People v. Jaffe

Citations: 493 N.E.2d 600; 145 Ill. App. 3d 840; 97 Ill. Dec. 793; 1986 Ill. App. LEXIS 1704Docket: 83-1129

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 11, 1986; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Sheldon Jaffe was convicted of the murder of Patricia Dean and attempted murder of her husband, Ghazi Dean, following a jury trial. On appeal, Jaffe contested the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and argued that jury instructions regarding a witness's mental history were flawed. He also asserted that cross-examination of Ghazi was improperly limited, his sentencing did not comply with the habitual criminal act, and the judgment incorrectly indicated two murder counts. The court affirmed the murder conviction but reversed the attempted murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. 

Key trial evidence included testimony from Deputy Sheriff William Bobrowski, who found Patricia bleeding from a gunshot wound at their residence, where a revolver, a knife, and various bullet holes were present. Detective Ray Lamprich confirmed that the knife and gun had no usable fingerprints and found no signs of forced entry. Ghazi's testimony revealed a history of conflict with Jaffe, who had been living with the Deans until shortly before the incident. On the night of the shooting, Ghazi, under the influence of prescribed medications, was awakened by Patricia's distress and witnessed Jaffe with the gun.

Ghazi and the defendant engaged in a physical confrontation that escalated when Ghazi seized a gun, resulting in a shot being fired. They struggled into the living room, where Ghazi subdued the defendant and beat him until he lost consciousness. After calling for help, Ghazi discovered the defendant had fled. While waiting for police, Ghazi cleaned himself of blood and vomited before dressing. During the trial, Ghazi admitted to a history of arguments with his wife, Pat, and acknowledged previous instances of violence against her. The defendant recounted his relationship with Pat and described their arguments, including discussions about a fire that destroyed their residence in February 1983. On June 29, 1983, the day of Pat's murder, the defendant drank at his mother’s house before visiting the Dean residence and later the Firehouse Pub. He took a nap in his car before returning to the pub and then driving to the Dean residence around 12:30 a.m. There, he confronted Ghazi, who was armed, leading to a struggle that resulted in the defendant being knocked unconscious. The next morning, he sought assistance to return to Skokie, where he was arrested. The trial concluded with the jury finding the defendant guilty of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, armed violence, and home invasion. The court later vacated some charges as lesser offenses and merged the murder counts, sentencing the defendant to two concurrent life terms. Following the trial, the defendant filed a post-trial motion, which was denied, and subsequently filed a notice of appeal, asserting he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trier of fact is responsible for assessing witness credibility, determining the weight of their testimony, and making inferences from the evidence presented. In cases of conflicting evidence, an appellate court will not overrule the trier of fact's judgment; mere conflict does not create reasonable doubt. A jury verdict based on substantial evidence remains valid despite the introduction of contradictory evidence unless there is grave doubt regarding the guilt of the defendant. The evidence presented indicates that the defendant had a motive for the murder of Pat, stemming from a dispute over a $200 loan, which was corroborated by multiple witnesses. Testimonies revealed ongoing arguments between the defendant and Pat leading up to her death.

The defendant claimed he was at a pub on the night of June 29, 1983, but his account was contradicted by other witnesses who placed him at the pub later than he stated. These witnesses testified that he returned to the pub after midnight, which undermined his timeline and suggested inconsistencies in his story. Overall, the evidence was deemed substantial enough to support the jury's verdict, and the defendant's explanations were not sufficient to raise reasonable doubt about his guilt.

Defendant entered the bar appearing "uptight," requested a beer, and struggled to write a $5 check, indicating he was shaking. After making two phone calls, he left the bar at 1:20 a.m. On June 30, 1983, defendant called James Giovenco at St. Joseph's Hospital, expressing regret about not seeing him again. This raised doubts about defendant's claim of hiding behind a tree after an incident, allowing the jury to question his credibility. Les Card, a liquor store manager, noted that defendant appeared injured when he entered his store later that morning, claiming he had been in a fight. During his arrest, defendant told detectives he had no recollection of shooting Pat, attributed his memory loss to alcoholism and blackouts, yet later testified he remembered the events of June 29-30. The jury could interpret these inconsistent statements as undermining his credibility. 

Defendant's reasonable doubt argument mainly targeted Ghazi's credibility, though inconsistencies regarding whether Ghazi accompanied his wife in an ambulance were deemed insignificant. Discrepancies between Ghazi's account of blood splatter and a paramedic's observations were also minor, as the jury might have considered Ghazi's perception of the scene. Additionally, Kenneth Sweetwood's failure to disclose certain details to detectives could lead the jury to doubt his trial testimony. Defendant argued Ghazi's credibility was compromised due to a chronic brain condition resulting from a prior accident, with Dr. Ronald Baron testifying about Ghazi's symptoms, which included irritability and episodes of violence.

