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Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co.
Citations: 901 N.E.2d 329; 231 Ill. 2d 516Docket: 104983
Court: Illinois Supreme Court; December 18, 2008; Illinois; State Supreme Court
James Mikolajczyk died from injuries sustained when his Ford Escort was rear-ended. His widow, serving as the special administrator of his estate, filed a lawsuit against the other driver for negligence and against Ford Motor Company and Mazda Motor Corporation for defective design of the vehicle's driver's seat. The case against the other driver resulted in summary judgment in their favor, allowing the claims against Ford and Mazda to proceed to a jury trial in Cook County. The jury found the manufacturers liable, awarding $2 million for economic losses and $25 million for loss of society. The appellate court partially affirmed and partially reversed the decision, ultimately deeming the loss of society damages excessive and instructing a remittitur hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court then reviewed the case, particularly the trial court's jury instructions regarding the consumer-expectation test versus the risk-utility test for defective design. The court also accepted petitions from various groups as amici curiae to support the defendants and the plaintiff in the appeal process. On February 4, 2000, William Timberlake, after consuming alcohol, drove his Cadillac at 60 mph and collided with a stationary Ford Escort, resulting in severe injuries to the driver, James Mikolajczyk, who subsequently died, and injuries to his daughter, Elizabeth. Mikolajczyk was survived by his wife, Connie, and son, Adam. A negligence suit was filed against Timberlake, leading to a summary judgment in his favor. The plaintiff also sued Ford and Mazda for strict product liability, alleging a defective design of the Escort's driver's seat, which collapsed upon impact, causing Mikolajczyk's fatal injuries. The plaintiff claimed the seat design was unreasonably dangerous and directly linked to his death. Ford manufactured the Escort, while Mazda designed the seat, with Ford having final design approval. Trial evidence included expert testimonies about the seat design's risks and compliance with federal safety standards. The jury was instructed on the plaintiff's claims and definitions related to strict liability but rejected the defendants' proposed jury instructions concerning overall safety and risk-benefit analysis. The jury found the driver's seat to be in an unreasonably dangerous condition, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding $2 million for economic loss and $25 million for loss of society, with fault assigned as 60% to Timberlake and 40% to Ford and Mazda. The appellate court upheld the jury instructions but deemed the $25 million award excessive. The defendants contended that the appellate court improperly utilized the outdated consumer-expectation test instead of the risk-utility test for evaluating defective designs, arguing for the adoption of the latter as the exclusive standard. The defendants contend that the trial court incorrectly applied substantive law to the plaintiff's claim, particularly in relation to the refusal to provide their non-IPI jury instruction. They further assert that a new trial is warranted due to the jury instructions not aligning with the trial evidence. Conversely, the plaintiff claims the appellate court mistakenly deemed the $25 million award for loss of society excessive and remanded for a new remittitur hearing. The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) did not include guidelines for strict product liability claims until the 1977 supplement to the second edition. The relevant instruction, IPI Civil No. 400.06, defines "unreasonably dangerous" as unsafe under reasonably foreseeable uses. This terminology was established in the case of Suvada v. White Motor Co., which recognized strict liability for manufacturers of defectively dangerous products, aligning with the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law of Torts. The drafters of the IPI chose "unreasonably dangerous condition" to avoid suggesting fault and noted the necessity of a definition to aid jurors’ understanding. To succeed in a strict product liability claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury arose from a condition of the product that was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the manufacturer's control. A product may be deemed unreasonably dangerous due to a physical defect, design flaw, or inadequate warnings/instructions from the manufacturer. In 1979, the court established that a strict liability claim for design defect can be substantiated by demonstrating the availability and feasibility of alternative designs at the time of manufacture, or by showing that the design did not meet industry standards, guidelines from authoritative associations, or regulatory criteria. This principle was reinforced in Kerns v. Engelke, where evidence of a practical and effective alternative design was deemed significant in assessing whether a product was unreasonably dangerous. The court noted that the feasibility of alternatives plays a critical role in liability, as a manufacturer cannot be held liable if safer options are not viable. In Lamkin v. Towner, the court reiterated its alignment with section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, defining a product as unreasonably dangerous if it exceeds the danger expected by an ordinary consumer with typical knowledge of its characteristics. The court outlined two methods for proving a defective design claim: the consumer-expectation test, which evaluates if the product performed safely as expected, and the risk-utility test, which considers if the benefits of the design outweigh its risks. In Lamkin, involving window screens, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet either test, leading to an improper denial of summary judgment for the defendants. The decision emphasized that the window screens must perform safely in line with consumer expectations. Window screens are intended for ventilation and insect prevention, not for preventing falls, thus they operate as designed without posing unreasonable danger. The risk only materializes when they fail to perform a function for which they were not intended. An ordinary person would understand this distinction. Applying the risk-utility test, the court evaluated whether the design of the window screens was a proximate cause of the children's injuries and whether the plaintiff presented evidence for safer design alternatives. The