to her husband through legal counsel. Consequently, there was insufficient evidence of a willful violation of the visitation order, warranting annulment of the contempt adjudication.

The $1,000 attorney's fee awarded was directly related to the contempt proceeding and must also be vacated along with the contempt judgment. The court noted that several other arguments raised by Loretta regarding the contempt ruling, including ambiguity of the minute order and due process violations, were unnecessary to address given the annulment. Additionally, the court acknowledged that the determination of a parent's control over a child varies by case, referencing a precedent where the parent's conduct influenced the assessment of their ability to exercise proper parental control.

In Marr v. Superior Court, the court addressed the adoption of an infant under one year old who had been declared a dependent child by the juvenile court. The ruling emphasized that "parental control" encompasses the typical responsibilities parents have for their child's care and support. In In re J.T., the court examined a due process challenge to a dependency statute requiring "proper and effective parental care or control," ultimately ruling that the statute was not vague and could be interpreted concerning a parent's suitability in caring for their child. Both cases highlighted that determining whether a child is under parental control is a factual matter for the trial court to resolve based on the circumstances presented. The current case does not involve the dependency statutes discussed in these precedents but reaffirms the principle that parental control is a factual issue for judicial determination.