Richardson v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham

Citations: 221 N.E.2d 396; 351 Mass. 375; 1966 Mass. LEXIS 659

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; November 7, 1966; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

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An appeal was made to the Superior Court regarding a decision by the Framingham Zoning Board of Appeals concerning a building permit for a 44-apartment complex. The permit included a private access road extending over single-residence zoned land. The Zoning Board upheld the permit, but the Superior Court annulled this decision. Reservoir Realty Trust, the permit applicant, appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 

The court confirmed that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the appeal despite a procedural discrepancy concerning the attachment of the decision’s certified copy, which was a photostat rather than an original. This was deemed sufficient to meet the statutory purpose of timely filing and precise identification of the decision.

Additionally, the court addressed procedural issues related to the appeal from the Zoning Board. Although the town clerk failed to properly transmit the appeal notice to the building inspector and board members, the Zoning Board had conducted a hearing with proper notice. There was no evidence of prejudice to any party or impediment to the appeal's progress. The court ruled that failures by public officials do not invalidate the tribunal's jurisdiction.

The appellant argues that the notice of appeal filed on July 24 was deficient as it lacked a recital of specific grounds. During a hearing on August 18, 1964, the town counsel highlighted this deficiency, leading the appellees to request a continuance, which was denied. Subsequently, on August 19, the appellees filed a second notice of appeal with the town clerk and requested to withdraw the July 24 appeal. The board denied this withdrawal request on September 12, stating that the July 24 appeal sufficiently indicated the grounds to inform interested parties and that the hearing on August 18 was comprehensive. The judge ruled that the statutory requirement of notice regarding the reasons for the appeal was substantially met through a letter from the attorney dated May 11, 1964, which objected to the permit based on land use in a single residence district. The court acknowledged that failure to meet statutory specifications could be prejudicial, but determined that this did not affect the board's jurisdiction over the appeal, as the appeal was timely filed within the statutory thirty-day period. There was no demonstrated prejudice resulting from the initial notice's defect. The second notice effectively amended the first within the appeal period, and the board's procedures were validated. Furthermore, the absence of an appeal within thirty days of the planning board's April 27, 1964 action on the parking plan did not invalidate the permit, as the indorsement confirmed compliance with the relevant by-law concerning parking facility plans.

Part VII A3 of the by-laws grants the Board of Appeals the authority to hear appeals concerning the Planning Board's refusals to approve lot subdivisions due to noncompliance with the by-law. Under General Laws c. 40A. 13, individuals aggrieved by decisions of administrative officials can appeal. The appeal made on July 24, 1964, challenged both the building inspector's permit issuance and the Planning Board's prior decision. The court determined that the first appealable decision was the building inspector's permit issuance, while the Planning Board's endorsement on the plan was merely a condition and not a formal decision.

The Planning Board's actions were deemed administrative, not a misuse of discretionary zoning power. Unlike cases where boards exercised discretion in permit issuance, here the Planning Board's role was to assess compliance with the by-law. The judge correctly ruled that a private access road for an apartment house parking lot was not allowed in a single residence district, as apartment house use is not permitted in such zones. The by-law explicitly states no changes in land use are allowed outside of listed permitted uses.

Consequently, the judge modified the final decree to annul the Board of Appeals' decision and the permit regarding the access road through the single residence district. The decree prohibits the road's use while it remains private land in a district where apartment houses are not allowed. The appellant may reapply for a permit for the parking lot with one access road, subject to Planning Board review as required by the by-law. Any implied intent by the board to allow such access was rejected, emphasizing that such considerations should be explicitly addressed in the by-law. The modified decree was affirmed.