court found no supporting evidence for the plaintiffs' claims, concluding that the screens were not defective or unreasonably dangerous, which precluded a products liability claim. Previous rulings emphasized examining the product's use under the consumer-expectation test and alternative design feasibility under the risk-utility test. Defendants contend that subsequent cases have established the risk-utility test as the sole proper standard in complex product liability claims, arguing that the consumer-expectation test applies only to simpler products and situations. They assert that existing jury instructions misrepresent the applicable legal standard. The defendants frame the court's inquiry as a legal question regarding the applicability of the consumer-expectation test versus the risk-utility test, which the court reviews de novo. The plaintiff argues for an abuse of discretion standard, asserting that reversal is unwarranted unless prejudice to a fair trial is shown. Defendants counter that providing outdated instructions constitutes an abuse of discretion warranting a new trial. The court aligns with the defendants, recognizing the issue as a matter of law concerning the application of the consumer-expectation test in design defect cases. The term 'risk-utility' was first articulated in the case of Hansen, where a fatal air embolism resulted from the unintentional disconnection of an intravenous catheter device. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer failed to adequately warn users of this risk and argued that the device was unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect. The jury found the manufacturer liable, but the appellate court determined that the failure-to-warn theory could not support the general verdict, although evidence supported a finding of design defect under both the consumer-expectation and risk-utility tests. On appeal, the manufacturer contended that the appellate court erred in applying the risk-utility analysis, advocating instead for the consumer-expectation test grounded in healthcare professionals' views. However, this court concluded that the manufacturer had a duty to warn healthcare professionals of the device’s dangers, and the jury's verdict could validly be based on this failure to warn. While the court could have upheld the judgment solely on the failure to warn claim, it also examined the design defect claim. The court determined that the ordinary-consumer-expectation test, applicable to patients who would suffer harm from the device’s failure, was appropriate. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the device's design was defective under this test. The appellate court's decision was therefore upheld. Moreover, the court addressed the risk-utility test, noting that the manufacturer claimed its simple design and well-known risks made this test inapplicable. However, the court's ruling on the failure to warn claim alone would have sufficed to affirm the lower court's judgment. The distinction between 'judicial dicta' and 'obiter dicta' was also highlighted, suggesting that unnecessary yet argued points hold significant weight in future cases. The defendant referenced Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., where the court declined to apply the risk-utility test to a deep-fat fryer design defect case, emphasizing that a line exists beyond which the danger-utility test is not applicable. It was concluded that the circuit court rightly applied only the consumer-user contemplation test in this case. This court did not reject or adopt the principles from Scoby but noted that even if they were applicable, they would not alter the outcome in Hansen, as the medical device in question was marketed as a safety device and presented non-obvious dangers, unlike the fryer. Consequently, evidence of a safer alternative design was deemed admissible, supporting a finding of unreasonable dangerousness under the risk-utility analysis. The court declined to adopt a new test for design defects in medical devices under the then-recent Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, deeming the argument forfeited but leaving open the potential for future consideration of the Restatement sections. By 2002, case law affirmed that strict liability could arise from injuries caused by unreasonably dangerous product conditions, including manufacturing and design defects or inadequate warnings. Both the consumer-expectation and risk-utility tests could apply to determine if a product's design was unreasonably dangerous, as established in Lamkin. The court clarified that complex products, such as medical devices, could be assessed using both tests, distinguishing complexities without firmly defining them. The jury instruction for "unreasonably dangerous," established prior to the key decisions in Lamkin and Hansen, remained unchanged despite the development of two alternative methods for proving design defectiveness. In 2005, the risk-utility test was revisited in Blue, involving a trash compactor case where the plaintiff could only pursue negligence after the strict liability claim was dismissed due to statute of repose issues. The court addressed whether the trial court erred by presenting a jury interrogatory regarding the obviousness of the risk of injury associated with the compactor's design. The jury affirmed a question but delivered a general verdict favoring the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v., citing inconsistency between the jury's special interrogatory answer and the general verdict. The appellate court reversed this decision, stating that in negligence actions involving a failure to warn, no duty exists if the danger is open and obvious. However, it also clarified that open and obvious risks do not completely eliminate liability in negligent design claims. Citing case law, the appellate court noted that open and obvious risks are merely factors to consider under the risk-utility test in strict product liability cases related to defective design. The court discussed the risk-utility test and its relationship to negligence standards, ultimately concluding that it does not apply to negligent design claims. The defendants argued that the court endorsed section 2 of the Restatement of Torts: Products Liability, which defines product defects in terms of manufacturing, design, or inadequate instructions/warnings. They contended that this endorsement restricts the consumer-expectation test to manufacturing defect claims, while the risk-utility test applies to design defects. Despite Blue being a negligence case, the defendants claimed the appellate court