BREEZY POINT CO-OP v. Cigna Property and Cas. Co.

Citations: 868 F. Supp. 33; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16794; 1994 WL 660356Docket: 1:91-cv-04846

Court: District Court, E.D. New York; October 5, 1994; Federal District Court

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Breezy Point Cooperative, Inc. initiated a declaratory judgment action against CIGNA Property and Casualty Company, seeking defense and indemnity coverage under two liability insurance policies for personal injury claims occurring on its property. The first policy covered the period from March 1, 1989, to March 1, 1990, and the second renewed this coverage until March 1, 1991. Both policies required Breezy Point to notify CIGNA "as soon as practicable" of any "occurrence," defined as an accident or continuous exposure to harmful conditions.

Breezy Point failed to timely notify CIGNA of two incidents: the first involved William Lang, discovered unconscious near the shoreline on July 8, 1989, with notification to CIGNA occurring only on August 9, 1991, after a personal injury action was filed against Breezy Point. CIGNA denied coverage based on the two-year delay. The second incident involved Jason Sammut, injured on July 4, 1990, with Breezy Point notifying CIGNA of the incident on August 7, 1991, prior to a suit filed on October 16, 1991. CIGNA similarly denied coverage due to the year-long delay.

Breezy Point moved for partial summary judgment to compel CIGNA to defend in the Sammut action, while CIGNA cross-moved, arguing that Breezy Point's delays vitiated the policies. The court denied both motions, stating that factual issues regarding Breezy Point's belief of non-liability and justification for the delays precluded summary judgment. Subsequently, Breezy Point sought to exclude the testimony of CIGNA's expert witness and a transcript of a relevant conversation. The court granted the motion to exclude the expert's testimony but denied the motion to exclude the transcript of the August 1991 conversation.

Plaintiff seeks to exclude the expert testimony of Marvin Greenspan, Esq. on the basis that it improperly draws legal conclusions and infringes upon the roles of the judge and jury. The specific testimony in question includes opinions on the reasonableness of Breezy Point's delay in reporting incidents, allegations of the plaintiff's failure to provide timely notice under insurance policies and New York State Insurance Law, and assertions that Breezy Point lacks a reasonable excuse for such delays. The court holds broad discretion regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, as guided by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704, which allow expert opinions to assist in understanding evidence and addressing ultimate issues. However, expert testimony that expresses legal conclusions is generally inadmissible, as established by case law. Experts cannot opine on the legal obligations under contracts, statutory violations, or the legal significance of trial facts, as these determinations are for the jury. Greenspan's proposed testimony on the plaintiff's alleged notice violation interprets insurance contract terms, constituting an inadmissible legal opinion. Furthermore, his discussion of New York law would inappropriately instruct the jury on legal principles, a function reserved for the court. Overall, Greenspan's testimony would usurp judicial authority and is therefore objectionable.

Mr. Greenspan, despite being a qualified attorney, is not permitted to instruct the jury or provide expert testimony on the reasonableness of Breezy Point's delay in notifying CIGNA, as such testimony would require him to make legal conclusions and evaluate legal significance, functions reserved for the jury. Consequently, the Court grants the plaintiff's request to exclude Mr. Greenspan's testimony on this matter.

Breezy Point seeks to exclude a transcript of an August 1991 conversation between its employee and the plaintiff's assistant general manager, arguing issues of authentication and hearsay under various Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court finds that the statements made in the conversation are admissible non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) because they involve statements by a party's agent concerning matters within the scope of their employment. The conversation includes statements attributed to the plaintiff's General Manager, which supports their admissibility.

Since the defendant will produce the actual tape recording of the conversation, the Court does not need to rule on the Best Evidence Rule's application regarding the transcript. However, the transcript may be introduced to assist the jury, provided the original recording is authenticated as per Rules 901 and 902. Therefore, the Court allows the introduction of the recording and a properly authenticated transcript at trial while granting the plaintiff's motion to exclude Mr. Greenspan's expert testimony.