Oliver v. Forrest County General Hospital

Citations: 785 F. Supp. 590; 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20284; 1991 WL 325263Docket: Civ. A. H89-0227(P)

Court: District Court, S.D. Mississippi; April 9, 1991; Federal District Court

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Bonnie Oliver, a resident of Forrest County, Mississippi, filed a lawsuit against Forrest County General Hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her procedural due process rights and for breach of contract under Mississippi common law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

Oliver's employment history with the hospital includes several periods of employment and leaves of absence, notably starting in September 1975, with a break for graduate education beginning in 1986. Upon her return to work as a Registered Nurse (RN) on May 23, 1988, she was placed in the Coronary Care Unit (CCU). According to the hospital's employee handbook, newly hired employees must complete a six-month probationary period during which they are generally ineligible for departmental transfer. 

Oliver requested a transfer to the labor and delivery department during her probation and followed up with a letter to the Executive Director, Lowery Woodall, who acknowledged her request but did not guarantee a transfer. By November 1988, still not transferred, Oliver submitted a memorandum stating her desire to leave the CCU and requesting a transfer to labor and delivery or else she would have to terminate her employment at the hospital. The case revolves around her claims for injunctive and monetary relief based on these employment issues.

Five registered nurses (RNs) were hired in the labor and delivery unit of Forrest General Hospital in May 1988, despite Ms. Oliver's request for placement in that unit upon her return to work. An additional RN was hired on September 1, 1988, after Oliver's transfer request was submitted on June 23, 1988, and after communication from Mr. Woodall on August 23, 1988. No RN positions became available for Oliver from November 8 to December 8, 1988, when she voluntarily resigned. Oliver ceased employment on December 8, 1988, and filed this action exactly one year later. The employment relationship was governed by an Employee Handbook, which explicitly states that it does not create a contract and that employment is based on mutual consent, allowing either party to terminate it.

Forrest General moved to dismiss Oliver's complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court treated the motion as one for summary judgment because both parties submitted extraneous materials. The standard for summary judgment requires that the moving party demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the nonmoving party fails to provide sufficient evidence for an essential element of their claim, the court will grant summary judgment. The court found that Oliver did not present adequate evidence to warrant a trial, leading to the conclusion that Forrest General is entitled to summary judgment.

Oliver's complaint included a Section 1983 claim, alleging that the hospital's actions in not transferring her constituted a violation of her rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

To establish a violation of Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and U.S. laws. The threshold issue is whether the plaintiff possesses a protected property or liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. If the plaintiff lacks such an interest, the court cannot assess what process was due. A property right requires more than a mere expectation; a legitimate claim of entitlement must exist, which derives from sources such as state law rather than the Constitution itself. In this case, the plaintiff, Oliver, failed to provide evidence of a protected property interest in her employment with Forrest General, meaning the employer owed her no procedural protections prior to termination.

Regarding Oliver's breach of contract claim, she argued that an August 23, 1988 letter from Mr. Woodall constituted an enforceable contract that entitled her to a position in the labor and delivery unit. However, the court disagreed, finding that the letter did not create a binding contract under Mississippi law and did not negate the Employee Handbook's stipulations, which included a six-month probationary period for transfers and a disclaimer of guaranteed employment. The court concluded that the letter was insufficient to establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment.

Mississippi's employment-at-will doctrine allows either party in an indefinite employment contract to terminate the relationship without cause. In the case at hand, even if Oliver claims that a letter dated August 23, 1988, from Mr. Woodall constituted a contract, the lack of a specified duration means it remains subject to termination at will. Consequently, Oliver lacks a protected property interest in her continued employment at Forrest General. The Employee Handbook does not establish a legitimate claim of entitlement, as Oliver herself acknowledged. Under Mississippi law, hospitals can decide whether employees have property interests in their jobs, and Forrest General's choice supports the at-will termination. The August 23 letter does not create a binding contract that removes Oliver from at-will status. Since Oliver has not demonstrated any valid claim for continued employment, her termination does not invoke due process protections. Therefore, her Section 1983 due process claim fails, along with her breach of contract claim, leading the court to grant Forrest General summary judgment. Oliver's claims for injunctive relief and damages for emotional distress are also dismissed as they are contingent on her breach of contract claim. The court ultimately orders dismissal of Oliver's complaint with prejudice.