incorrectly treated the discussion of section 2 as dicta and misinterpreted its implications for strict liability design claims. They argued that the plurality opinion indicated a shift towards the risk-utility test for design defects, a view with which some concurring justices agreed. The court ultimately disagreed with the defendants' interpretation. Section 2 of the Products Liability Restatement was cited in Blue to differentiate between negligent design claims and strict product liability for defective design. The section was developed due to the shortcomings of section 402A in addressing design defects and inadequate instructions. However, the court did not adopt section 2(b) as the exclusive measure of dangerousness in strict liability cases. It acknowledged that the rationale for strict liability in manufacturing defects does not extend to design defects. The court explored the risk-utility test, suggesting that once a plaintiff demonstrates that a design defect caused their injury, the burden may shift to the defendant to prove that the design's benefits outweigh its hazards, a concept derived from Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. Although Barker's burden-shifting method was referenced in prior cases, it has not been explicitly adopted by the court. The court concluded that the risk-utility test was not applicable to the plaintiff's negligent design claim and addressed it due to the appellate court’s findings. The Blue plurality noted that a plaintiff must present evidence of a feasible alternative design to establish a prima facie case of design defect, with liability ultimately determined by the trier of fact. The opinion did not discard the consumer-expectation test but recognized its potential limitations in design defect cases. Additionally, the plurality rejected the burden-shifting aspect of the risk-utility test, a point not contested by concurring justices. Defendants in the current case argue that the risk-utility test is the sole measure of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, referencing the Calles case involving a utility lighter that resulted in a fatal fire started by a child. The trial court in Calles granted summary judgment favoring the defendants. The appellate court referenced the Blue plurality's citation of Scoby, which established that certain simple products have obvious dangers that do not necessitate the application of the risk-utility balancing test. The court determined that summary judgment for the defendant manufacturer is appropriate if the evidence strongly favors the defendant to the point where no reasonable jury could rule for the plaintiff. In the case discussed, the lighter did not meet the criteria of an especially simple device, justifying a reversal in part of the prior ruling. The central issue was whether a 'simple product exception' existed in strict liability design defect cases, specifically if products deemed 'simple' and having obvious dangers were exempt from the risk-utility test. The court acknowledged that the consumer-expectation test, originally developed for manufacturing defect claims, had been applied to design defect claims, although its applicability had faced scrutiny. The analysis showed that a product could meet consumer expectations yet still be deemed defective under risk-utility analysis. The utility lighter in question met the expectations of an ordinary adult consumer by functioning as intended; however, it had been misused by a child, leading to a tragic incident. The court concluded that because the lighter functioned as expected in a foreseeable manner, it could not be classified as unreasonably dangerous under the consumer-expectation test. Further, the court explored the defendant's argument for a "simple product" exception to the risk-utility test, as proposed in Scoby. The court found that Scoby's exception requires both simplicity of the product and obviousness of its danger. Thus, the analysis continued to consider the risk-utility framework to determine the product's safety. Disagreement arose regarding the notion that dangers from "simple" products are inherently open and obvious, as exemplified by risks like burns from frying oil and fire hazards from utility lighters. The conclusion was that the so-called simple-product exception is effectively a general rule shielding manufacturers from liability for open and obvious dangers. However, the court rejected a blanket exemption for such products from the risk-utility analysis, asserting that open and obvious dangers are merely one factor in the broader risk-utility test. This application revealed a material fact dispute, preventing summary judgment for the defendant. The Calles decision also dismissed the idea that only the consumer-expectation test applies in certain strict liability cases, prompting the defendants to argue that it rendered the consumer-expectation test "largely superfluous." They based this claim on references to California cases such as Soule v. General Motors Corp. and Barker, which supported the use of both tests in assessing product design. The court clarified that their citation of Soule did not signal an adoption of a new rule that would overrule prior cases, emphasizing that open and obvious dangers do not exempt products from the risk-utility test. However, the court noted that the issue of whether complex products are exempt from the consumer-expectation test remained unaddressed. Past decisions have not indicated that the consumer-expectation test is rejected in cases involving complex products, as established in Hansen, where both the consumer-expectation and risk-utility tests were applied to find a defective design. The defendants claim that Illinois law should recognize the risk-utility test as the only measure of dangerousness for defectively designed products, particularly for complex products that ordinary consumers may not fully understand. They argue that the consumer-expectation test is limited to manufacturing defects, as jurors can rely on their experiences with simple products, while design defects involve complexities that require expert analysis beyond common consumer expectations. The defendants assert that jurors would lack reasonable expectations regarding the performance of complex products like car seats in various accident scenarios. In contrast, the plaintiff contends that adopting the defendants' approach would undermine established case law and that distinguishing between simple and complex products is impractical. The plaintiff also references a division in the court regarding what constitutes a "simple" product, citing the Calles