Arakawa v. Reagan

Citations: 666 F. Supp. 254; 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2815; 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6905Docket: Civ. A. 85-3488 SSH

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; July 28, 1987; Federal District Court

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The case involves 38 former air traffic controllers dismissed by the FAA in 1981 due to their participation in an illegal strike, called by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) after failed negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Over 70% of air traffic controllers participated in the strike, which violated federal law prohibiting strikes by federal employees (5 U.S.C. 7311(2)). President Reagan issued an ultimatum for the controllers to return to work within 48 hours or lose their jobs, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiffs under the relevant federal procedures (5 U.S.C. 7512-14).

Of the dismissed controllers, 37 appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which upheld their dismissals. Subsequently, 31 of these plaintiffs sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which stayed review of over 225 petitions to consolidate common legal issues. By December 1984, the Federal Circuit indicated that the lead cases had concluded, allowing petitioners to submit renewed petitions, with only ten plaintiffs doing so. Additionally, some plaintiffs sought re-employment with the FAA, but OPM ruled that those dismissed for illegal strike participation were ineligible for rehiring based on a Presidential Directive. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion to join additional plaintiffs.

On November 1, 1985, plaintiffs filed a 13-count complaint against President Reagan, the FAA, OPM, MSPB, and the Federal Circuit, asserting a range of claims. These include constitutional claims under the First and Fifth Amendments (counts one and two), several common law tort claims likely under the Federal Tort Claims Act (counts three, four, five, nine, ten, eleven, and thirteen), unfair labor practices (counts six, seven, and eight), and a conspiracy claim to deprive civil rights (count twelve). Plaintiffs seek reinstatement with backpay, benefits, retraining, and $1 million each in compensatory and punitive damages. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, leading to jurisdictional discussions. The Court found it lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the MSPB and the Federal Circuit as these bodies have exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(9) and 1254. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs did not exhaust their judicial review options regarding MSPB and Federal Circuit decisions, warranting dismissal of the claims against these entities.

Regarding employment-related claims, the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) establishes a comprehensive administrative and judicial framework for federal employees' complaints. Most plaintiffs utilized the CSRA review procedures, and as they attempt to pursue constitutional and statutory claims outside this framework, the Court must assess if the CSRA serves as an exclusive remedy for employment-related claims. It was noted that the CSRA is recognized as the exclusive remedy for nonconstitutional claims from aggrieved federal employees, in line with precedent from the D.C. Circuit.

The rule established in Carducci v. Regan asserts that the comprehensive remedial framework of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) prohibits immediate access to courts for nonconstitutional claims involving lesser personnel actions, as it would undermine the statute's provisions for major adverse actions. Consequently, nonconstitutional claims in the complaint must be dismissed. While Carducci confirmed that the CSRA preempts nonconstitutional claims, it did not address the impact of the CSRA on federal courts' jurisdiction over constitutional claims. Subsequent rulings clarified that the CSRA does not limit district court jurisdiction over constitutional claims, allowing federal employees to seek injunctive relief against unconstitutional agency actions, although monetary relief is restricted. In Bush v. Lucas, the Supreme Court determined that the CSRA serves as the exclusive remedy for monetary claims, limiting judicial review of such claims. However, courts have maintained that constitutional claims seeking injunctive relief are not precluded by the CSRA. The jurisdiction of the district court to hear these constitutional claims is deemed concurrent with that of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), as the CSRA allows constitutional challenges within its proceedings. Thus, while monetary relief claims are dismissed, the court retains jurisdiction for injunctive relief claims, which can be pursued alongside MSPB proceedings.

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims against the MSPB and the Federal Circuit, as well as their nonconstitutional claims against defendants Reagan, FAA, and OPM. For the remaining constitutional claims (counts one and two), plaintiffs may only seek injunctive relief, specifically reinstatement, with no possibility for monetary damages. 

Upon reviewing the sufficiency of the remaining claims, the Court notes that while plaintiffs argue that the MSPB and Federal Circuit improperly consolidated diverse cases of air traffic controllers, their own complaint exhibits similar inconsistencies. The extent of administrative relief sought by plaintiffs varies significantly, from one plaintiff, Ken Geisert, who did not contest his discharge with the MSPB, to others who appealed to the Federal Circuit without seeking Supreme Court review. Many plaintiffs requested re-employment with the FAA, but most did not pursue this option.

Crucially, the plaintiffs allege various due process or First Amendment violations without specifying how each plaintiff was injured by particular actions or policies. This lack of specificity limits the Court's ability to assess claims individually. The principle of res judicata, or claim preclusion, allows the Court to dismiss most claims, as it prevents relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in a prior action, including administrative proceedings where the tribunal acts in a judicial capacity and allows for judicial review of decisions. 

Accordingly, those plaintiffs who appealed their discharges to the MSPB are barred from rearguing those challenges in this Court. While it is unclear whether plaintiffs raised their constitutional claims before the MSPB, res judicata applies to both litigated and unlitigated claims, meaning constitutional challenges could have been presented in prior proceedings. The plaintiffs’ failure to appeal adverse decisions does not affect the preclusive effect of those decisions.

Counts one and two of the complaint, which challenge the constitutionality of discharges, are dismissed for all plaintiffs except Ken Geisert. The same dismissal applies to the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) suitability determinations for re-employment. Plaintiffs Hall, McKee, Matsumoto, and Yap, who were deemed unsuitable by OPM and have already challenged this decision unsuccessfully before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), are barred from relitigating their constitutional claims due to res judicata. Consequently, counts one and two are dismissed with respect to these four plaintiffs regarding OPM's suitability process.

