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Caveness v. State Personnel Board

Citations: 113 Cal. App. 3d 617; 170 Cal. Rptr. 54; 1980 Cal. App. LEXIS 2574Docket: Civ. 58926

Court: California Court of Appeal; November 21, 1980; California; State Appellate Court

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Mildred Caveness appeals a judgment that denied her petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel the State Personnel Board to reinstate her as a program technician I with the California Department of Motor Vehicles and award back salary following her dismissal. Caveness had been a permanent employee since December 1964 but received a reprimand on February 2, 1975, for neglect of duty and unauthorized absence. She was dismissed on September 14, 1977, for misconduct, including insubordination, discourteous treatment, and violations of board rules under Government Code section 19572. An amended dismissal notice on October 5, 1977, omitted insubordination as a charge. Caveness appealed, leading to an administrative hearing that began on February 10, 1978. The Department later amended the dismissal's effective date, which was ultimately confirmed as September 30, 1977. The hearing officer's findings included incidents from July 26, 1977, where Caveness exhibited rude behavior towards a customer and made derogatory remarks to a fellow employee who reported her conduct.

In July 1977, the Pasadena office required that employees serve customers arriving before closing time, resulting in some employees adjusting their schedules. Appellant, who began serving a customer at 5:00 p.m., requested a relief employee to complete the service but was informed that none was available. After unsuccessfully attempting to get help from co-workers, she left the customer unattended and departed the office. On July 26, 1977, after mishandling a transaction, appellant refused to discuss it with her supervisor until her lunch hour was finished, despite it being standard practice to address such matters on-site. 

Appellant had previously received a reprimand in February 1975 for neglect and absence without leave. Following these incidents, a hearing officer concluded that her ongoing conduct warranted dismissal under specific provisions of the Government Code. The Department's dismissal was upheld by the Board on July 13, 1978. 

Appellant raises several contentions: she claims her dismissal violated due process due to lack of opportunity to respond to new charges prior to discipline; she argues that the Board abused its discretion by allowing an amendment to the dismissal notice that changed the effective date, infringing on her right to respond; and she contends that the Board's finding of insubordination and discourteous treatment lacked substantial evidence.

Appellant argues that the dismissal penalty is excessively severe and constitutes an abuse of discretion. She claims that her due process rights were violated because she was not allowed to respond to the second amended notice of dismissal. However, the court finds this argument unmeritorious. Citing the Skelly v. State Personnel Board case, the court explains that permanent civil service employees are entitled to certain procedural rights, which include notice of the proposed action, reasons for it, access to charges and underlying materials, and the right to respond. The appellant had received these rights with the original notice of dismissal on September 14, 1977.

The appellant contends that the second amended notice introduced new charges and thus warranted a new opportunity to respond. However, the court clarifies that the first amended notice merely changed the dismissal date and did not eliminate insubordination as a charge. The omission was deemed a technical oversight, and the initial notice still stood. The second amended notice was intended to correct prior errors without introducing new allegations. The court emphasizes that Skelly requires clear warning to the employee about the seriousness of the situation and the opportunity to respond. The appellant had received such a warning with the initial notice, and logic would suggest she should have addressed the incidents leading to the corrective interviews, reinforcing the justification for her dismissal.

Appellant was not entitled to a second opportunity to respond to the Department after the second amended notice was served on March 3, 1978, and therefore did not experience a denial of due process. The hearing officer's decision to amend the effective date of dismissal from March 10, 1978, to September 30, 1977, was appropriate and corrected a clerical error, not affecting appellant's rights since she had already responded to the same charges. There was no indication that the amendment misled or prejudiced appellant in any way. 

Appellant's claims regarding the Board's findings on insubordination and discourteous treatment were found to be without merit. Appellant argued that there was no substantial evidence supporting claims of insubordination, asserting that there was no specific order she was required to follow. However, the hearing officer found that employees, including appellant, were instructed to complete customer service before closing. Appellant's decision to leave a customer unattended after being informed that no relief was available constituted willful disobedience of that order. Additionally, when approached by her supervisor about a transaction she mishandled, appellant refused to engage, which was also deemed a refusal to follow an appropriate directive, thus supporting the charge of insubordination.

The appellant challenges the findings of her misconduct, specifically citing finding IV, which details her derogatory remarks toward a fellow employee who reported her rudeness. While acknowledging this conduct as egregiously discourteous, the appellant overlooks finding VI, where her refusal to accept instructions from her supervisor is cited as insubordination and further discourteous behavior. The court determines that findings IV, V, and VI collectively support the conclusion of insubordination and discourteous treatment.

The appellant also argues that the Board's findings lack sufficient evidentiary support. However, the court notes that the appellant failed to provide an evidentiary record for review, thus binding the court to the existing record, which must be presumed adequate. The court emphasizes that factual statements not supported by the record are disregarded. Even if the appellant's claims were accepted as true, they would not alter the conclusion that the findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Regarding the penalty of dismissal, the appellant contends it is disproportionate. The court disagrees, stating that while administrative bodies must exercise discretion within legal boundaries, appellate courts cannot substitute their judgment regarding punitive measures. The appropriate standard for determining abuse of discretion in public employee discipline considers the potential harm to public service, the context of the misconduct, and the likelihood of recurrence.

Appellant faces dismissal based on four disciplinary incidents within a month, indicating a pattern of misconduct. She exhibited insubordination on two occasions by refusing to follow supervisor instructions, which disrupted and failed to improve public service. Additionally, she treated two employees discourteously; one was her supervisor, from whom she rejected guidance, and the other was a coworker whom she publicly insulted, undermining workplace cooperation and public confidence in services. The temporal proximity of these incidents suggests a recurring behavior, aggravating the situation further due to the nature of her role in public service. Past disregard for duties, evidenced by a reprimand for neglect and unauthorized absence, contributes to the justification for maximum penalty. The decision to uphold dismissal is affirmed, with no abuse of discretion noted, and the appellant's procedural arguments regarding evidence inclusion were found insufficient. Relevant government code provisions and board rules regarding employee conduct and disciplinary procedures are cited.