case. The defendants' proposed rule aligns with section 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement, which suggests design defects occur only when a reasonable alternative design could have mitigated foreseeable risks, rendering the product unsafe. Accepting the defendants' proposal to adopt section 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement would necessitate overruling existing legal precedent, as this section changes the fundamental elements of product liability claims regarding alleged design defects under Illinois law. The established criteria for strict liability claims necessitate proving: 1) the product's defective condition due to manufacturing or design, 2) that this defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, 3) that this condition existed when the product left the defendant's control, 4) an injury to the plaintiff, and 5) that the injury was proximately caused by the defect, with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff for each element. Adopting section 2(b) would significantly modify the "unreasonably dangerous" element by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a feasible alternative design in all cases and shifting the burden to prove that the product is "not reasonably safe" instead of showing it is "unreasonably dangerous." The requirement for a feasible alternative design was briefly part of Illinois law under Public Act 89-7, which was declared unconstitutional in 1997, and since then, the legislature has not reinstated this provision. The court expresses hesitance to make such a fundamental change in product liability law based solely on the Restatement's suggestions, asserting that such modifications are more appropriately addressed through legislative action rather than judicial intervention. The shift to "not reasonably safe" aims to clarify the plaintiff's burden by reducing misinterpretation associated with the term "unreasonably dangerous." The excerpt analyzes the implications of adopting a different standard for product liability in tort law, specifically contrasting the "unreasonably dangerous" test with the proposed "not reasonably safe" test. It emphasizes that the existing standard is clearer for jurors and that the proposed change could complicate juror understanding. The discussion references the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and critiques the defendants' push for a shift in substantive law, which would require overruling established precedents. While recognizing that the existence of a feasible alternative design and risk-benefit analysis are relevant in design defect cases, it clarifies that these are not mandatory elements that plaintiffs must prove in every instance. The excerpt further addresses the defendants' argument for jury instruction on the risk-utility test, concluding that in instances where the consumer-expectation test is not applicable, an instruction that incorporates risk and utility considerations is necessary. It distinguishes the current case from a previous ruling (Calles), where the risk-utility test was the sole standard applied due to the inadequacy of the consumer-expectation test. The excerpt ultimately raises the question of whether the same requirement for jury instruction applies when the consumer-expectation test remains a viable consideration. Defendants assert that the risk-utility test should take precedence over the consumer-expectation test even if the latter favors the plaintiff, claiming that the only relevant factor is whether the risk-utility issue has been raised by the evidence. They reference the Kerns decision, which allowed a nonpattern jury instruction on alternative design feasibility, emphasizing that the trial court must instruct the jury on all evidence-raised issues. The plaintiff counters that she has the discretion to choose between the consumer-expectation and risk-utility theories of design defect, asserting that she can proceed under whichever theory her evidence supports. She cites precedent affirming that plaintiffs are "masters of their complaint" regarding the theories pursued. The plaintiff argues it would be unreasonable for defendants to dictate her chosen theory, emphasizing that she opted for the consumer-expectation theory of strict liability. Additionally, she contends that the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury on alternative liability theories. The plaintiff distinguishes between theories of liability and methods of proof, noting that three strict product liability theories exist: manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn. She highlights that she is proceeding under the design defect theory and references the Lamkin case, which delineates the consumer-expectation and risk-utility tests as methods of proof, not separate theories of liability. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine serves as circumstantial evidence to demonstrate breach of duty in negligence claims. However, in this case, the plaintiff opted for strict product liability based on design defect rather than negligence and chose the consumer-expectation method for proof, as reflected in her jury instructions. The defendants assert their right to present their case using any valid method of proof and argue they are entitled to a jury instruction corresponding to their chosen method. The court faces two key questions: whether a defendant can receive a risk-utility instruction despite a plaintiff's consumer-expectation method, and which result prevails if both instructions yield conflicting outcomes. Parties are entitled to jury instructions on relevant issues, applicable legal principles, and necessary proof facts, as established in Dillon v. Evanston Hospital. The threshold for instruction in civil cases is low, requiring only some record evidence to support an instruction, regardless of its strength. The trial court has discretion in deciding which instructions to grant, provided they fairly instruct the jury. The term "theory of the case" includes both parties' framing of issues, and while a plaintiff may receive an instruction aligned with her theory, she cannot prevent the defendant from receiving an instruction that accurately reflects the law and is backed by evidence. Defendants contend that if both consumer-expectation and risk-utility instructions are provided to a jury in a design defect case, treating them independently could yield four outcomes. First, a product may be deemed unreasonably dangerous under both tests, favoring the plaintiff, as seen in Hansen involving a medical device. Second, if neither test finds the product unreasonably