The court grants in part and denies in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. Counts three through thirteen of the complaint are dismissed entirely, while counts one and two are dismissed in full against the MSPB and the Federal Circuit. For the remaining defendants (FAA, OPM, and Reagan), counts one and two are partially dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs' motion to join additional plaintiffs is denied due to insufficient information regarding the claims of those individuals. The court also strikes the plaintiffs' demands for monetary relief and for a jury trial. Remaining defendants must respond to the claims under counts one and two within 14 days. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Plaintiffs Arakawa, Barros, Degagne, Geutsch, Inada, Isono, Konianpia, Kunishige, Lee, Maekawa, Matsumoto, Nakano, Omura, Suda, Waialee, and Yap had their appeals consolidated with Aiken, et al. v. Dep't of Transp. FAA, leading to their discharges being upheld by the MSPB. Guetsch, Inada, Lee, Omura, and Suda sought a full MSPB review, which upheld their discharges. Similarly, Castillo, Ellis, Fong, Fukui, Galves, Hutchison, Kanetani, Lau, Lum, McKee, Nitta, Tanner, Nakao, Hoe, and Kamau's appeals were consolidated with Acosta, et al. v. Dep't of Transp. FAA, resulting in denied full review petitions. For plaintiffs Copely and Gripper, their appeals were consolidated with Baker, et al. v. Dep't of Transp. FAA, and since they did not petition for review, the Regional Office's decision was final. Plaintiff Hall's appeal was consolidated with Prieto, et al. v. Dep't of Transp. FAA, and he also did not seek review. Discharges for plaintiffs Adams and Ayau were upheld, with neither seeking further MSPB review. Defendants noted Gonzales' discharge was upheld by both a Regional Office and the full MSPB, though citation was not provided. Plaintiff Geisert did not appeal. Additionally, Konianpia, Tanner, Gonzales, Nakao, Ayau, and Kamau did not seek Federal Circuit review. The Federal Circuit's lead case opinions are referenced. Some plaintiffs reinstated petitions for review in the Federal Circuit. Of six plaintiffs seeking reemployment, four challenged the OPM's unsuitability determinations, with Hall, McKee, and Matsumoto previously involved in Wagner v. OPM, where the suitability policy was upheld. The MSPB denied their review petitions based on Wagner. The unsuitability determination for Yap was affirmed without further review. Initially, the complaint listed 26 plaintiffs, with an additional 12 joining by court order.

The exclusivity of an individual's Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) remedy does not negate unfair labor practice claims, as Congress has established distinct provisions for federal employees under collective bargaining agreements (5 U.S.C. 7101-35). The Court lacks jurisdiction over such nonconstitutional claims since Congress has designated a specific review process through the Federal Labor Relations Authority, with subsequent judicial review in the courts of appeals (5 U.S.C. 7105(a)(2) and 7123). The Court does not address defendants' argument regarding the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act, as the resolution of tort claims relies on CSRA exclusivity.

The Court critiques a prior ruling by the Court of Appeals that allowed for injunctive relief despite the Supreme Court's earlier focus on damage actions in Bush. The Supreme Court characterized the CSRA as a comprehensive framework designed to address arbitrary supervisory actions and established procedures for redress. The Court emphasizes that merely lacking complete relief does not justify the creation of new judicial remedies for constitutional violations. It argues that policy decisions regarding additional remedies should consider the existing regulatory structure and the potential impacts on civil service efficiency, which Congress is better equipped to evaluate. The Court refrains from deciding on the appropriateness of allowing federal employees to seek damages for First Amendment violations, aligning with the principle of legislative deference in determining the adequacy of remedial systems.

The legal framework allows for constitutional challenges to agency actions, including First Amendment claims, to be addressed within the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) system, as established by the Supreme Court in Bush. The court emphasizes that the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Federal Circuit provide meaningful remedies, including injunctive relief such as reinstatement with back pay, which contrasts with the limitations noted in Bush regarding damages. Although direct judicial review of constitutional claims is not entirely precluded, the court argues against a blanket rule allowing it solely based on the pursuit of injunctive relief. In certain circumstances, where CSRA does not permit judicial review, courts have shown reluctance to limit employees to CSRA remedies. Additionally, some constitutional challenges may not be effectively resolved through administrative processes alone. The discussion includes references to previous cases which illustrate the balance between CSRA remedies and the need for judicial review in specific situations. Overall, while there are circumstances warranting judicial review, the court does not support an automatic provision for it based solely on requests for injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs' jury trial request is denied as only equitable claims are at issue. The Court's understanding of the plaintiffs' factual circumstances stems from defendants' submissions of MSPB decisions, not from the plaintiffs themselves. The MSPB has previously addressed the legality of the actions and policies contested, including issues such as the clarity of the President's ultimatum, notice of removal actions, and the adequacy of reply periods. The principle of res judicata necessitates that plaintiffs select a litigation forum, either an Article III court for immediate constitutional claims or the CSRA for more comprehensive relief. Although this choice may seem coercive, allowing parallel litigation would undermine the MSPB's authority. Alternatively, the exhaustion doctrine supports the conclusion that the administrative process can adequately address the alleged constitutional violations, promoting judicial efficiency and respecting the expertise of the MSPB and Federal Circuit. Most plaintiffs have opted for administrative review, making new proceedings redundant. Lastly, without additional context on the OPM's suitability determinations, the Court cannot assess the standing of plaintiffs not seeking reemployment, and no opinion on standing is provided at this time.