Ghazi experienced seizures and memory deficiencies due to an accident, which affected his ability to recall specific details of events but allowed him to remember major occurrences and familiar names. Testimony from Baron indicated a conflict with another doctor's assessment regarding Ghazi's cognitive impairment. The jury could infer that Ghazi accurately remembered key events from June 29-30, 1983, despite his potential confusion over minor details. Ghazi's credibility was not significantly undermined by his brain injury. The defense pointed out inconsistencies between Ghazi's account of vomiting and throwing away bloodied paper towels after a fight and the absence of such evidence found by investigator Bobrowski. The jury might have concluded that Ghazi flushed the toilet, making the lack of evidence less significant when compared to inconsistencies in the defendant's narrative.

The defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his attorney failed to raise voluntary intoxication and self-defense as defenses. To prove ineffective assistance, the defendant needed to show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that these shortcomings deprived him of a fair trial, as established in Strickland v. Washington. The defendant contended that evidence indicated he was too intoxicated to have formed the intent to commit murder. However, the strategy employed by his attorney—to present the defendant's account while challenging Ghazi's credibility—was deemed reasonable. The defenses presented by the defendant were self-defense for the attempted murder charge and a denial of involvement in Pat's murder. Counsel likely believed that relying on a voluntary intoxication defense, which requires demonstrating a complete suspension of reason, would contradict the defendant's ability to provide a detailed account of his actions on the nights in question.

Defense counsel's choice to not pursue the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication or to request related jury instructions for the murder and attempted murder charges was deemed a valid trial tactic. The court referenced *People v. Barrentine*, noting that the inconclusive evidence of the defendant's intoxication and his admission of not being drunk justified this decision, as counsel focused on a justification defense instead. The defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice stemming from this choice, as evidence indicated he was not intoxicated to a degree that would negate the specific intent required for the charges. 

Witness testimonies revealed mixed accounts of the defendant's intoxication level throughout the evening, with one witness stating he appeared sober enough to hold a conversation and play pool. The defendant himself reported consuming around 15 beers throughout the day but had the foresight to call and inquire about staying overnight if he was too drunk to drive. Furthermore, testimony from a witness did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant was intoxicated six hours before the incident.

However, the court acknowledged the merit in the defendant's claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present any self-defense instructions. Self-defense, as defined in *People v. Estes* and *People v. Jordan*, requires the defendant to prove several elements, including the necessity of force in response to an imminent threat. The court recognized that even minimal evidence could warrant a self-defense instruction, as established in *People v. Bailey* and *People v. Bratcher*. The defendant testified that he was confronted by Ghazi, who was armed with a pistol when he entered the residence, indicating a potential basis for a self-defense claim that should have been presented to the jury.

Ghazi pointed a gun at the defendant, prompting the defendant to attempt to seize the weapon, resulting in a struggle during which the defendant lost consciousness. Upon regaining awareness, the defendant fled in fear. The testimony, if credible, raises a self-defense claim that would have warranted the jury being instructed on this defense. The absence of a request for self-defense instructions by defense counsel is deemed ineffective assistance, particularly since self-defense was the sole defense against the attempted murder charge. The defendant acknowledged his presence at the scene and admitted to fighting with Ghazi, making the failure to present self-defense instructions unreasonable under the circumstances. Various precedents support the notion that ineffective assistance occurs when counsel fails to offer necessary jury instructions on defenses, including self-defense. Unlike other cases where tactical decisions were justified, no such rationale exists here, as there is no alternative compromise offense for attempted murder that could have influenced counsel's decision. Evidence suggests that self-defense instructions were warranted, reinforcing the need for a new trial due to the ineffective representation.

Counsel's failure to provide the jury with a self-defense instruction cannot be justified by the arguments made or other jury instructions given. This conduct is deemed to fall outside the acceptable range of professional assistance as established in Strickland v. Washington. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that the failure resulted in prejudice, specifically showing a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have differed but for the errors. In People v. Berry, the court identified substantial prejudice resulting from a similar omission, noting that the jury's lack of a crucial instruction likely altered the trial's outcome. In the current case, the absence of self-defense instructions is more significant given that no relevant guidance was provided to the jury, which could have led to a different verdict had they received proper instructions. The defendant testified that he used force to protect himself, indicating a potential justification for his actions. Without self-defense instructions, the jury could convict him of attempted murder despite believing his testimony. Therefore, the court concludes that the defense counsel's failure to request these instructions constitutes incompetence, warranting the reversal of the defendant's attempted murder conviction.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider a witness's mental history only in relation to his believability. The defendant claims this instruction improperly focused on a specific witness's testimony and restricted the jury from considering the effects of Ghazi's head injury and medication on his perception and memory. The court finds that the first objection was waived since it was not raised during the trial or in the post-trial motion. Furthermore, the court holds that the instruction was not improper, as it aligns with the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI Criminal No. 1.02), which allows the jury to assess the believability of witnesses while considering various factors, including memory and perception. The court concludes that the instruction did not prevent the jury from considering these aspects of Ghazi's testimony.

Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of Ghazi on three specific questions related to insurance proceeds and Ghazi's whereabouts. However, the court notes that the defendant failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion, leading to a waiver. Even if not waived, the court asserts that any alleged errors would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and emphasizes that the scope of cross-examination is typically at the trial court's discretion, which will only be disturbed if there is a clear abuse resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant.

Evidence of bias in witness testimony must be specific enough to suggest that the witness could gain or lose something from their statements, as established in People v. Foley. Even if cross-examination is restricted in error, it constitutes reversible error only if the defendant experiences manifest prejudice, as seen in People v. Crosser. Any such error is deemed harmless unless it creates reasonable doubt about its contribution to the conviction, per People v. Rogers.

The defendant aimed to demonstrate Ghazi's bias by suggesting Ghazi killed Pat due to his exclusion from insurance proceeds related to alleged arson. However, a question posed to Ghazi about his satisfaction with a $2,000 payment from Pat’s daughter did not effectively address Ghazi's potential anger over the insurance money. Ghazi confirmed receiving the $2,000, and thus, any error in sustaining the State’s objection to this question was harmless. 

Furthermore, a question regarding Ghazi's satisfaction with a $42,000 amount, based on a statement he allegedly made, was also deemed irrelevant since Ghazi did not recall making such a statement. The trial court's decision to sustain objections to questions about Ghazi's whereabouts on the day of Pat's funeral was justified as it only had a minimal connection to any bias, especially since the jury was informed that Ghazi did not attend the funeral. Consequently, the trial court's rulings on these questions did not result in reversible error.

The defendant also claimed entitlement to a new sentencing hearing, arguing that the trial court violated section 33B-2(a) of the habitual criminal act by accepting the presentence report as evidence of his prior convictions without certified copies. He contended that the court failed to inform him of his right to a hearing and did not conduct one. However, during the sentencing hearing, the defendant’s counsel acknowledged that both he and the defendant had read the presentence report and found it accurate, limiting the defense's argument regarding the appropriateness of a life sentence under the statute.

Defendant chose not to present any arguments on his behalf, resulting in the waiver of issues raised for the first time on appeal. He did not contest the accuracy of the convictions listed in the presentence report, rendering any procedural error regarding the absence of a separate hearing harmless. Both the defendant and the State acknowledged that the order of judgment incorrectly indicated two counts of murder; thus, it should be amended to reflect a single conviction for murder. The court affirmed the murder conviction but reversed and remanded the attempted murder conviction for a new trial. 

In a supplemental opinion addressing petitions for rehearing from both parties, the State contended that the affirmation of the murder conviction implies no jury could acquit the defendant on retrial for attempted murder, arguing no prejudice arose from ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to provide self-defense instructions. To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient and that this deficiency likely affected the outcome of the trial. The court noted that while the jury could have believed parts of Ghazi's testimony regarding the murder, the attempted murder charge derived from a separate incident. It concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the absence of self-defense instructions could have altered the outcome of the attempted murder charge. The defendant also cited a more recent case, asserting ineffective assistance due to his attorney's failure to address voluntary intoxication as a defense.

In Wright, a defendant convicted of murder and armed violence successfully argued ineffective assistance of counsel after an evidentiary hearing revealed that his attorney failed to present critical evidence of intoxication, which could have led to a lesser charge of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court found this failure constituted incompetence, as the attorney did not consider the implications of the defendant's actions being reckless. The supreme court highlighted that the attorney's representation did not meet the reasonable competence standard, noting that the judge believed the outcome would have differed had the evidence been presented.

In contrast, the current case lacks similar supporting evidence from the defendant's counsel regarding intoxication. The defense may have strategically chosen not to pursue this defense, believing that the defendant's denial of involvement was stronger. The court found insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the attorney’s performance fell below a reasonable standard, as there was no clear reasoning from the defense counsel recorded at trial.

Additionally, unlike in Wright, there is no conclusive evidence suggesting that the trial's outcome would have been different if the intoxication defense had been raised. Here, the evidence did not support a finding of recklessness, as the defendant maintained he did not kill the victim, while the prosecution’s evidence indicated murder. The defendant's claim that the court misapprehended his arguments was dismissed, as he did not establish a reasonable likelihood that additional intoxication evidence would have altered the trial's results. The burden of proof for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was not met, leading to the denial of both petitions for rehearing.