dangerous, judgment would favor the defendant, illustrated by Lamkin concerning a window screen. Third, a product could be found not unreasonably dangerous by the consumer-expectation test but unreasonably dangerous by the risk-utility test, resulting in judgment for the plaintiff, as noted in Calles with a utility lighter. Fourth, defendants argue that if a product is unreasonably dangerous under the consumer-expectation test but the risk-utility analysis shows no feasible alternatives or that benefits outweigh risks, the risk-utility test should prevail. They warn that treating the tests as alternatives would impose absolute liability, particularly for complex products, leading to potential liability for all injuries regardless of the risk-utility balance. Defendants reference Mele and Besse to support their argument, although these cases have been overruled in part by Calles, which rejected the "simple product" exception from Scoby. Defendants also highlight efforts in Mele and Besse to create an integrated test for design defects, with Besse specifically addressing strict liability due to a corn picker's design and the plaintiff's evidence of a preventable injury through a design modification. The defendant in Besse argued that the machine functioned as designed, thus could not be found unreasonably dangerous under the consumer-expectation standard. The appellate court in Besse established that the "narrow test" from comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is not the sole standard for products liability in Illinois. Instead, a broader definition of "unreasonably dangerous" encompasses both the "consumer expectation" test and the "risk/utility analysis," which are complementary and can be used simultaneously when evidence supports it. In Besse, the jury determined that the plaintiff's evidence met the integrated test for unreasonably dangerous products. In the Mele case, concerning a medical device used in a hip replacement, the court held the manufacturer strictly liable under a theory of defective design. The plaintiff employed the consumer-expectation method, asserting that the device did not meet safety expectations. The court ruled against the defendant's attempt to introduce a risk-benefit analysis, maintaining that to prove a product is unreasonably dangerous, the plaintiff must demonstrate a design defect posing an unreasonable risk of harm. The court rejected the defendant's proposal to adopt section 6(c) of the Products Liability Restatement, which would prioritize risk-utility analysis over consumer expectations, asserting it would contradict Illinois law. Additionally, the trial court found that evidence concerning risks and benefits was irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim, as it focused solely on consumer expectations for safety. The court identified a lack of Illinois authority regarding a defendant's ability to present evidence that the benefits of a product's design outweigh its risks when a plaintiff claims the product is unreasonably dangerous due to not meeting consumer safety expectations. The court referenced the Besse case, which advocated for a test evaluating product danger based on both consumer expectations and the risks and benefits of the product, particularly in the context of complex products like medical devices. It concluded that the trial court erred in excluding evidence related to the risks and benefits of a hip replacement device, which could demonstrate the product was not unreasonably dangerous according to the integrated test. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for retrial. The Mele case indicated that even when a plaintiff utilizes the consumer-expectation test, they cannot restrict the defendant's evidence related to the risk-utility analysis. The court noted that both parties introduced relevant evidence for the risk-utility inquiry, raising the question of whether the defendant could have the jury instructed specifically on this test. It differentiated between the single-factor consumer-expectation test, which is narrow and relies on jurors' personal experiences, and the broader multifactor risk-utility test, where consumer expectations are one among many considerations. The court found the formulation of the risk-utility test in the Products Liability Restatement to be helpful, indicating it includes a variety of factors such as the magnitude of foreseeable risks, consumer expectations, and the implications of alternative designs on production and consumer choice. The integrated risk-utility test incorporates consumer expectations alongside traditional risk-utility considerations, aligning with prior appellate court decisions in Mele and Besse. This formulation allows advertising and marketing messages to inform consumer expectations. When evidence supports the application of this integrated test, instructions reflecting this should be provided upon request from either party. However, if both parties’ arguments focus solely on consumer expectations or the foreseeability of product use during the injury, the jury should only receive instructions on the consumer-expectation test. The integration of the consumer-expectation factor into the broader risk-utility test clarifies that one does not supersede the other, maintaining the relevance of both in strict product liability cases concerning design defects. Each party retains the right to select their proof method and request relevant jury instructions. The case illustrates this principle, where a jury found a car seat to be unreasonably dangerous after a rear-end collision led to a fatal injury, concluding that consumer expectations about safety were not met. Additionally, the Kerns case demonstrates that proper jury instructions must accurately reflect applicable legal standards, affirming the trial court’s discretion to provide specific instructions on feasibility in product liability actions. Instructions must accurately address the issues at hand and be substantiated by evidence. The court must evaluate whether it erred by denying the defendants' nonpattern jury instruction. This involves determining: (a) if the defendants preserved the issue for appeal through adequate objections and alternative instructions; (b) if sufficient evidence supported the risk-utility test instruction; and (c) if the trial court's refusal to provide this instruction constitutes a reversible error. A party loses the right to contest a jury instruction unless it timely objects and proposes a remedial instruction, which allows the court to rectify any defects and prevents unfair advantage. In a referenced case, the defendant successfully