Goldfarb v. Civil Service Commission

Citations: 225 Cal. App. 3d 633; 275 Cal. Rptr. 284; 90 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8560; 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 1220Docket: A048507

Court: California Court of Appeal; November 26, 1990; California; State Appellate Court

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Stephen Goldfarb appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Alameda County Civil Service Commission to pay interest on backpay awarded after his wrongful demotion was rescinded. Following a civil service hearing, Goldfarb was restored to his original position and received approximately $15,000 in backpay under a County ordinance. However, his request for interest on this backpay was rejected, prompting his appeal.

The Court of Appeals clarified that it is not bound by the trial court's denial of a writ of mandate when the facts are undisputed and the issue is one of law. The sole legal question was whether a civil servant is entitled to interest on a backpay award. The court determined that Goldfarb's claim satisfied the criteria for issuing a writ of mandate, as there is a clear duty for the County to pay interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), which stipulates that individuals entitled to recover certain damages are also entitled to interest from the date the right to recover vested.

The court emphasized that "damages" broadly encompasses monetary compensation for detriment caused by unlawful acts, and previous rulings have established that backpay awards qualify as damages under this section. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision, affirming Goldfarb's entitlement to interest on his backpay.

In Mass v. Board of Education (1964), the court ruled that a wrongfully suspended teacher was entitled to reinstatement and full salary from the suspension date, including prejudgment interest on each lost salary payment under section 3287. The court emphasized that this section was amended in 1959 to allow claims against local governmental agencies and disapproved prior decisions that denied interest in mandamus actions. It established that salary payments accrued on specific dates, and if the suspension was not justified, the payments were vested. The court concluded that the teacher lost potential interest on the withheld salary, thereby justifying the award of interest from the date each payment became due.

Subsequent cases, such as Sanders v. City of Los Angeles and Olson v. Cory, supported that backpay awards are classified as "damages" under section 3287, affirming the entitlement to interest on back salary and pension payments. The court rejected respondents' attempts to distinguish these precedents, arguing that the distinction in the nature of the administrative versus court-awarded backpay was irrelevant. Respondents also claimed they were not liable for interest due to the absence of specific statutory provisions for interest on claims against counties. However, the court referenced the Austin v. Board of Retirement case, asserting that such provisions are unnecessary since Civil Code section 3287 generally allows for recovery of interest from any debtor, including counties. This reasoning was applied to support the appellant's entitlement to interest on backpay.

Respondents cite cases asserting that claims for backpay are not considered "money or damages" under the Tort Claims Act, referencing Eureka Teacher's Assn. v. Board of Education and Harris v. State Personnel Bd. However, these cases are deemed irrelevant as they do not clarify the definition of "damages" in section 3287, and the Tort Claims Act does not apply in this context. The court concludes that the appellant's petition should be granted for interest on the backpay received. The trial court did not address the request for attorneys' fees and costs under Government Code section 800, and no opinion is expressed on that matter. The order denying the writ of mandate is reversed, directing the trial court to grant the petition for backpay interest and to conduct further proceedings regarding attorneys' fees and costs. The appellant is awarded costs on appeal. Anderson, P.J., and Reardon, J. concurred.