Forrand v. Foodmaker, Inc.

Citations: 182 Cal. App. 3d 196; 227 Cal. Rptr. 74; 1986 Cal. App. LEXIS 1698Docket: B006084

Court: California Court of Appeal; June 10, 1986; California; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of California upheld a jury verdict finding Foodmaker, Inc., operating as Jack-in-the-Box, negligent for injuries sustained by Keith W. Forrand during an armed robbery at the restaurant. On July 17, 1977, a 15-year-old named Glenn Dore committed the robbery, threatening the shift manager with a rifle. As Forrand entered the restaurant, a waitress urged him to "Stop him!" without informing him of the robbery or the armed threat. Believing the situation involved a payment issue, Forrand confronted Dore outside the restaurant, leading to Dore shooting him in the head. The jury awarded Forrand $2,879,000.

Foodmaker appealed, asserting four main issues: (1) the assertion that no legal duty was breached by the waitress's warning; (2) alleged prejudicial error regarding the admission of evidence on company conduct guidelines and the exclusion of testimony about their irrelevance to the shooting; (3) a lack of substantial evidence linking the company’s negligence to Forrand's injuries; and (4) the need for a new trial on damages due to evidentiary errors, attorney misconduct, and excessive damages awarded.

Forrand countered that (1) a duty to warn existed and was breached; (2) liability under traditional duty analysis was warranted; (3) the admission of evidence regarding company policy was relevant; (4) substantial evidence supported causation; and (5) the damages awarded were justified and all evidence was appropriately admitted. The central legal issue is whether a duty of care was owed by Foodmaker to Forrand, which is crucial for establishing negligence liability. The court noted that while the existence of duty is a legal question, foreseeability of risk is a key factor in determining that duty.

Foreseeability is typically a factual question, unless established decisional law indicates no foreseeability exists under similar circumstances. The appellant contends that existing case law supports their position, asserting that the trial court should have determined foreseeability as a matter of law in their favor. They reference two cases: Vandermost v. Alpha Beta and Young v. Desert View Management Co.

In Vandermost, the plaintiff was shot during a robbery at a restaurant. The court found that while business owners have a duty to protect patrons, the evidence of foreseeability was weak, the connection between the injury and the defendant's actions was tenuous, and public policy factors precluded imposing a duty of care.

In Young, the plaintiff was shot after responding to a robbery in progress. The court ruled against imposing a duty of care, reasoning that neither the employees nor the plaintiff had adequate knowledge of the robber's armed status, and the nature of the request for help was not sufficient to create a legal obligation.

The analysis of the current case, drawing on Vandermost and Young, indicates minimal foreseeability. The court reminds that foreseeability does not equate to duty, and in cases with weak foreseeability and other factors, a lack of duty must be determined. The court questions whether a bystander could have reasonably foreseen that a statement made during the robbery would lead to a pursuit of the robber, concluding that any foreseeability is too minimal to establish a duty of care.

Hotstetter's capacity to fully comprehend the implications of her statement during the robbery was limited, despite her claims of remaining calm. The respondent argued that Hotstetter had a duty to warn him about Dore being armed. However, the jury found that Hotstetter's actions were within the context of the robbery, and imposing a duty of rational thought during such a chaotic situation is unjustifiable. If the respondent had been shot while attempting to confront Dore, the foreseeability of such harm in a volatile environment would be low. Consequently, the respondent's decision to pursue Dore in his car, which led to an unforeseeable event, cannot be attributed to Hotstetter’s actions.

The legal standard for premises liability requires that a property owner must protect visitors from foreseeable harm caused by third parties. However, this duty applies only when the owner has reasonable cause to anticipate such wrongful conduct and fails to act. The court found no basis to extend this liability to incidents occurring away from the premises, as there was no reasonable foreseeability of Dore attacking the respondent a block and a half away. The link between Hotstetter's statement and the respondent's injury is weak, compounded by the unreasonable nature of the respondent's actions, which included leaving the restaurant, pursuing Dore, and confronting him while armed.

Hotstetter's command to "Stop him!" was deemed a reasonable attempt to prevent a crime, and public policy dictates that such cries for help should not lead to liability. Thus, the court concluded that no duty existed between the parties, resulting in no viable negligence claim. The judgment was reversed, and the Supreme Court denied the respondent's petition for review.

Respondent arrived at the Jack-in-the-Box after a robbery had occurred but before the robber, Dore, exited the premises. Upon entering, he noticed a young man with a Jack-in-the-Box bag. Hotstetter, a witness, claimed Dore had already left when respondent entered, and she denied yelling for anyone to "Stop him," a claim made solely by respondent. Another witness, Laberteaux, corroborated Hotstetter's assertion that no such call was made. 

Conflicting testimonies emerged regarding the confrontation preceding the shooting. Dore claimed he instructed respondent to remain in the car, but respondent exited, provocatively referencing Dore's gun. Dore subsequently shot respondent as he approached. Eyewitness Cherrie Katayama supported parts of Dore's account, noting she saw them conversing while respondent was still in the car, though she could not hear their exchange. She estimated the confrontation lasted several minutes, contrary to another witness's assertion that it lasted only seconds. The jury ultimately found respondent not contributorily negligent by a nine-to-three vote.

The text cites factors from Rowland v. Christian relevant to assessing liability, including foreseeability of harm, certainty of injury, and moral blame associated with the defendant's conduct. Hotstetter stated she informed respondent of the robbery and the need to secure the establishment, maintaining a calm demeanor. Respondent's reliance on her testimony is noted, yet the jury rejected his claim regarding her yell. Although Hotstetter served respondent frequently, he did not recognize her, indicating a lack of the special relationship necessary to impose a common law duty to act.