preserved the issue for review by objecting to an instruction and submitting an alternative. In the current case, the defendants objected to the plaintiff's version of an existing instruction regarding "unreasonably dangerous" products, which reflects the consumer-expectation test. The defendants' nonpattern instructions were rejected. A product is deemed defectively designed if its foreseeable risks outweigh its benefits and feasible alternative designs were available when the product was manufactured. Evaluating design alternatives must consider overall safety, and it is insufficient for alternatives to reduce harm if they introduce equal or greater risks. The defendants argue that despite the court's acknowledgment of the risk-utility test, there is no established pattern instruction for it, necessitating a nonpattern instruction for jury assessments of product risk-utility. Defendants cite Supreme Court Rule 239(a) to argue that nonpattern jury instructions are appropriate when the Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI) do not address specific subjects that require simple, impartial, and clear guidance. They reference relevant case law, including Lamkin and the Products Liability Restatement, and note that such instructions can clarify unique factual situations or legal points. In contrast, the plaintiff contends that the defendants' nonpattern instructions do not accurately reflect the law and fail to meet the criteria for alternative instructions, particularly arguing that the concepts presented do not pertain to the plaintiff's burden of proof in a product liability case. The plaintiff asserts that she is not obligated to prove the existence of a feasible alternative design or to use the risk-utility method of proof, but she must demonstrate that the product is unreasonably dangerous due to design defects. The plaintiff's burden shifts if the defendant provides evidence concerning the absence of feasible alternatives or the design's benefits outweighing its risks, which could influence the jury's determination. Given established pleading rules, it should not be unexpected for a product liability plaintiff to encounter the risk-utility method of proof, as it was a central issue in the case. The defendants objected to the plaintiff's consumer-expectation instruction and submitted a nonpattern instruction on risk-utility. The defendants' instructions do not impose a burden on the plaintiff to prove feasible alternatives. Additionally, the plaintiff introduced evidence related to the risk-utility test to support her argument. The court finds that the defendants adequately preserved the issue for appeal regarding the jury instructions on the risk-utility test, affirming that each party is entitled to have the jury instructed on relevant theories supported by the evidence. The key issue is whether the risk-utility test was appropriately supported by evidence during the trial, warranting a jury instruction on this theory. The court determines that any instruction must be justified by some evidence in the record. Defendants argue that both parties presented sufficient evidence related to the feasibility of alternative seat designs, crash test results, and the risks associated with rigid versus yielding seats, thereby supporting the need for a jury instruction on the risk-utility test. The plaintiff acknowledges the evidence but contends that she should have the option to pursue her chosen theory, the consumer-expectation theory, and not be compelled to adopt the defendants' risk-utility approach. The court concludes that sufficient evidence was presented to warrant an instruction on the risk-utility test. It then addresses whether the trial court's refusal to provide the tendered instruction constituted an abuse of discretion, which is evaluated based on whether the refusal prejudiced the requesting party’s right to a fair trial. The defendants assert that the complexity of the considerations involved in seat design, accounting for various collision types and occupant conditions, makes the situation unsuitable for consumer-expectation analysis. The court aligns with precedents stating that a jury instruction that accurately reflects applicable legal principles and is supported by evidence should not be denied if such denial prejudices the requesting party's right to a fair trial. Defendants submitted a nonpattern jury instruction aimed at directing the jury's focus on the feasibility of alternative designs, the risks associated with the CT20 seat, and its benefits. They contended that had this instruction been given, the jury would have been prompted to evaluate expert testimony suggesting that the CT20 seat, despite causing James's death, might have been safer for other drivers in different collision scenarios. They highlighted an expert's testimony indicating the seat could have reduced serious injuries for backseat passengers, despite increasing risks for James. Defendants argued that the court's refusal to provide their proposed instruction prejudiced them, leaving the jury without guidance on assessing the evidence or balancing risks and benefits. They asserted that under the given pattern instruction, jurors were only asked to determine if the seat was unsafe in foreseeable situations, which could lead to a bias against the seat due to the tragic outcome, without considering beneficial evidence, such as the prevalence of yielding seats (99.6% of vehicles at the time). The plaintiff countered that she adhered to Supreme Court Rule 239 by submitting applicable pattern instructions and noted that no precedent mandates an additional risk-utility instruction. She referenced Carrillo v. Ford Motor Co., a similar case involving a seat collapse due to a rear-end collision, where the same jury instructions were used and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, which was upheld on appeal. The same judge presided over both cases, and the trial testimonies, including expert witnesses, were comparable, reinforcing the validity of the instructions used in the current case. The appellate court in Carrillo affirmed the rejection of a jury instruction that framed a strict liability claim in terms of "not reasonably safe," stating that this terminology conflicts with established legal standards which define the test as "unreasonably dangerous." The court referenced previous decisions that rejected the notion of using "not reasonably safe" in strict liability claims. Additionally, it highlighted that IPI Civil (2000) No. 400.07, which includes the term "duty," should be avoided to maintain clarity between strict liability and negligence. The absence of guidance in the instruction's comments further supported the court's decision. Following the concerns raised in Carrillo, the 2006 edition of IPI Civil replaced the disputed instruction with a recommendation against giving any duty-related instructions in strict product liability cases, except when relevant to warnings. The court held that IPI Civil (2000) No. 400.06 adequately informed the jury of the necessary legal principles. The plaintiff argued that if IPI Civil (2000) No. 400.06 was sufficient in Carrillo, it should also be adequate in the current case, claiming the trial court was constrained by precedents. However, the court found Carrillo not applicable, noting that the nonpattern instruction proposed by the defendants did not suffer from the same issues as the rejected pattern instruction. The court referenced Dillon, a medical malpractice case, to illustrate that the principles of law relevant to the evidence presented should guide the jury instructions. The physician and the hospital appealed a trial court's decision, claiming it erred by modifying a jury instruction to include consideration of "increased risk of future injuries" in damage calculations. This modification arose from a precedent set in Dillon, which established that plaintiffs could recover for future injury risks if adequately quantified. The court noted that previous rulings had excluded future injury risks from damages, and that there was no existing pattern jury instruction addressing this issue. The modified instruction, however, inadequately communicated the need for the jury to assess the degree of risk associated with future harm and adjust damages accordingly. Consequently, since the jury received insufficient guidance on applying the correct legal principles, a retrial was deemed necessary. Additionally, in the current case, the trial court rejected a non-pattern jury instruction related to the risk-utility test. Although the jury found the defendants liable, they were not properly instructed to consider both the risk-utility and consumer-expectation tests, leading to prejudice against the defendants. The jury was directed to focus solely on whether the seat was unsafe under foreseeable use, disregarding important considerations regarding the risks and benefits of alternative designs. The trial court's refusal to provide a requested risk-utility instruction, while allowing the use of IPI Civil (2000) No. 400.06, impeded the defendants' right to a thorough jury review. The court deemed this refusal an abuse of discretion. It clarified that plaintiffs in design defect cases can use either the consumer-expectation test or the risk-utility test to demonstrate that a product is "unreasonably dangerous." If either party employs risk-utility evidence, a corresponding jury instruction must be given upon request. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for a new trial, making it unnecessary to assess the excessiveness of the loss of society award. The appellate court's judgment is reversed, the circuit court's judgment is also reversed, and the case is sent back for retrial. Justices FREEMAN, THOMAS, KARMEIER, and BURKE agreed with the judgment. Chief Justice FITZGERALD partially concurred and dissented, arguing that the defendants’ non-IPI instructions were not superior to the IPI instructions and that the jury was not misled, thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Justice KILBRIDE did not participate in the decision. The trial court instructed the jury to find in favor of the plaintiffs based on a strict liability theory if the seat was deemed "unreasonably dangerous," specifically if it was "unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably foreseeable." Ford's instructions asserted that the issue was whether the design defect of the Escort made it unreasonably dangerous, positing that the benefits of its front seat design outweighed the inherent risks. Ford's definition of a defective design included the notion that the foreseeable risks of harm must outweigh the design benefits, and that risks could be mitigated through feasible alternative designs, considering economic, effective, practical, and technological factors at the time of production. Furthermore, when assessing the reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall safety of the product must be evaluated, emphasizing that it is insufficient for an alternative design to simply reduce harm if it introduces equal or greater dangers. The trial court's choice of jury instructions must be assessed to determine if it abused its discretion, as governed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a), which mandates the use of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) unless they misstate the law. A reviewing court will only overturn the trial court's decision on jury instructions if there is a clear abuse of discretion that misled the jury and prejudiced the appellant. The jurisprudence acknowledges that counsel also plays a role in clarifying instructions for the jury, and an earlier case, Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., underscores the importance of proper instruction, noting that the trial court erred in its application of IPI in that instance. The court determined that the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury did not constitute reversible error, affirming that the appellate court's judgment could be upheld on any record basis. The record did not clearly show that the jury was misled by the instruction error. The trial court permitted defense counsel to address evidence regarding a rejected instruction during closing arguments, which the court noted was effectively incorporated into the jury's consideration. The case referenced, Carrillo v. Ford Motor Co., involved similar circumstances, including the same legal representatives and expert witnesses, with identical jury instructions provided. The court in Carrillo highlighted that defense counsel's arguments were adequate, indicating that the jury received sufficient guidance on determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous based on foreseeable use. Counsel had the latitude to argue the risks and benefits of the CT20 seat, emphasizing extensive evidence about its safety and Timberlake's role in the accident. The defense contended that the risks associated with an alternative seat design were greater, thereby arguing that the CT20 seat was not unreasonably dangerous. Additionally, defense counsel focused on Timberlake's potential sole responsibility for the accident due to his actions as an intoxicated driver. The court concluded that, based on the provided jury instructions and counsel's arguments, there was no clear indication that the jury was misled or that the defendants were prejudiced. The jury was equipped to perform a risk/benefit analysis, allowing them to determine that the risks associated with the seat did not outweigh its benefits in various potential accident scenarios. The trial court properly rejected the defendants' non-IPI (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions) instructions, which aimed to impose the risk-utility test as the sole standard for products liability, thereby denying the plaintiff's chosen method of proof—the consumer expectations test. The defendants failed to raise this argument before the appellate court or this court, indicating a lack of precedent for forcing the plaintiff to abandon her preferred test. The majority agrees that the consumer expectations test should remain applicable and clarifies that the Third Restatement of Torts does not dictate specific jury instructions but allows local law to define their form and content. Additionally, the defendants’ instruction on burden shifting incorrectly stated that the burden would shift to Ford/Mazda if certain propositions were proven, whereas the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff to demonstrate that the car seat was unreasonably dangerous. The majority notes that no prior court decision has endorsed this burden-shifting language. Furthermore, other problematic language in the defendants' instructions suggested a product could be "reasonably safe" even if not accident-proof, which has been rejected for lack of clarity in Illinois precedent. The majority emphasizes that the jury should be instructed on the "unreasonably dangerous" condition of the product to establish liability, aligning with the Restatement (Third) of Torts and conflicting with prior cases. The phrase "not accident proof" lacks grounding in Illinois law and could imply that any product is not "unreasonably dangerous," as all products could potentially meet such a standard. The trial judge faced the risk of misleading the jury if the defendants’ instructions were utilized, which could have prejudiced the plaintiff. If the trial judge found the plaintiff's instructions inadequate, the defendants' non-IPI instructions would have complicated the jury's understanding of the law. The case of Dillon is distinguished, where jury instructions on future injury risks were deemed improper, conflicting with the court's historical stance against compensating for such risks. The court in Dillon did not address the impact of adversarial arguments on jury instructions. Here, there was no indication of a misled jury or prejudice against the defendants, validating the trial court's discretion in favoring the plaintiff's IPI instructions. The dissent criticizes the majority for assuming that the defendants’ instructions were superior without considering the context of the defense counsel's arguments. The dissent concludes that the trial court acted appropriately by choosing the plaintiff's instructions, and it disagrees with the majority's assessment, arguing that prior precedents were overlooked or misinterpreted. The dissenting opinion argues against the denial of rehearing, asserting that the plaintiff's claims regarding the defendants' jury instructions misstate the law in several significant ways. Specifically, the dissent identifies seven errors in the defendants' instructions: 1. They incorrectly required the plaintiff to prove an alternative feasible design existed at the time of the product sale to establish liability. 2. The burden for proving risk-utility was misstated, placing the onus on defendants to show that the benefits of the design outweighed its risks. 3. The instructions failed to reference consumer expectation in the context of the majority's "integrated test." 4. The requirement for the plaintiff to prove the product was "unreasonably dangerous" lacked a definition of that term. 5. The plaintiff was asked to prove both a "design defect" and that the vehicle was "unreasonably dangerous." 6. The term "not reasonably safe" was used, which the court had previously rejected as inadequate. 7. An argumentative statement suggesting a product could be "reasonably safe" even if not "accident proof" was included. The dissent emphasizes that the trial court's choice of jury instructions was crucial and that the majority's failure to address whether the plaintiff would have faced serious prejudice from the trial court's decisions suggests a potential endorsement of the incorrect instructions. Additionally, the dissent notes the trial court utilized IPI instructions allowing for jury consideration of risk-utility evidence, and it argues that closing arguments could have mitigated any prejudice to the defendants. It also highlights that the majority's opinion does not adequately address the implications of the defendants' incorrect instructions, referencing the precedent set in Deal v. Byford, which requires a party claiming error to present a correct instruction to avoid waiver. Ultimately, the dissent calls for rehearing to address these issues and clarify the role of the trial court regarding the incorrect instructions. Plaintiff contends that a neutral jury instruction regarding the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" could have influenced her decision to object, suggesting that the outcome might differ had defendants provided a proper "integrated" instruction that aligned with her consumer expectation theory. The plaintiff emphasizes the necessity of jury instructions reflecting her theory, as established in prior case law, arguing that the trial court erred in providing Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI) that did not adequately represent her claims. The majority's stance that the consumer-expectation test remains a valid theory is criticized as misleading, raising concerns about the implications for established precedents such as Lamkin, Hansen, and Calles, which allowed plaintiffs to choose between the consumer-expectation and risk-utility tests. The dissent highlights the flawed nature of the defendants' submissions and questions the trial court's discretion in handling jury instructions. The dissenting opinion calls for a reevaluation of the majority's findings and suggests that the viability of the consumer-expectation test remains uncertain due to the perceived overreach in the majority's ruling. Additionally, the dissent expresses a desire to address the issue of remittitur based on the belief that the majority misconstrued the trial court's discretion.